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The Founders’ constitution—the one they had before the Revolution
and the one they fought the Revolution to preserve—was one in which
violence played a lawmaking role. An embrace of violence to assert
constitutional claims is worked deeply into our intellectual history and
culture. It was entailed upon us by the Founding generation, who
sincerely believed that people “are only as free as they deserve to be” and
that one could tell how much freedom people deserved by how much blood
they were willing to shed to obtain it. This constitutionalism of force
survived ratiﬁcation. Its legacy is a constitutional order that legitimizes
the violent assertion of rights, especially by groups of armed white men—
a legacy that showed itself in the Republican National Committee’s
statement that the January 6 Insurrection amounted to “legitimate
political discourse.” We must acknowledge this heritage and the pressure
it imposes on the rule of law if we are to survive today’s authoritarian
challenges to our democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
The insurrectionists who attacked the Capitol on January 6, 2021,
went to Washington, D.C. to assert a set of legal claims. Their claims were
primarily about who won the election,1 but they also asserted subsidiary
arguments about whose opinion on that question mattered2 and how disagreements ought to be settled.3 On each of these points, the rioters were
certain they were right. You might think that because the rioters were misinformed4 and their message unsophisticated, their constitutional ideas
don’t matter. But I worry that they matter a great deal. And I do not think
we can yet tell how much their beliefs will change our legal order.
In saying that the rioters’ beliefs about the constitution matter, I’m
not saying anything popular constitutionalism scholars haven’t been saying
these last twenty years or so. But I am saying it in a less happy, optimistic
1. See Nicholas Fandos & Emily Cochrane, After Pro-Trump Mob Storms Capitol,
Congress Conﬁrms Biden’s Win, N.Y. Times (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
01/06/us/politics/congress-gop-subvert-election.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
2. “Nobody voted for Joe Biden . . . ” followed by the sneer, directed at a Black police
officer defending the Capitol: “You hear that, guys, this nigger voted for Joe Biden.” January
6 Committee Meeting With Capitol and D.C. Police, C-SPAN, at 01:23 (July 27, 2021),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?513434-1/capitol-dc-police-testify-january-6-attack (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing testimony of
Officer Harry Dunn).
3. See Fandos & Cochrane, supra note 1.
4. The fact that the January 6 rioters were misinformed puts them in good company
with Americans of the Founding Era, as “[n]o one . . . can deny the prevalence of
conspiratorial fears among the Revolutionaries.” Gordon S. Wood, Conspiracy and the
Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century, 39 Wm. & Mary Q. 401, 403
(1982). Indeed, one historian has argued that the American Revolution is rooted in the
actions of “highly mobilized” disparate groups, each embracing “violent direct action on
the basis of false beliefs.” Jordan E. Taylor, What Pro-Trump Insurrectionists Share—and
Don’t—With the American Revolution, Wash. Post (Jan. 7, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/07/what-pro-trump-insurrectionists-sharedont-with-american-revolution/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Jordan E.
Taylor, Misinformation Nation: Foreign News and the Politics of Truth in Revolutionary
America (2022) (elaborating this thesis).
Instead, what most sets January 6 apart is what we are beginning to learn about the
involvement of the President himself, which has no precedent in American history. See Luke
Broadwater, ‘Trump Was at the Center’: Jan. 6 Hearing Lays Out Case in Vivid Detail, N.Y.
Times (June 9, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/us/politics/trump-jan-6hearings.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated June 11, 2022). That,
however, is a topic for another article.
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tone. And I will add that the many scholars who have elaborated upon
Larry Kramer’s central idea in The People Themselves have gotten popular
constitutionalism, as it has actually existed in American life, quite wrong,
primarily because they have failed to take violence seriously.5 Riot is not
only, as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously put it, “the language of the
unheard.”6 It has long been, and continues to be, the language of the
heard as well.7
The early literature of “popular constitutionalism” aimed to ennoble
and validate popular efforts to stir up the stasis and order of the American
5. Larry Kramer ended The People Themselves envisioning a Supreme Court that
showed the same deference to popular opinion that lower courts accord the Court “with an
awareness that there is a higher authority out there with power to overturn their decisions—
an actual authority, too, not some abstract ‘people’ who spoke once, two hundred years ago,
and then disappeared.” Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 253 (2004). We’ve had a chance to see how that would
work in practice—not at the Supreme Court but in Congress. In a proﬁle in the Atlantic,
Congressman Peter Meijer (R–Mich.) recalled:
When the Capitol was ﬁnally secured and members returned to the House
chamber, [he] expected an outraged, deﬁant House of Representatives
to vote in overwhelming numbers to certify the election results, sending a
message to the mob that Congress would not be scared away from
fulﬁlling its constitutional obligations. But as he began talking with his
colleagues, he was shocked to realize that more of them—perhaps far
more of them—were now preparing to object to the election results than
before the riot.
Tim Alberta, What the GOP Does to Its Own Dissenters, Atlantic (Dec. 7, 2021), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/01/peter-meijer-freshman-republicanimpeach/620844/ [https://perma.cc/LJ8T-3SQ7]. One member told Congressman Meijer
“that no matter his belief in the legitimacy of the election, he could no longer vote to certify
the results, because he feared for his family’s safety.” Id.
6. Interview by Mike Wallace with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (CBS television
broadcast Sept. 27, 1966); see also 60 Minutes Staff, MLK: A Riot Is the Language of the
Unheard, CBS News (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mlk-a-riot-is-thelanguage-of-the-unheard/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
7. Kramer’s The People Themselves rediscovered the eighteenth-century Whiggish
understanding of a constitution deﬁned, in part, by the people out-of-doors and suggested
that we use this as a model for modern constitutional regeneration. But the violence
somehow disappeared as he translated that tradition from its eighteenth-century origins to
modern life. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 249 (suggesting impeachment, budgetary
maneuvers, and other legislative solutions to judicial overreach—not tarring and
featherings, whippings, the stocks, the destruction of the officials’ homes, coerced
resignations in front of jeering crowds, or other eighteenth-century options). From the
beginning, critics needled Kramer for suggesting a theory that, they said, boiled down to
mob rule. But even those critics did not seem to take Kramer seriously enough to worry, as
I do, that “the people’s” methods are bloody, instead arguing primarily that the idea was
theoretically unsatisfying. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1622 (2005) (book review) (arguing that mobs
cannot continually sit, cannot claim to speak for all of the people, cannot make consistent
or reviewable decisions, and “cannot exercise authority; they can only exercise power”); L.A.
Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
855, 857 (2005) (book review).
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constitution—usually in progressive directions.8 But in rediscovering that
the American constitutional order is not static, this literature has ignored
one of the dominant mechanisms of change. The appeal to arms as a way
of validating legal arguments is worked deeply into our intellectual history
and culture. It was entailed upon us by our Founding generation, who sincerely believed that people “are only as free as they deserve to be” and,
relatedly, that one can tell how much freedom people deserve by how
much blood they were willing to shed to obtain it.9
The optimism of early popular constitutionalism scholarship built on
the work of so-called “neo-Whig” historians, the school dominated by Professors Bernard Bailyn, Edmund Morgan, and Gordon S. Wood, among
others.10 This is hardly surprising, as these were still the leading working
8. In a provocative 1988 article introducing a constitutional and historical argument
for popular amendment of the Constitution, Professor Akhil Amar argued that
“[i]ndividual rights, federalism, separation of powers, and ordinary representation all exist
under our Constitution, but they all derive from a higher source,” that is, “‘We the People
of the United States.’” Akhil Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1103–04 (1988). A few years later, Professor Bruce
Ackerman’s multivolume work developed a theory that throughout American history there
have indeed been “constitutional moments,” in which “We the People” have stood up in
defense of a new understanding of the Constitution, eventually changing its meaning. See
generally Bruce Ackerman, We the People (1991–2018) (highlighting moments in
American history that widened the franchise and expanded rights beyond the scope of the
constitution’s text). But, as Professor Randy Barnett later pointed out, having made the
“Second Reconstruction” of the 1960s one such constitutional moment, Ackerman refused
to see widespread popular mobilization against desegregation in the 1970s as
constitutionally signiﬁcant, describing it instead as the end of popular constitutional activity.
Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 Yale L.J. 2576, 2585 (2014).
Professor Reva Siegel’s work stands as an important exception to this progressive-only view
of when the “people’s” ideas should be thought “constitutional,” as she has increasingly
focused on the constitutional vitality of social movements on the right. See, e.g., Reva B.
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev.
191, 192–94 (2008) (exploring the social movement that preceded the decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller, 555 U.S. 570 (2008), examining how the “boundary between
constitutional law and constitutional politics has been negotiated”). But all of these scholars
have a blind spot when it comes to how violence has shaped the law.
9. This is Samuel Adams’s axiom from the Revolutionary era that “nations were as
free as they deserved to be.” François Furstenberg, Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy,
Virtue, and Resistance in Early American Political Discourse, 89 J. Am. Hist. 1295, 1295
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Benjamin Rush to John
Adams (July 20, 1812), in The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush,
1805–1813, at 234, 234 (John A. Schutz & Douglass Adair eds., 1966)).
10. This group of scholars has been given several labels, including “Whig” historians,
“consensus” school, and neo-Whig. See, e.g., Thomas P. Slaughter, Crowds in EighteenthCentury America: Reﬂections and New Directions, 115 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 3, 4–6
(1991) [hereinafter Slaughter, Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America] (discussing the
“Whig,” “neo-Whig,” or “consensus” interpretative perspective). All agree that “consensus
school” fairly points to Professor Richard Hofstadter and scholars grouped around his era
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historians when Professors Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Larry Kramer,
and the rest were ﬁrst developing their theories. And as neo-Whig history,
especially Wood’s Creation of the American Republic, remains the go-to
citation for Supreme Court opinions, it is, in a sense, our official state
narrative.11 One expects to ﬁnd it reﬂected in legal scholarship.12
and paradigm of thought, but Bailyn and Wood have also been regularly tarred with the
“consensus” epithet over the years. Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 Tex. L.
Rev. 755, 757 (2011). See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Bailyn, Ideological Origins]; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of
the American Republic 1776–1787 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Wood, Creation of the
American Republic].
11. Wood has not long been out of the Court’s mind over the past three decades. See
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 805 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Rucho v.
Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512 n.1 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Puerto Rico v.
Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1330–31 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Evenwel v. Abbott, 136
S. Ct. 1120, 1137, 1138–39 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 n.2 (2015); Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 117 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 356 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 768 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137, 151 & n.45, 155 n.50, 160, 164 n.58 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment)); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 826 n.38
(1995); id. at 911 (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995); Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 184 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Freytag v.
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991)); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883, 885; id. at 904 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of the American Revolution was an earlier favorite, only
recently giving way to Wood’s work in citation count. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 13 S. Ct.
2584, 2634 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 489 n.5
(2014); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 815 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353; Alden, 527 U.S. at
768, 799 & n.31 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 151 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 287, 288 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989), abrogated by Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 722 n.28 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 n.10 (1982);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.18 (1982); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 n.8
(1979). Bailyn’s work as an editor of primary sources was cited passim in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997); id. at 946 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Thornton, 514 U.S.
at 813 n.23, 814 n.26, 820 & n.30, 821 n.31, 825 n.36, 826 n.40, 833 n.47; id. at 880 n.17
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See Driver, supra note 10, at 759–67 (describing the rise and fall of the consensus
school in history departments and regretting that “the widespread embrace of” the conﬂict
counternarrative “within the history department has yet to migrate across campus to the law
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But the view of the neo-Whig school is not neutral.13 A theme of neoWhig history is that the American Revolution unleashed, in Bailyn’s words,
a “contagion of liberty,” subjecting slavery and the other injustices of its
day to “severe pressure” and advancing a “spirit of . . . idealism” at a
“rapid, irreversible, and irresistible” pace.14 Morgan taught the “American
Revolution” as Americans’ “noble,” “daring,” and “successful” “search” for
“nothing more or less than the principle of human equality”—“a discovery
that would turn the course of history in a new direction . . . and liberate us
from our past as it was soon to liberate them.”15 Wood, Bailyn’s student,
emphasized the thought of the Federalists because, he explained, “the
Federalists’ intellectual achievement really transcended their particular
political and social intentions” and “embodied what Americans had been
groping towards from the beginning of their history.”16 Wood argued that
Federalist ideas would endure and underpin a distinctly “American System
of Government,”17 even as those ideas were “adopted and expanded by
others.”18 One aspect of the Founders’ genius, Wood insisted, was that they
“institutionalized and legitimized revolution,” such that “new knowledge”
could be incorporated into governance “without resorting to violence.”19
This view of history must be understood as an artifact of a particular
moment. In the 1950s and 1960s, Americans expressed a higher degree of

school”); Christopher Tomlins, The Consumption of History in the Legal Academy: Science
and Synthesis, Perils and Prospects, 61 J. Legal Educ. 139, 144–45 (2011) (book review)
(describing how useful Bailyn’s and Wood’s histories have been, ﬁrst to liberal legal
academics and then to conservative politicians and lawyers).
13. No works of history are. A journalist once asked Eric Foner, the acclaimed Civil
War historian, “[W]hen did historians stop relating facts and start all this revising of
interpretations of the past?” He replied, “Around the time of Thucydides.” Eric Foner, Who
Owns History? Rethinking the Past in a Changing World, at xvii (2003). Historians strive to
tell a true story about the past, but in choosing some facts to emphasize and build into a
coherent narrative, we suppress available alternatives. We do our best to characterize the
past truthfully, knowing that other historians with equal integrity will make different
choices. We welcome well-constructed and deeply researched alternatives when they come
because the competing iterations build together toward something like the true complexity
of the past. Of course, I do not mean to “imply that all historical arguments are created
equal” or that historians “stand helpless” unable “to distinguish divergent accounts.”
William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in American Public
Law, 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 623, 628.
14. Bailyn, Ideological Origins, supra note 10, at 230–32, 246.
15. Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763–89, at 3, 66 (4th ed. 2013).
To be sure, the spirit of optimism pervading these works was not naiveté. It was an effort to
tell a story about the survival of a republican aspiration to gradualist, nonviolent, pluralistic
social change, and these works’ relative optimism must be read in light of the recent
conclusion of a war against authoritarianism (my thanks to Norm Silber for this insight).
16. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 593–615 (emphasis
omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 614.
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trust in their government than at any other point since.20 Victory in World
War II gave the nation a coherent, if not messianic, idea of American culture and destiny. An all-consuming battle against Soviet ideology then
encouraged intellectual efforts to prove the integrity of the American
political project.21 A muscular administrative state had yet to fall under the
relentless attack of the 1980s, and it seemed that the Federalists’ vision—
Alexander Hamilton’s vision—for American empire was ascendant.22 The
successes of the Civil Rights movement, ﬁrst in Brown v. Board and then the
Civil Rights Act, emboldened historians to downplay the horror of slavery
as a doomed theme.23 It is in that context that the cheerful, triumphant
neo-Whig version of American history emerged.24 These historians tried to
20. Pew Rsch. Ctr., Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government 18
(2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-19582015/ [https://perma.cc/KT6L-8NCV].
21. See Alfred F. Young & Gregory H. Nobles, Whose American Revolution Was It?
Historians Interpret the Founding 48–51 (2011) (quoting a 1949 American Historical
Association presidential address that “[t]otal war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone
and calls upon everyone to assume his part”).
22. See Robert L. Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and the Concept of Rights, 92 Yale
L.J. 1174, 1178–79 (1983) (describing the expansion of the administrative state); see also
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of
American Administrative Law 29 (2012) (“The Federalist or Hamiltonian wing of the
founding generation was keenly aware of the need to create a government with broad
authority that could command the respect and the loyalty of the populace.”).
23. See Young & Nobles, supra note 21, at 57–58 (discussing Edmund Morgan’s deﬁcits
on this score). Those scholars who discussed race more directly during the 1960s were “like
the white mainstream culture from which most of them came and to which most of them
spoke, less concerned with blacks themselves than with white attitudes and responses toward
blacks.” Peter H. Wood, “I Did the Best I Could for My Day”: The Study of Early Black
History During the Second Reconstruction, 1960 to 1976, 35 Wm. & Mary Q. 185, 189
(1978). And how could it be otherwise? In historical accounts concerned with the white
citizen’s “inevitable” realization of his nation’s majestic core values of liberty and equality,
the Black American can only be an inert object—any amelioration of his position is but
evidence of others’ moral progress. In 1968, in his Presidential Address, the leader of the
Organization of American Historians warned against African Americans’ insistence “on
visibility, if not overvisibility, in the textbooks,” a project that could “win little support from
true scholarship.” Id. at 218–19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas A.
Bailey, The Mythmakers of American History, 55 J. Am. Hist. 5, 7–8 (1968)). “The luckless
African-Americans while in slavery were essentially in jail; and we certainly would not write
the story of a nation in terms of its prison population.” Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bailey, supra, at 8).
24. Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical Hamilton, which opened during the Obama
presidency, is like the neo-Whig history in that it emerged in another moment of optimism.
It barely mentions slavery, uses actors of color as the Patriot Founders, and casts white actors
for the Loyalists and King George. It thereby associates the “freedom” and “liberty” that the
American Patriots fought for with the freedom struggles of Black and brown peoples against
white supremacist and colonial regimes. Many of those Patriot Founders, however, owned
slaves or otherwise participated in or proﬁted from Black slavery, a vast system of kidnapping
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gather a compelling narrative from the mass of information in the past
and make it advance sensibly toward their present. This is not a criticism
of their work; that is the historian’s craft.
We’re writing in a different context now. Armed groups have surrounded state legislatures to intimidate them into passing or rescinding legislation.25
and torture and rape. The actual historical ﬁgures Hamilton depicts knew that slavery was
wrong but founded a nation with slavery at its heart anyway. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery
and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant With Death, in Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 188, 193–97
(Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987). The musical’s
innovative casting works an insidious erasure of that history. This was not, of course, the
playwright’s intention. There was a poignant moment soon after the transition to the Trump
presidency that seemed to highlight that the optimism or, perhaps, the complacency of the
Obama years had always been important context supporting the show’s ebullient message.
See Christopher Mele & Patrick Healy, ‘Hamilton’ Had Some Unscripted Lines for Pence.
Trump Wasn’t Happy., N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/19/us/mike-pence-hamilton.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). With
Vice President Mike Pence in the audience, the cast of Hamilton evidently did not feel that
the show, by itself, did enough to represent their “American values,” including their stance
on the “inalienable rights” of “diverse America.” Id.
25. See Mike Baker, Armed Protesters Angry Over Virus Restrictions Try to Force Their
Way Into the Oregon Statehouse., N.Y. Times (June 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/21/world/oregon-coronavirus-protests.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting that armed protesters tried to enter the Oregon State Capitol in December 2020
to object to COVID-19 restrictions); Katelyn Burns, Armed Protesters Entered Michigan’s
State Capitol During Rally Against Stay-At-Home Order, Vox (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/4/30/21243462/armed-protesters-michigancapitol-rally-stay-at-home-order [https://perma.cc/K3US-A3EH] (reporting that armed
protestors entered the Michigan Capitol to protest Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s shelterat-home order); Bill Chappell, Richmond Gun Rally: Thousands of Gun Owners Converge
on Virginia Capitol on MLK Day, NPR (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/20/
797895183/richmond-gun-rally-thousands-of-gun-owners-converge-on-virginia-capitol-onmlk-d [https://perma.cc/G7ZC-MSE8] (reporting that thousands of gun owners and
armed militia members gathered at the Virginia State Capitol to protest new gun
restrictions); John D’Anna, As Nation Braces for Armed Protests, Arizona Showcases How
First and Second Amendments Intersect—or Collide, azcentral (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2021/01/16/armed-protestsarizona-ﬁrst-and-second-amendments-intersect/4183132001/ [https://perma.cc/DWS4WWNW] (reporting that armed protesters gathered outside the Arizona Capitol to protest
the results of the 2020 presidential election); Katie Hall, Armed Gun Rights Activists Gather
at Texas Capitol, Say Protest Is ‘Not About the Election’, Austin American-Statesman (Jan.
17, 2021), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/01/17/protests-austin-capitoltexas-live-updates-election-2020/4182139001/ [https://perma.cc/6VDM-GBQ4] (last
updated Jan. 18, 2021) (reporting that about one hundred protestors, many of them armed,
gathered outside the Texas Capitol to support gun rights); Stephanie Lai, Luke Broadwater
& Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Confront a Rise in Threats and Intimidation, and Fear Worse,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/us/politics/violentthreats-lawmakers.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Grant Schulte, Activists With
Assault Riﬂes Stir Fears at Nebraska Capitol, AP News (Feb. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/
article/88b9dd6f34d930704273bd03fa0835f8 [https://perma.cc/9ZZ7-66XZ] (reporting
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This behavior has gone unpunished.26 Anti-government extremists laid a
months-long plot to kidnap a state governor.27 Elected officials regularly
receive death threats, and their homes and the homes of public health
officials are picketed by armed men.28 A growing percentage of Americans
that protesters entered the Nebraska Capitol in February 2020 with loaded, semi-automatic
riﬂes to protest proposed restrictions on gun ownership); Shauna Sowersby & David
Kroman, Armed Protesters in Olympia Occupy Capitol Steps, Governor’s Mansion Lawn,
Crosscut (Jan. 6, 2021), https://crosscut.com/politics/2021/01/armed-protesters-olympiaoccupy-capitol-steps-governors-mansion-lawn [https://perma.cc/4Z3Y-9DA5] (reporting
that hundreds of armed protesters occupied the steps of the Washington State Capitol
demanding the results of the November election be overturned); Ben Tobin, At Kentucky
Capitol, You Can Open Carry a Gun . . . But Don’t Conceal Those Umbrellas, Courier J.
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2020/01/
08/kentucky-state-capitol-photo-circulates-men-guns/2843722001/ [https://perma.cc/RZ96HGDE] (last updated Jan. 9, 2020) (reporting that gun owners entered the capitol rotunda
in Kentucky to protest proposed restrictions on gun restrictions).
26. See, e.g., Jeremy Kohler, “Sense of Entitlement”: Rioters Faced Few Consequences
Invading State Capitols. No Wonder They Turned to the U.S. Capitol Next., ProPublica
(Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/sense-of-entitlement-rioters-faced-noconsequences-invading-state-capitols-no-wonder-they-turned-to-the-u-s-capitol-next
[https://perma.cc/6SZG-ZVXC] (reporting that few, if any, charges were ﬁled in several
state capitol invasions).
27. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Shaila Dewan & Kathleen Gray, F.B.I. Says Michigan
Anti-Government Group Plotted to Kidnap Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/us/gretchen-whitmer-michigan-militia.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Apr. 13, 2021).
28. See Bill Chappell, Michigan Secretary of State Says Armed Protestors Descended
on Her Home Saturday, NPR (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/biden-transitionupdates/2020/12/07/943820889/michigan-secretary-of-state-says-armed-protesters-descendedon-her-home-saturday [https://perma.cc/E5KC-MVSP] (showing armed protestors at the
home of the Michigan secretary of state in December 2020); Amy Donaldson, Anti-Mask
Protestors Target State Epidemiologist Dr. Angela Dunn, Deseret News (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.deseret.com/utah/2020/10/29/21540624/anti-mask-protesters-target-stateepidemiologist-dr-angela-dunn [https://perma.cc/U8FB-RBRG] (showing protestors
targeted the home of Utah’s state epidemiologist); Pete Grieve, Gunshot Struck Front Door
of Ohio Assistant Medical Director’s Residence, Spectrum News 1 (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://spectrumnews1.com/oh/columbus/news/2021/01/25/mary-kate-francis-ohiodepartment-of-health-shots-fired-residence-home [https://perma.cc/W9RT-T6X3] (reporting
that a gunshot struck the front door of an Ohio public health official’s home); Gary
Horcher, Protestors Break Through Gates at Governor’s Mansion in Olympia, Storm to
Front Door, KIRO 7 (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/protesters-breakthrough-gates-governors-mansion-olympia/C5EC7W2MCZBKRA6RFCEJMSRYCE/
[https://perma.cc/Z3D6-67LP] (reporting that armed protestors broke through the gates
of Washington’s governor’s mansion and quoting one protestor saying, “We pay for this
mansion, so yeah we’re taking it over”); Bob Jacob, Protestors Gather Outside of Dr. Amy
Acton’s Home, Clev. Jewish News (May 3, 2020), https://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/
news/local_news/protesters-gather-outside-of-dr-amy-acton-s-home/article_fc0a516c-8d7b11ea-b3ef-fbbfcd2244ef.html [https://perma.cc/VYP8-54MF] (showing, in May 2020,
armed protestors gathered outside of the home of the director of Ohio’s Department of
Health); KOIN 6 News Staff, Photos: Armed Protestors Gather in Front of Gov. Brown’s
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now believe that force is justiﬁed to make political change.29 In this
context, it no longer makes sense to celebrate America as exceptional
because we have discovered how to engage in politics “without resorting
to violence.”30 Instead, it makes more sense to ask: What is the path that
led us here?
There are more than enough signs, for those looking to ﬁnd them,
that violence has been an integral part of the American system of government from the Founding era. That is because we are the inheritors of not
one constitutional tradition from that era but two. One is a constitutionalism of institutions created by text along with a practice of turning to
those institutions to resolve political differences.31 We have been taught to
understand that this is the end-all-be-all. But that’s not right.
We are also the inheritors of the Founders’ unwritten constitutional
tradition. And under the unwritten constitution of their upbringing, the
Residence, KOIN 6 (Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.koin.com/news/oregon/photos-armedprotesters-gather-in-front-of-gov-browns-house/ [https://perma.cc/22XV-JYJM] (showing
armed protestors in front of the Oregon governor’s home); Siobhan Lopez, Sununu Says
Inauguration Ceremony Canceled Because of Concerns Over Armed Protestors, WMUR 9
(Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.wmur.com/article/chris-sununu-2021-inauguration-canceled/
35097969# [https://perma.cc/M4HG-KZ9J] (reporting the New Hampshire governor’s
announcement cancelling his outdoor inauguration due to armed protestors gathering
outside his home for several weeks, including one individual who was arrested in his
backyard with over two dozen rounds of ammunition); Jake Zuckerman, Pandemic Brings
Protests, and Guns, to Officials’ Personal Homes, Ohio Cap. J. (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2021/01/27/pandemic-brings-protests-and-guns-to-officialspersonal-homes/ [https://perma.cc/EN2A-TUTH] (reporting that armed protestors
gathered at a former Ohio congresswoman’s home); see also Camryn Justice, Protestors
Allegedly Supporting Trump Gather Outside State Rep. Weinstein’s Hudson Home, ABC
News 5 Clev. (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/democracy-2020/
ohio-politics/protesters-allegedly-supporting-trump-gather-outside-state-rep-weinsteinshudson-home [https://perma.cc/6FGM-YDCZ] (last updated Jan. 25, 2022) (showing
protestors at the home of Ohio Representative Casey Weinstein).
29. See Rachel Kleinfeld, The Rise of Political Violence in the United States, 32 J.
Democracy 160, 167 (2021) (ﬁnding that the percentage of Democrats and Republicans
who believed that violence was sometimes justiﬁed to advance their political goals
approximately doubled from 2017 to 2020); Larry Diamond, Lee Drutman, Tod Lindberg,
Nathan P. Kalmoe & Lilliana Mason, Opinion, Americans Increasingly Believe Violence Is
Justiﬁed if the Other Side Wins, Politico (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/
magazine/2020/10/01/political-violence-424157 [https://perma.cc/8N9X-PGB6] (last
updated Oct. 9, 2020) (ﬁnding that “the willingness of Democrats and Republicans alike to
justify violence as a way to achieve political goals has essentially been rising in lockstep,”
such that 26% of Americans with a strong political affiliation are “quite willing to endorse
violence if the other party wins the presidency”); see also Robert Pape, Why We Cannot
Afford to Ignore the American Insurrectionist Movement, Chi. Project on Sec. & Threats
(Aug. 6, 2021), https://cpost.uchicago.edu/research/domestic_extremism/why_we_cannot_
afford_to_ignore_the_american_insurrectionist_movement/ [https://perma.cc/42UZ-UBNU]
(concluding from a survey that “the insurrectionist movement is more mainstream, crossparty, and more complex than many people might like to think”).
30. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 613–14.
31. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
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Founders made claims through action, won rights through usage, and
maintained rights through uninterrupted custom.32 This Article demonstrates that under a constitution thus deﬁned through praxis, violence
formed a part of the legal lexicon. It was not just that people at times
resorted to violence to get their way; British North Americans belonged to
communities that recognized violence as a means of making legal
arguments and preserving legal norms.33
The Federalists tried to replace this constitution of community consensus, of praxis, of action, and of force, with a written constitution. Their
accomplishment, the neo-Whig historians taught us (skipping over the
Civil War, which was not their period of expertise), was that we would
thereafter ﬁght out our controversies at the ballot box or in court.34 A written constitution was supposed to conﬁne constitutional claimsmaking to
text and institutions.35 Neo-Whig historians and their students have
described the Founding moment as the triumphant establishment by the
era’s elite of this ordered system, one so bloodless and rational that we can
still discern its outlines and parse its Framers’ intentions by looking at the
text they set down.36 But this Article argues that the Federalists were not
able to suppress or to fully transform Americans’ constitutionalism of force.
The constitutionalism of force endures. Even as our institutional
traditions have grown more dominant over the centuries, it is nonetheless
impossible to fully account for the ordering of our society or for the
interpretation of the textual Constitution without also understanding that
32. As I have previously argued, “[H]aving grown up as Britons, and having lost friends
and family in a war to defend their rights as such, they” would continue to think “of
themselves as the beneﬁciaries of a constitution of customary right.” Farah Peterson,
Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, 106 Va. L. Rev. 559, 565 (2020) [hereinafter
Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places].
33. These competing traditions are well-represented in the architecture of our
Supreme Court building. Text engraved on its architrave proclaims, “Equal Justice Under
Law,” while just underneath, the brass doors show King John sealing the Magna Carta
following his defeat to the Rebel Barons at Runnymede. Building Features, Sup. Ct. of the
U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/buildingfeatures.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL9DVC4X] (last visited July 26, 2022); Magna Carta, Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/featured-documents/magna-carta [https://perma.cc/CC8U-NMGH] (last visited July
26, 2022). Each of these architectural elements, both the textual truism and the pictorial
origin story, have become a sort of anodyne pap for the ﬁrst-year law student. But as
constitutional philosophy, these sentiments are in opposition. Equal justice, the system of
text- and precedent-based law that gives to each claimant the same principled answer, is not
compatible with a system that awards rights to those few who win by force of arms. If these
elements both belong on the face of the Supreme Court building, it is because of that
tension. Together they help to express a contradiction at the core of our legal culture.
34. See, e.g., Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 614
(“Americans had in fact institutionalized and legitimized revolution . . . . [N]ew knowledge
about the nature of government could be converted into concrete form without resorting
to violence.”).
35. See id. at 613–15.
36. See, e.g., id.
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violence has at times fueled the Constitution’s evolution and deﬁned the
limits of constitutional amendment by more formal means. The Ku Klux
Klan’s campaign of terror deﬁned the scope of the Reconstruction
Amendments more than its framers’ intentions did,37 a scope formalized
after the fact in Plessy v. Ferguson.38
If America has a constitutional order that has endured since the
Founding moment, that order is a blend of text and violence. The
Founders’ legitimation of violence is not a point of historical interest that
has since been “ﬁxed” and safely resolved. Resort to violence to resolve
constitutional questions has instead been a recurring theme, one that is
not as acute in every era but that resurfaces frequently. When it does, it
poses a serious threat to the rule of law system and the institutional traditions we have nurtured and strengthened over the course of our history.
We have inherited the Federalists’ failures, and these days we may feel
them even more keenly than the Federalists’ many successes. Violent
movements have power to change our constitutional order. As a result, we
are now in a time as precarious and as open to inﬂuence as any of the other
key moments in our country’s formation.
I. ORIGIN STORY
The Founders’ constitution—the one they had before the Revolution,
the one they fought to preserve in the Revolution, and the one they
maintained afterward—was a constitution in which violence played a
37. See John Patrick Daly, The War After the War: A New History of Construction 3–4
(2022) (arguing that the “complete triumph of white supremacist military forces in 1877
settled many of the open issues of the legacy of the earlier Civil War,” and “ex-Confederate
extremists, with their military action,” also “crippled” each of the Reconstruction
Amendments in the South); Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political
Struggles in the Rural South From Slavery to the Great Migration 266 (2003) (observing
that “[b]etter than anyone,” the freed slaves in the South “understood that the rites of
democracy had been built on rituals of violence and suppression directed against them,”
and “[j]ust as “[p]aramilitary organization” had been central to slavery, “it remained
fundamental to the social and political order of freedom”); id. at 265–313 (discussing the
martial efforts Southern Black Americans undertook in order to participate in democracy
and the rise of paramilitary organizations like the Klan devoted to suppressing Black
participation); see also Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—
and Vice-Versa, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1585, 1587–90, 1592–93, 1602–03 (2012) (describing
how historical writing of Reconstruction, which valorized the Ku Klux Klan, inﬂuenced the
Supreme Court to limit the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments). See generally Eric
Foner, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the
Constitution (2019).
38. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), the Court held that “[t]he object”
of the Fourteenth Amendment “was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the
two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political,
equality.” But critical issues, including what the “nature of things” consisted in and whether
“social” equality was a reasonable goal, were decided outside of the courthouse by
paramilitary groups.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4245352

2022]

OUR CONSTITUTIONALISM OF FORCE

1551

legitimate role. This is not to say that textual and hermeneutical
arguments were unimportant; it is only to recover that violence also made
for valid legal argument under the constitution of the Founders’
upbringing. They had a “constitutionalism of force,” by which I mean a
legal culture in which some nongovernmental groups’ recourse to
violence to make claims could be understood or later ratiﬁed as legitimate
and lawlike, rather than extralegal or seditious. Those groups’ use of force
could also establish legal rights and answer unsettled constitutional
questions for the community going forward.39
In this Part, as I explain what I mean when I say that the Founders had
a constitutionalism of force, I will also address the most obvious
counterargument—that I am describing tendencies that the Founders
abhorred and tried to guard against, in part by erecting barriers against
democracy and what they called a “Spirit of Licentiousness.”40 One wants
to believe that what I am describing is not American culture at all, but
American counterculture, and that this is not American constitutionalism,
but the constitutional phantasms of the dispossessed and the fringe
members of society, our rejects. And so, as I describe what I am calling the
Founders’ constitutionalism of force, I will also attend to what historians
have said about class cleavages and the Founders’ supposed fastidiousness
about violence.
39. I am not using the word “constitution” to describe a system of fundamental law or
a restraint on the arbitrary or willful uses of power. I am instead using “constitution”
descriptively, to discuss how society is constituted. This Article’s use of the word differs,
therefore, from the modern law dictionary deﬁnition. See Constitution, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (deﬁning “Constitution,” in part, as “the fundamental and
organic law of a country or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, deﬁnes the scope of government sovereign powers, and guarantees individual rights
and civil liberties”). This Article’s usage also differs from that of the early twentieth-century
British jurist Albert Venn Dicey, who deﬁned “Constitutional law” as “all rules which directly
or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power of the state,”
because this Article’s use of “constitution” takes into view coercive, custom-enforcing, and
norm-setting relationships that are not typically thought of as aspects of sovereign or state
power. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 22 (8th ed.
1915); see also Stephen Holmes, Foreword to András Sajó, Limiting Government: An
Introduction to Constitutionalism, at ix–x (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press trans., 1999) (deﬁning
constitutions as restraints on power). On the complicated and multivarious modern deﬁnitions of constitution and constitutionalism, see Tom Ginsburg, David Landau & Mila
Versteeg, Comparative Constitutional Law: A Global and Interdisciplinary Approach
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2–8) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). For
important thoughts on the origins of the Founders’ other constitutional traditions, including textual constitutionalism and the division of government power among institutions, see
generally Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (2011);
Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397 (2019).
40. Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the
Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776, at 22 (1974) [hereinafter
Maier, From Resistance to Revolution] (citing Letter from John Jay to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 27, 1786), in 10 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 22 June to 31 December 1786, at
488, 488 (Julian P. Boyd, Mina R. Bryan & Fredrick Aandahl eds., 1954)).
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I am crediting, as part of our constitutional heritage, the ideas of a
range of thinkers of America’s late eighteenth century, including incipient
Federalists, Anti-Federalists, and also a third group of men, often lumped
with the Anti-Federalists, who held more egalitarian ideas than the elite
representatives of Anti-Federalism we usually study.41 All of these men
thought that violence could create good law. In discussing all of them, I
am straying from the fashion for picking out a theme in the intellectual
tradition of elite Federalists,42 a scholarly trend which makes for far more
orderly writing and is also so useful to the history-inclined sensibilities of
modern jurisprudence. My history is more unwieldy—and less reassuring.
One might hope that a chronology that begins in the mid-eighteenth
century and proceeds through the Revolution, Shays’ Rebellion,
Ratiﬁcation, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries’s Rebellion would end on a
note of triumph for the Federalists, who would have captured some claim
to a monopoly of violence and ﬁnally rejected popular insurrections
against positive law as transgressive and illegitimate. This, however, is not
our story. Including more voices makes more sense of the tradition that
emerged, viewed in its totality.
A.

The Urgency of Early American Constitutional Thought

We now tend to emphasize aspects of eighteenth-century constitutional culture that were inventive, forward looking, and revolutionary. But
British North Americans had a self-congratulatory legal culture and,
before the war, all but the truly radical seemed to believe that their existing
constitution was the “hapiest in the World, found on Maxims of consummate Wisdom.”43 They believed, with Voltaire, that it had “not been
without some difficulty that liberty ha[d] been established in England, and
the idol of arbitrary power ha[d] been drowned in seas of blood.”44 All that
bloodshed, furthermore, had not been “too high a price.”45
British North Americans could not rest on the achievements of prior
generations, however, because their “constitution” was not a blueprint for
government or a mission statement as ours is. Instead, they used the word
descriptively, to compass how their society was constituted, including “that
assemblage of laws, institutions and customs . . . according to which the
41. See Saul Cornell, Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Back-Country AntiFederalism, 76 J. Am. Hist. 1148, 1149–50 (1990) (describing a “distinctive populist variant
of Anti-Federalist ideology” that was shaped by elite antagonism).
42. See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 721, 725–28 (2013).
43. The Connecticut Resolves, October 25, 1765, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution:
Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766, at 54, 54 (Edmund S. Morgan
ed., 1959) [hereinafter Prologue to Revolution].
44. Voltaire, Of the Parliament, in 13 The Works of M. de Voltaire 68, 71 (T. Smollett
& T. Francklin eds., 1762).
45. Id.
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community hath agreed to be governed.”46 As such, a government infraction of rights, if unresisted, was nothing less than a redeﬁnition of the constitutional order. During the Stamp Act crisis and the other confrontations
with Britain in the 1760s, this understanding of the constitution generated
a tremendous sense of urgency.47 When other appeals failed, colonists
believed that force was necessary to preserve their freedoms.
The constitution was the community’s consensus about its customs,
duties, privileges, rules, and procedures, as expressed through ongoing
praxis.48 The importance of community consensus explains many aspects
of eighteenth-century legal thought: the law-ﬁnding jury, for instance,49 as
well as British North Americans’ intense localism.50 The explicit legal point
most debated in pamphlet literature before the American Revolution was
whether adequate representation was possible in a distant legislative
body.51 This makes sense because distance meaningfully limited the range
over which it was possible to maintain communities of shared culture. The
basis of the constitution in consensus also explains the force behind the
frequent argument that a privilege or immunity had persisted from “time
immemorial,” which was not just an argument that a practice should be
accorded dignity because of its antiquity.52 An assertion of continuous
46. From the Craftsman, Boston-Gazette & Country J., Oct. 12, 1767, at 3 (discussing
the difference between constitution and government); see also Bernard Bailyn, Power and
Liberty: A Theory of Politics, in 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776, at 38,
45 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965) [hereinafter Bailyn, Power and Liberty] (deﬁning British
North Americans’ constitution as “the constituted—that is, existing—arrangement of
governmental institutions, laws, and customs together with the principles and goals that
animated them”).
47. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text.
48. Jack P. Greene, Law and the Origins of the American Revolution, in 1 The
Cambridge History of Law in America 447, 470 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins
eds., 2008) (“[I]n the context of British and British-American legal traditions, law in the
1760s and 1770s was still as much thought of as custom and community consensus as
sovereign command.”).
49. See John Adams, Adams’ Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1
Legal Papers of John Adams 228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)
(opining that a juror should use his own judgment even if it goes against the
recommendation of the judge, as the “great Principles of the Constitution, are intimately
known, they are sensibly felt by every Briton”).
50. See J.R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American
Republic 339–42 (1971) (discussing localism as a political tradition and strategy for
Revolutionary organization).
51. See Authentic Account of the Proceedings of the Congress Held at New-York in
1765, on the Subject of the American Stamp Act 6 (n.p. 1767) [hereinafter Proceedings of
the Congress Held at New-York] (“That the people of these colonies are not, and, from their
local circumstances, cannot be, represented in the House of Commons in Great-Britain.”).
52. One sees this argument everywhere, but to pick a relevant series of examples, we
ﬁnd it in every single colony’s official remonstrance to Parliament over the Stamp Act.
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practice also represented the acquiescence of many Britons—in essence,
the continuing consent of a larger community over time.53 Any change
would therefore be met with resistance from those who had come to enjoy
privileges that had accrued by prescription, like property rights, under the
law as it stood.54
Because the word “constitution” described the existing arrangement
of society, eighteenth-century thinkers sometimes used the word to
describe Britain’s celebrated balance of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.55 Among groups whose circumstances bred a certain natural
antagonism, however, that balance was constantly at risk, and the greatest
threat to the constitution was man’s tendency to aggrandize his own
power.56 “Such is the ‘depravity of mankind,’” warned Samuel Adams,
“‘that ambition and lust of power above the law are . . . predominant
Prologue to Revolution, supra note 43, at 47–62 (printing the colonies’ remonstrances to
Parliament over the Stamp Act); see also Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted: Or, a
More Impartial and Comprehensive View of the Dispute Between Great-Britain and the
Colonies 10 (New York, 1775).
53. Reﬂecting on the great difficulty that English legal scholars have had coming up
with rational explanations justifying their assertions over the ages that English law is the best
law, the historian J.G.A. Pocock once pointed out that “custom is the fruit of experience,
operating at the lowest and least articulate level of intelligence, that of trial and error. Only
experience can establish it; only experience can know it to be good,” and “it necessarily
rests on the experience of countless other men in past generations, of which the custom
itself is the expression. Custom therefore is self-validating . . . .” J.G.A. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
17–18 (1975).
54. See Greene, supra note 48, at 469–70 (describing the use of “force and
intimidation to prevent the enforcement of metropolitan laws contrary to local customs and
interests”).
55. Following this pattern of breaking the constitution into taxonomical elements,
John Adams compared it to the “Constitution of the human Body,” which included “a
certain Contexture of Nerves, ﬁbres, Muscles, or certain Qualities of the Blood and Juices”
and whose end was life and health. 1 Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 296–97 (L.
H. Butterﬁeld ed., 1961). Government was “a Frame, a scheme, a system, a Combination of
Powers,” including those of “the King, the Lords, the Commons, and the People.” Id. at
297–98. Its purpose was “Liberty.” Id. at 298. For a witty and learned essay tracing the rise
and fall of the idea of the balanced constitution in British and eighteenth-century American
thought, and also arguing that it should be seen as part of a larger intellectual fad for a
priori historical reasoning, see generally Stanley Pargellis, The Theory of Balanced
Government, in The Constitution Reconsidered 37 (Conyers Read ed., 1938). For a broader
work tying the “balanced constitution” to the development of British institutions in the
eighteenth century and showing its overlap and interaction with earlier notions of the mixed
constitution, as well as new ideas about separation of powers, see generally M.J.C. Vile,
Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967).
56. See The Nature and Extent of Parliamentary Power Considered, in Some Remarks
Upon Mr. Pitt’s Speech in the House of Commons, Previous to the Repeal of the Stamp-Act,
Boston-Gazette & Country J., Feb. 15, 1768, at 2 (“In mixt forms of government . . . jealous
fears frequently intervene, upon the slightest appearance of irregularity . . . lest a designing
minister should extend the prerogative of the crown, or an artful commoner increase the
liberty of the subject. A few thousands added to the military list, have alarmed the whole
nation . . . .”).
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passions in the breasts of most men.’”57 Pastor Zabdiel Adams thought that
“the united considerations of reason and religion” had never been enough
“to restrain these lusts.”58 These temptations “combined the worst passions
of the human heart and the worst projects of the human mind in league
against the liberties of mankind.”59 Institutions of government were prone
to overreach as well, as “avarice, pride, malice, envy, and a love of power”
always motivate “established bodies in government, so long as men are
men.”60 Therefore, “the least attempt upon public Liberty” must be
opposed immediately because “if it is suffered once, it will be apt to be
repeated often; a few repetitions create a habit; habit claims prescription
and right.”61
To say that the constitution is descriptive and made up of rights that
accrue through use, like property rights, and to add that men are power
hungry and grasping by nature, is to point out a terrible vulnerability.
Because men were fallible and because the constitution was whatever the
community assented to over time, the constitution was especially

57. Bailyn, Power and Liberty, supra note 46, at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting
Samuel Adams); see also id. at 38–41, 39 n.3, 40 nn.4–5, 41 n.6 (collecting quotes and
sources on the eighteenth-century obsession with the problem of man’s lust for power).
58. Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting pastor Zabdiel Adams); see
also Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British
Colonies, for the Purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament 58 (North America,
2d ed. 1765) (“Mankind are generally so fond of Power, that they are oftner tempted to
exercise it beyond the Limits of Justice, than induced to set bounds to it . . . .”); Letter to
the Editor, Bos. Evening-Post, Dec. 9, 1765, at 1 [hereinafter Dec. 1765 Letter to the Editor,
Bos. Evening-Post] (“Power is of a tenacious Nature: What it seizes it will retain.”).
59. Bailyn, Power and Liberty, supra note 46, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting pastor Oliver Noble); see also Bailyn, Ideological Origins, supra note 10, at 60–61
n.6 (collecting quotes on this theme).
60. Obadiah Hulme, An Historical Essay on the English Constitution: Or, an Impartial
Inquiry Into the Elective Power of the People, From the First Establishment of the Saxons
in This Kingdom 140 (London, 1771). While historians have found that lower-class radical
political movements in the American colonies seem to have been less interested, overall, in
“balance” and more optimistic about man’s basic goodness, popular movements had their
own version of these anxious ruminations about the vices of men, focusing on the
corruptions of wealth instead of place. See Edward Countryman, “Out of the Bounds of the
Law”: Northern Land Rioters in the Eighteenth Century, in The American Revolution:
Explorations in the History of American Radicalism 37, 49 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1976)
[hereinafter The American Revolution] (quoting Moss Kent and William Prendergast that
“poor men were always oppressed by the rich,” and, as a result, “there is no law for poor
men”). As much of the shared rhetoric in the lead up to the Revolution criticized the British
Empire as a greedy and unfair trading partner, and as wealth and place usually went hand
in hand, in the 1760s and 1770s, this class distinction was not one that mattered. See
Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 573 (explaining the
ways economic justice themes contributed to the justiﬁcation for the Revolution).
61. Thomas Gordon, Discourse V: Of Governments Free and Arbitrary, More
Especially that of the Caesars, in 4 The Works of Tacitus With Political Discourses Upon that
Author 219, 248 (Thomas Gordon ed., Dublin, 5th ed. 1777).
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vulnerable to decay. British North Americans believed that “the Fate of
Nations” was “precarious” and could tip at any moment toward tyranny.62
During the Stamp Act crisis, Americans sounded the alarm, urging
that “such is the delicacy of the British constitution, that it instantly dies”
when infringed and “every privilege wings” its “ﬂight.”63 They insisted that
“the Taxation of the People by themselves, or by Persons chosen by
themselves” is “the distinguishing Characteristick of British Freedom,
without which the ancient Constitution cannot exist.”64 This was the
language they used—not just that the constitution would be violated but
that it “cannot exist”65 and “cannot subsist.”66
It did not seem hyperbole to them to say that their “rights and liberties” were “in danger of being for ever lost.”67 That is because the constitutional rights of the eighteenth century had a “use it or lose it” quality.68
A constitution, left unenforced by the people, would be dead and gone,
and whatever replaced it as the status quo would be the actual constitution.
Because of this, it was not enough during the Stamp Act crisis for British
North Americans to say that self-governance had historical precedent—
that it was a “Birth-right” that they, “as Englishmen,” had “possessed ever
since” the colonies were “settled”69 and that their rights had been guaranteed by colonial charters.70 They also had to insist that their rights to local
self-government had not since been “wa[i]v[ed]”71 and had been enjoyed
“without Interruption”72 and further, that they “have never been forfeited,

62. The Votes and Proceedings of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town
of Boston, in Town Meeting Assembled, According to Law 34 (Boston, Edes & Gill, T. & J.
Fleet 1772).
63. Letter, Sent by a Plain Yeoman in New-England, to a Certain Great Personage in
Old-England, Providence Gazette & Country J., May 11, 1765, at 1 [hereinafter Plain
Yeoman Letter].
64. Thursday, the 30th of May, 5 Geo. III. 1765, in Journals of the House of Burgesses
of Virginia: 1761–1765, at 358, 360 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1907).
65. Id.
66. The Resolutions as Recalled by Patrick Henry, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution,
supra note 43, at 48, 48.
67. Proceedings of the Congress Held at New-York, supra note 51, at 13.
68. This is a phrase I’m borrowing from Hendrik Hartog. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog,
Someday All This Will Be Yours: A History of Inheritance and Old Age 172 (2012).
69. The Pennsylvania Resolves, September 21, 1765, reprinted in Prologue to
Revolution, supra note 43, at 51, 51–52.
70. Although, they made all these points as well. For additional instances of appeals to
“birthrights,” see Petition to the House of Commons, in Proceedings of the Congress Held
at New-York, supra note 51, at 19, 20–21.
71. Memorial to the Lords of Parliament, in Proceedings of the Congress Held at NewYork, supra note 51, at 15, 17.
72. Resolves of the House of Burgesses in Virginia, June 1765, Md. Gazette, July 4, 1765,
at 3.
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or any other Way yielded up, but have been constantly recogniz’d by the
King and People of Britain.”73
The constitution was nothing more and nothing less than the
ongoing, active consent of the governed, and so Americans had to be ever
vigilant, to oppose anything they saw as an infringement, and to insist that
they were “not in the least desiring any alteration or innovation in the
grand bulwark of their liberties and the wisdom of the ages.”74 Colonial
assemblies explained the need for public resolves against unconstitutional
legislation on the same rationale: that “their Posterity may learn and know,
that it was not with their Consent and Acquiescence, that any Taxes should
be levied on them by any Persons but their own Representatives.”75
Because the constitution developed through acquiescence and
prescription, eighteenth-century America rang with early warnings about
possible insults to constitutional privileges. After all, “SLAVERY IS EVER
PRECEDED BY SLEEP.”76 “It is well known,” they urged, “by what silent
and almost imperceptible degrees the liberties of subjects may be
encroached upon.”77 And every one of those incursions, “every little
infraction of . . . privilege[], whether casual or designed, tends consequentially to the introduction of tyranny.”78 While the Stamp Act might seem
incremental, a writer in the Boston Evening-Post warned that it was actually
“an Experiment of your Disposition. If you quietly bend your Necks to that
Yoke, you prove yourselves ready to receive any Bondage to which your
Lords and Masters shall please to subject you.”79 George Mason agreed,
calling the act nothing less than an “endeavor” by “those who have

73. Extract of a Letter From a Gentleman in Philadelphia, to His Friend in This Town,
Dated Last Thursday, Newport Mercury, June 24, 1765, at 3 (enclosing the Resolves of the
Virginia Assembly on debating the Stamp Act); see also The Maryland Resolves, September
28, 1765, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution, supra note 43, at 52, 53 (noting that Maryland
subjects “have always enjoyed the Right of being Governed by Laws to which they themselves
have consented” and that this right “hath been Constantly recognized by the King and
People of Great Britain”); Proceedings of the General Assembly, Held for the Colony of
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, at East Greenwich, the Second Monday in
September, 1765, in 6 Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
in New England 447, 452 (John Russell Bartlett ed., Providence, Knowles, Anthony & Co.
1861) (noting that Rhode Island subjects had “enjoyed the right” to self-governance on the
subject of “taxes and internal police; and that the same hath never been forfeited, or any
other way yielded up; but hath been constantly recognized by the King and people of
Britain”).
74. Union in Arms, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution, supra note 43, at 117, 118.
75. The Pennsylvania Resolves, supra note 69, at 52.
76. A Farmer, Letter to the Editor, Dunlap’s Pa. Packet or, Gen. Advertiser, Feb. 27,
1775, at 3 [hereinafter A Farmer Letter].
77. Plain Yeoman Letter, supra note 63, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Dec. 1765 Letter to the Editor, Bos. Evening-Post, supra note 58, at 1.
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hitherto acted as our friends . . . insidiously to draw from us concessions
destructive to what we hold far dearer than life.”80
Symbolic protest was not enough to save a constitution deﬁned by
praxis. Patriots had to take concrete measures to preserve their rights
against encroachment. Throughout the decade leading up to the
Revolution, mobs terrorized officials charged with executing laws they did
not like, forcing them to resign their commissions on pain of death,
destroying property both public and private, and subjecting suspected
collaborators to whippings, tarring and featherings, public humiliations,
imprisonments in the stocks, forced marches through jeering crowds,
public confessions, hanging in effigy, and other intimidations.81
Americans justiﬁed these measures by appealing to the sacriﬁces of
their forebears. An endlessly repeated theme was that the men of the
glorious past had done their bloody duty and British North Americans
would not hesitate to do theirs. A New Yorker named himself a “patriot”
who, ﬁnding his “beloved country” “fainting and . . . hourly expecting to
be utterly crush’d by the iron rod of power,” “would joyfully pour out his
blood to extricate” her “from destruction.”82 A Virginian speaking to his
assembly was moved to the “heat of passion” by the “Interest of his
Countrys Dying liberty,” to say that “in former times tarquin and Julus had
their Brutus, Charles had his Cromwell, and he Did not Doubt but that
some good American would stand up in favor of his Country.”83 Gathering
in groups calling themselves “Sons of Liberty,” men wrote resolutions, like
that of the Virginia Liberty Men, pledging to “chearfully embark our Lives
and fortunes in the Defence of our Liberties and Privileges,” and
promising to “resist” the Stamp Act “to the last Extremity.”84 North
Carolina Liberty Men likewise avowed that they were “truly sensible of the
inestimable Blessings of a free Constitution, gloriously handed down to us
by our brave Forefathers” and as they preferred “Death to Slavery,” they
would prevent the operation of the Stamp Act “at any Risk whatever.”85
The obligation to maintain the constitution was not just a debt owed
to the honorable dead. It was also a “Duty they owe[d] to . . . their
Posterity,” to whom they would either pass the constitution in the state of
80. An American Reaction, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution, supra note 43, at 158,
162.
81. See infra notes 106–122 and accompanying text.
82. New-York, New-York Mercury, Oct. 21, 1765, at 1.
83. Journal of a French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765, I., 26 Am. Hist. Rev. 726, 745–
46 (1921).
84. At a Meeting of the Sons of Liberty of the City of New-Brunswick, in the County of
Middlesex, and the Province of New-Jersey, the 25th of February, 1766, Pa. Gazette, Mar. 6,
1766, at 2; see also New-York, January 13, New-York Mercury, Jan. 13, 1766, at 3 (“[W]e will
go to the last Extremity, and venture our Lives and Fortunes, effectually to prevent the said
Stamp-Act from ever taking Place in this City and Province.”).
85. North Carolina, Md. Gazette, Apr. 10, 1766, at 2.
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perfection in which they had found it or gravely diminished if they now
failed to defend each inch of ground.86 As a Bostonian put it in his town
meeting, “Your regard for Yourselves and for the rising Generation,
cannot suffer you to doze,” or to sit “supinely indifferent,” while “the Iron
Hand of Oppression” tore “Fruit” from the “Tree of Liberty, planted by
our worthy Predecessors, at the Expence of their Treasure, and abundantly
water’d with their Blood.”87 The stakes were high. The Virginia Sons of
Liberty’s resolves against the Stamp Act asserted that they were willing to
“sacriﬁce” their “lives” because they were “unwilling to rivet the shackles
of slavery and oppression on ourselves, and millions yet unborn.”88
Eighteenth-century British North Americans also held strong views
about how governments should respond to citizen violence. They believed
that governments ought to engage in discursive relationships with violent
groups of angry men. To “suffer the laws to be trampled upon, by the
licence among the rabble” was “far less dangerous, to the Freedom of a
State” than “to dispence with their force by an act of power.”89 Their view
that “[g]overnm’t . . . ought to be weak”90 was not, however, a preference
for private force over public force. Understanding the constitution as they
did—as community consensus—this view was rather a preference for
violence to rest in the hands of more of the public, where it could more
accurately reﬂect the will of those who would ultimately decide which
measures were lawful.
In what historian John Phillip Reid would call a good summary of
Whiggish political theory, the Massachusetts House of Representatives
read a lecture to acting Governor Thomas Hutchinson on how responsible
executives ought to respond to “complaints” of “riots and tumults.”91 “[I]t
is the wisdom of government,” they said, to “inquire into the real causes of

86. The Pennsylvania Resolves, supra note 69, at 51; see also An American Reaction,
supra note 80, at 162 (“[W]e have received [these rights] from our ancestors, and with God’s
leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired, to our posterity.”); Petition to the House of
Commons, reprinted in Prologue to Revolution, supra note 43, at 66, 67 (“[W]e glory in . . .
having been born under the most perfect form of government . . . .”).
87. The Votes and Proceedings of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town
of Boston, supra note 62, at 34.
88. At a Meeting of a Considerable Number of Inhabitants of the Town and County of
Norfolk, and Others, Sons of Liberty, at the Court House of the Said County, in the Colony
of Virginia, on Monday the 31st of March, 1766, Pa. J. & Wkly. Advertiser, Apr. 17, 1766, at 2.
89. Supplement to New-York J., or Gen. Advertiser, Jan. 4, 1770, at 1.
90. John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justiﬁcation in
Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1043, 1051 (1974)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter of July 2, 1770, in Letters of Samuel
Cooper to Thomas Pownall, 1769–1777, 8 Am. Hist. Rev. 301, 319 (1903)).
91. Answer of the House of Representatives, to the Foregoing, April 23, 1770, in
Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts From 1765 to 1775; and the Answers of the
House of Representatives to the Same, at 203, 203 (Boston, Russell & Gardner 1818)
(writing to Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson).
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them”92 and “[i]f they arise from oppression, as is frequently the case, a
thorough redress of grievances” puts “an end to the complaint.”93 After
all, “[i]t cannot be expected, that a people, accustomed to the freedom of
the English constitution, will be patient, while they are under the hand of
tyranny and arbitrary power.”94
For their part, once alerted to an infringement on their liberties, the
people could not back down from their claims. What was at issue in each
of these contests was not only whether Americans would remain free but
whether, according to the dictates of their own constitutional theory,
British North Americans would continue to deserve liberty. The English
political writers that formed the political education for many American
Patriot leaders taught that moral corruption prepared the public for “the
Yoke of Servitude.”95 These ideas, very much in the air by the 1770s, were
well-represented in pamphlet and newspaper propaganda in the lead up
to the Revolution: When “states . . . los[e] their liberty . . . [it] is generally
owing to the decay of virtue,” said “A Farmer” in 1775, clearly a student of
this tradition.96 Thomas Paine’s pithy warning—“when the republican
virtue fails, slavery ensues”—made the same point.97 The kind of “Publick
Spirit” or “Virtue” called for was the fortitude to “maintain the People in
Liberty” by “resist[ing] oppressors.”98
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 203–04. This argument reﬂected, John Phillip Reid argues, “respectable
political thought not only in the colonies but also in Great Britain.” See Reid, supra note
90, at 1051–52. “I love a mob,” said the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords, in a boast
reported in 1768 in the Boston Gazette: “I headed a mob myself. We owe the Hanoverian
succession to a mob.” Id. at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anecdote,
Boston-Gazette & Country J., Aug. 22, 1768, at 1). While Whiggish views did not stand
unopposed in the metropole, they nevertheless always found an inﬂuential mouthpiece.
Prime Minister William Pitt told the House of Lords to consider these “tumults” in America
merely “the ebullitions of liberty.” Id. at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Paragraph of a Speech of the Right Hon. Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, BostonGazette & Country J., May 7, 1770, at 2). “[T]hey are only some breakings out in the skin of
the body politic, which, if rudely restrained and improperly checked, may strike inwardly,
and endanger the vitals of the constitution,” Pitt remarked. Id. at 1052 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Paragraph of a Speech of the Right Hon. Earl of Chatham, in the
House of Lords, Boston-Gazette & Country J., May 7, 1770, at 2).
95. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 44 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 1 John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters 203 (London,
1723)).
96. A Farmer Letter, supra note 76, at 3. John Dickinson wrote a series of letters for
colonial newspapers under the pseudonym “A Farmer.” See The English Editor to the Reader
[of John Dickinson’s Letters From a Farmer], 8 May 1768, Nat’l Archives: Founders Online,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-15-02-0066 [https://perma.cc/QUV8ZKZW].
97. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings 19
(Mark Philp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1776).
98. Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 25, 1748, at 1 [hereinafter
Jan. 1748 Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser].
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Critically, the connection between a failure of vigilance and the loss
of rights was not thought simply causal but also moral, and therefore,
people always had the constitution they deserved. “[N]ations were as free
as they deserved to be,” Benjamin Rush wrote, quoting Samuel Adams in
a letter to John Adams.99 John Adams replied that he thought this was
“true . . . and has a good tendency to excite vigilance and energy in
defense of freedom.”100 That is to say, Americans of the Founding era
believed that people had a legitimate legal claim to only as much liberty as
they were willing to defend—through violence if necessary.101
As a corollary, Americans believed that those who were not willing to
defend their rights by force thereby forfeited them. “They, who are willing
to be made slaves and to lose their rights . . . without one struggle,” said an
author in a Massachusetts paper in 1761, “justly deserve the miseries and
insults an imperious despot can put upon them.”102 Such people “deserve
to be trampled on by the whole chain of wretches.”103 Or, as a Pennsylvania
newspaper trumpeted in 1768, “Those who would give up essential Liberty
to purchase a little temporary Safety, DESERVE neither Liberty nor
Safety.”104 “The cause of freedom is a great and good cause,” said the
patriot pamphleteer Cato in 1770, “and those only deserve to enjoy it who
have the courage to assert it when it is invaded.”105
And assert it they did. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, townspeople erected
“a large Gallows . . . with a rope ready ﬁxed thereon” and declared that
“the ﬁrst person that either distributes or takes out a stampt paper” would
“be hung thereon without judge or jury.”106 In Virginia, gentlemen
99. Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 1295 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (July 20, 1812), in The Spur of Fame: Dialogues
of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805–1813, at 234, 234 (John A. Schutz & Douglass
Adair eds., 1966)).
100. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from John Adams to
Benjamin Rush (Aug. 1, 1812), in The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and
Benjamin Rush, 1805–1813, at 234, 235 (John A. Schutz & Douglass Adair eds., 1966)).
101. I should pause to note that Americans were a diverse people and the historical
record contains dissenting voices and alternate trends in intellectual culture. There is rarely
any one thing that “Americans” “believed.” A longer article would have engaged with some
of these alternatives. For those who are interested, Reid’s article, cited throughout this
section, provides one alternative starting point for analysis. See Reid, supra note 90, at 1064.
He discusses a contrary “Tory” perspective on the violence of these decades, a perspective
which was much more law and order. Id.
102. Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts 209 (1985)).
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard L. Bushman, King and
People in Provincial Massachusetts 209 (1985)).
104. Pa. J. & Wkly. Advertiser, July 28, 1768, at 3.
105. Cato, Libertas et Natale Solum, N.H. Gazette & Hist. Chron., July 13, 1770, at 1.
See generally Furstenberg, supra note 9 (proving the thesis that late eighteenth-century
Americans believed that liberty must be deserved).
106. New-York, Feb. 20, Bos. Evening-Post, Mar. 3, 1766, at 2.
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informed a recently arrived stamp master that “his Baggage was put on
board” a “Vessel which was to sail for London the next morning, and
advised him to take Passage in her without Delay, as his Life would be in
Danger if he staid there another Day.”107 The newspaper reported that the
Stamp Master “complied with” this advice “immediately.”108
In Newport, Rhode Island, crowds hung effigies of the newly
appointed stamp officers from a gallows through the day with
contemptuous messages scrawled on them. At nightfall, the effigies were
“cut down and burnt under the gallows, amidst the acclamations of the
people.”109 The following night, the “populace” “muster’d and beset the
house” of the ﬁrst stamp master, “enter’d and broke and destroyed the
goods, furniture, and every thing therein, leaving only a shell of the
house.”110 They did the same to the second stamp master’s house and
continued on to the stamp distributor’s lodging.111 Finding only this third
victim’s landlord at home, they demanded the distributor’s personal
effects but were ﬁnally convinced to come back for him the following day
instead.112 The stamp distributor returned to town the next day and
promptly resigned his office “which resolution was immediately published
thro’ the town.”113
On the day the Stamp Act was actually to take effect, a colonial
newspaper reported that “the inhabitants of these Colonies, with an
unexampled unanimity, compell[ed] the Stamp-Officers throughout the
Provinces to resign their employments.”114 These acts of “virtuous
indignation,” were “judged the most effectual . . . method of preventing
the Execution of a statute, that strikes the Axe into the Root of the Tree,
and lays the hitherto ﬂourishing branches of American Freedom, with all
its precious Fruits, low in the Dust.”115 The colonists could not have
achieved this legal point, in effect striking down the statute as
unconstitutional, without the help of many scenes of violence and
intimidation.116
107. Extract of a Letter From a Gentleman in Newport-Rhode Island, to One in This
Town, Aug. 29, 1765, Boston-Gazette & Country J., Sept. 2, 1765, at 4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Dec. 1765 Letter to the Editor, Bos. Evening-Post, supra note 58, at 1.
115. Id.
116. See Frank Moore, 1 Diary of the American Revolution From Newspapers and
Original Documents 138 (New York, Charles Scribner 1860) (reproducing a later example
of a crowd revising a court judgment). A newspaper from 1775 reported that “a judge of the
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Retribution against men suspected of reporting information about
violations of the hated British revenue laws could be especially harsh.117 In
New Haven, Connecticut, in January 1766, a crowd “forcibly took a
seafaring man from a tavern who was convicted as a mercenary informer”
(the report did not say how he was convicted).118 “A constable soon
appeared to suppress the riot, but his endeavours were fruitless.”119 The
crowd dragged the man to the edge of town, “where they whipp’d him and
obliged him to depart the town immediately with only the clothes he had
on,” telling him “never to return . . . lest he should be saluted with a
second part of the same tune, with new additions in a higher strain.”120 In
Cape Ann, New Jersey, a suspected informant was roused from his bed by
a mob who “walk’d him barefoot about 4 Miles to the Harbour, then placed
him in a Cart they had provided for that Purpose, and putting a Lanthorn
with a lighted Candle in his Hand, . . . carted him thro’ all their Streets,”
forcing him to denounce himself “at every House” until they ﬁnally
“bestowed a handsome Coat of Tar upon him,” made him stand up on the
town water pump, and “caused him to swear that he would never more
inform against any Person.”121 In another case, “an infamous Informer was
laid hold of by a number of people, near the drawbridge, who ducked him”
into the water, “afterwards besmeared him all over” with tar and feathers,
Court of Common Pleas” in Duchess County, New York “was very handsomely tarred and
feathered,” and “carted ﬁve or six miles into the country . . . for acting in open contempt of
the resolves of the county committee” when he “undertook to sue for, and recover the arms
taken from the Tories by order of said committee, and actually committed one of the
committee, who assisted in disarming the Tories” to jail. Id. This “enraged the people so
much, that they rose and rescued the prisoner, and poured out their resentment on this
villainous retailer of the law.” Id.
117. Reid, supra note 90, at 1055 (discussing these anecdotes as well but following the
neo-Whig convention of framing incidents of crowd violence as examples of restrained
crowd behavior).
118. New Haven, January 31, Bos. Evening-Post, Mar. 3, 1766, at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Reid, supra note 90, at 1074 (discussing this incident).
121. Boston, March 26, 1770, Bos. Evening-Post, Mar. 26, 1770, at 3. In a similar
incident, men surveilled an informant until he emerged from his home and then he was
“immediately seized upon by the Populace, and soon placed in a Cart, his Jacket and Shirt
taken off, and his naked Skin well tarr’d and feather’d.” Letter to the Editor, Bos. EveningPost, Oct. 30, 1769, at 2. The men then made the informant “hold a large Glass Lanthorn
in his Hand that People might see the doleful Condition he was in, and to deter others from
such infamous Practices.” Id. The informant was then carted a long way “thro’ the main
Street up to Liberty Tree, amidst a vast Concourse of People, where he was made to swear
never to be guilty of the like Crime for the future.” Id. The crowd then continued “Carting
the feather’d Informer thro’ the principal Streets in Town for about three Hours.” Id.; see
also Reid, supra note 90, at 1077, 1079 (discussing these incidents); Boston, May 21, 1770,
Bos. Evening-Post, May 21, 1770, at 3 [hereinafter Boston, May 1770, Bos. Evening-Post]
(“[A] Tide-Waiter in the Customs, being suspected of having given Information . . . was
taken by a number of Persons, who after Tarring and Feathering him, agreeable to the
modern Mode of punishing Informers, carted him thro’ all the principal Streets in Town
for about three Hours . . . .”).
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then locked him in the pillory “for some time[,] after which they took him
down, and paraded through the public Streets for near two hours.”122
B.

The Intellectual Origins of America’s Constitutionalism of Force

In their paradigm-setting works, neo-Whig scholars, including
Professors Bernard Bailyn, Pauline Maier, and Gordon S. Wood, urged that
the mob actions of the Founding era were models of “restraint.”123 The
Founders’ constitutionalism, they argued, was measured even when
expressed in riot form. Any bloodletting one ﬁnds was simply part of the
messy, chaotic transition from one ordered stasis to another. Some tea got
wet—but what tea doesn’t? When riots got excessive for their taste, these
scholars could quote elite voices repudiating the violence as the lawless
behavior of the “rabble,” thus preserving for analysis a category of lawful
mob actions that seemed more moderate and civilized.124
The neo-Whig scholars framed the violence of the Founding era this
way because they saw the politics of that period bending inexorably toward
the “ordered liberty” of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.
The neo-Whigs recovered the eighteenth-century “Real Whig” tradition,
which taught that violent resistance was lawful only when the motivating
complaint touched the interests of the entire community, including elites;
when it followed attempts at nonviolent resolution; when the use of force
was measured; and when the aims of resistance were moderate.125 But the
122. Philadelphia, October 12, Bos. Evening-Post, Oct. 23, 1769, at 2. This report
assured readers, as many newspaper accounts did, that the crowd ultimately released this
victim “without doing any harm to his Person.” Id.; see also Boston, May 1770, Bos. EveningPost, supra note 121, at 3 (noting that after tarring and feathering the suspected informer,
the crowd “dismissed him”). While this may tell us something interesting about the
rhetorical emphasis on restraint pressed by authors for the newspapers, given the facts
related in the article, it cannot tell us that there was no “harm.” See New-Haven, Sept. 15,
Essex Gazette (Salem), Oct. 10, 1769, at 42; Philadelphia, October 12, Bos. Evening-Post,
supra, at 2. Many of these examples are from Northern or Mid-Atlantic colonies, but the
Southern colonies also took part in this custom. In 1775, a South Carolina crowd carted a
tarred-and-feathered victim to the homes of every other member of the community who had
also refused to join a Patriot military association, forcing the victim to drink a toast: “[T]here
is hardly a street through which, he was not paraded; nor a Tory house, where they did not
halt . . . . I believe there was scarce” one who “did not tremble” as a result. 2 John Drayton,
Memoirs of the American Revolution 17 (Charleston, A.E. Miller 1821); see also 1 id. at
273–74 (noting that the ﬁrst instance of tarring and feathering in South Carolina was carried
out at the direction of the colony’s patriot Committee of Correspondence); Ivor Noel
Hume, 1775: Another Part of the Field 287–88 (1966) (discussing a Tory tarred and
feathered in 1775).
123. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 9, 27–50.
124. Josiah Quincy, Destruction of the House of the Chief Justice, in Reports of Cases
Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay, Between 1761 and 1772, at 168, 169–70 (Samuel M. Quincy ed., Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1865) (describing the mob that destroyed Thomas Hutchinson’s house as a “Rageintoxicated Rabble”).
125. See, e.g., Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 36–38.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4245352

2022]

OUR CONSTITUTIONALISM OF FORCE

1565

intellectual tradition the neo-Whigs identiﬁed was just one of several that
taught British North Americans to think of political violence as a legitimate
means of making legal claims—and not all were so conservative.126
That is not to say the neo-Whig historians were wrong to emphasize
the Real Whig tradition. It is not difficult to ﬁnd examples that prove its
salience. During King George’s War in the 1740s,127 for example,
Bostonians chafed at the impressment of American seamen into the
British Navy.128 When other avenues of legal redress failed, the Boston
town meeting and Massachusetts General Court joined with the laboring
classes in a communal effort that included mob violence.129 These events
inspired a young Samuel Adams, together with others, to publish the shortlived but impressive Boston Independent Advertiser.130 The paper’s columnists
126. Bailyn argued that British country opposition writing, which he called “Real Whig”
rhetoric, provided the intellectual pattern book for American colonists during the late
eighteenth century. See Bailyn, Ideological Origins, supra note 10, at 33–54. His student,
Wood, built on this aspect of Bailyn’s thesis. See Wood, Creation of the American Republic,
supra note 10, at 3–45 (describing the “Whig science of politics”). Another Bailyn mentee,
Maier, took it as her premise for a pivotal book on the ideology of resistance in the lead up
to the Revolution. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 27–50.
127. See John Lax & William Pencak, The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740s, in
William A. Pencak, Contested Commonwealths: Essays in American History 3, 7–8 (2011).
128. This anti-impressment activity in Boston was hardly unique. See Jesse Lemisch, Jack
Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America, 25 Wm. &
Mary Q. 371, 383–85, 387, 407 (1968) (describing dozens of anti-impressment mobs
throughout the colonies that shared many characteristics, including the involvement of the
entire community in the protection of the seamen and dramatic antigovernment
insurgency). Looking at unrest motivated by a wider range of causes, historian Richard
Maxwell Brown has counted eighteen insurgent movements throughout the colonies
between 1645 and 1760 “directed by white Americans toward the overthrow of colonial
governments.” Richard M. Brown, Violence and the American Revolution, in Essays on the
American Revolution 81, 85 (Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson eds., 1973) [hereinafter
Brown, Violence and the American Revolution]. By this time, insurrection had a long
heritage in the American colonies. During the Glorious Revolution in 1689, for example,
four rebellions connected to local grievances—in Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and
North Carolina—strained or unsettled local government. See David S. Lovejoy, The
Glorious Revolution in America 79–81, 229–31, 233–35, 254–55, 260–61 (1973).
129. See Lax & Pencak, supra note 127, at 3, 26–29 (describing how the Massachusetts
legislature covertly cooperated with the Knowles Riot mob to get the people’s impressment
grievances redressed); William Pencak, War, Politics, and Revolution in Provincial
Massachusetts 124 (1981).
130. Chris Beneke, The Critical Turn: Jonathan Mayhew, the British Empire, and the
Idea of Resistance in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Boston, 10 Mass. Hist. Rev. 23, 33 (2008)
(placing the sermon into the context of these events and describing how the Knowles Riot
inspired Samuel Adams to cofound the Boston Independent Advertiser). This riot was also the
political context for Jonathan Mayhew’s sermon, A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission
and Nonresistance to the Higher Powers, arguing that the people were justiﬁed in resisting
unjust commands. See Jonathan Mayhew, A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission
and Nonresistance to the Higher Powers (Boston, 1750), in 1 Pamphlets of the American
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cited the impressment riots to argue that violence could be justiﬁed when
resort to formal legal means had failed: “[W]ill any Man easily trust his
Liberty, to the precarious Issue of Intreaties and Persuasion?”131 The people,
they urged, have a “natural Right”—even a duty—“to defend themselves,”
“as the giving Way to one Invasion is an Encouragement to Another.”132
Violence, in this view, was not extralegal but rather law’s own “remedy.”133
As hot-tempered as these justiﬁcations of violent resistance to impressment
may sound, however, the Real Whig thinkers of British North America were
conservative in both the means they urged and the ends they approved.
The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political writers, whose
works informed the Real Whig tradition, taught Britons to be satisﬁed with
the constitutional order they had, along with its hereditary distinctions
and inequality.134 These authors saw the Glorious Revolution as a founding
Revolution, supra note 46, at 203, 237–38. That sermon, Bailyn wrote, would be seen as the
“classic formulation of the necessity and virtue of resistance to oppression.” Id. at 209.
Mayhew’s sermon, said John Adams, “was read by everybody.” Letter from John Adams to
H. Niles (Feb. 13, 1818), reprinted in 10 The Works of John Adams, at 282, 288 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856). Adams had read it so well in his own
youth that it was “indelibly engraved on [his] Memory.” Letter from John Adams to Thomas
Jefferson (July 18, 1818), reprinted in The Adams–Jefferson Letters: The Complete
Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, at 527, 527
(Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
131. Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser (Boston), Feb. 15, 1749, at 1.
132. Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser (Boston), Feb. 8, 1748, at 1.
133. A 1748 column argued that “in Case of EXTREMITY,” that is, when facing
oppression, the law “has resigned the Remedy to those desperate Physicians, the Law of
Nature and Self-Preservation.” Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser (Boston), Nov. 21,
1748, at 1. In work speciﬁcally about the legal mentality of the seaman resisting
impressment, Professor Jesse Lemisch has written that “[t]he seaman who defended himself
against impressment felt that he was ﬁghting to defend his ‘liberty,’ and he justiﬁed his
resistance on grounds of ‘right.’” Lemisch, supra note 128, at 407. For a more recent study
on impressment, see generally Christopher Magra, Poseidon’s Curse (2016).
134. Writers in this tradition included seventeenth-century revolutionaries like John
Milton, Algernon Sidney, and John Locke, as well as those who later elaborated upon their
political ideas in the early eighteenth century, including Robert Molesworth, Bishop
Benjamin Hoadly, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, the Scottish writer Francis Hutcheson,
and historian Catherine Macaulay. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at
27. To be sure, many of these writings were bombastic in tone but those who employed this
rhetoric in Britain shared an understanding that the violence of the civil wars had gone
beyond the boundaries of normal politics. See John M. Murrin, The Great Inversion, or
Court Versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688–
1721) and America (1776–1816), in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 368, 411
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980) (“Whigs and Tories agreed after 1689 that violent protest was no
longer acceptable politics . . . .”); see also J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in
England, 1675–1725, at 188–89 (1967) (attributing the achievement of this stability to the
power of patronage). In their proper context in eighteenth-century British politics, Real
Whig authors ﬁt into an emerging tradition of a loyal opposition. Their rhetorical themes
on the risks of tyranny and corruption, drawing on the previous hundred years of
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moment and the English constitution that emerged from it as an ideal of
balanced government.135 As “the Nobility, Clergy, Gentry, rich Merchants,
and the Body of the People” all had some measure of happiness already, it
was the duty of each part of the community to “preserve our present
Establishment, and support the just Rights of the Crown and the Liberties
of the People.”136 Englishmen should, in other words, “oppose all
Usurpations on either Side” that might “spoil the Harmony which alone
can make them both happy.”137 Real Whig authors thus rejected the use of
violence in service of utopian projects. “No Man of Sense and Fortune,”
they argued, “will venture the Happiness he is in full Possession of for
imaginary Visions.”138 Subjects should not “rise up in Arms against their
Governours” merely “to make Alterations in what is good and tolerable
already.”139 While the people had a “right” to “[e]xtrajudicial proceedings,
by sedition” or “tumult” when an oppressor was not susceptible to judicial
process,140 violence was legitimate only as a means to restore the social
order—not remake it.
This framework certainly ﬁt the thinking of colonial elites. But what
the Founding elite had to contend with (and what some historians have
struggled to appreciate since) is that elites could not dictate the limits of
lawful or legitimate resistance. Other historians have found that poorer
Americans had very different intellectual traditions. We know less about
experience, had developed into an opposition set piece. See Quentin Skinner, The
Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke Versus Walpole, in
Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J.H. Plumb
93, 101–02 (Neil McKendrick ed., 1974) (arguing that Real Whig style rhetoric became a
tried-and-true vehicle for attacking the government, taken up in turn by whichever group
was out of power, and did not necessarily indicate commitment to the underlying
principles). In the colonies, it seems that men took the violent themes in the British rhetoric
of opposition even more seriously than those who wrote them. See Bailyn, Ideological
Origins, supra note 10, at 44–46. Maier noted how bewildered Josiah Quincy Jr. and John
Adams were, coming across provisos in Blackstone and elsewhere backing down from
essential statements of political philosophy that, in the British context, tended toward the
utopian. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 47. In hedging, these
British authors were suggesting, Quincy Jr. noted in frustration, that “a conclusion can be
just in theory, that will not bear adoption in practice.” Id. Adams wrote, “How [principles]
can be in general true, and not applicable in particular cases, I cannot comprehend.” Id.
But see Pauline Maier, The Charleston Mob and the Evolution of Popular Politics in
Revolutionary South Carolina, 1765–1784, 4 Persps. Am. Hist. 173, 173–98 (1970)
(connecting the role of the mob in American colonial politics to a heritage of similar mob
actions in British politics).
135. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 29; see also Bailyn,
Ideological Origins, supra note 10, at 33–54.
136. 3 John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters 87 (London, 1724).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 2 Benjamin Hoadly, A Defense of the Foregoing Sermon, in The Works of
Benjamin Hoadly, D.D. 26, 37 (London, John Hoadly 1773) (emphasis omitted).
140. 2 Algernon Sidley, Discourses on Government 245 (New York, Richard Lee 1805).
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these traditions, as these groups left fewer records of their thoughts.141 But
what we can discern suggests that ordinary Patriots embraced a right to
rebel in service of much more radical ends.
Historian Gary Nash, for instance, has shown that times of hardship
provoked open discussions about “the proper distribution of wealth and
power in the social system.”142 He found a link that “historians who
concentrate on Whig ideology, which had its strongest appeal among the
educated and well-to-do” “overlooked” between increasing wealth
inequality in eighteenth-century Philadelphia, New York, and Boston and
the rise of a new “political radicalism” in those cities.143 Lower-class
protests in those cities urged that economic redistribution was a moral
imperative.144 And this “resentment of wealth” was increasingly tied to “the
rejection of an elitist conception of politics” as well.145 A Philadelphia
committee representing poor workers urged Pennsylvanians in 1776 to
vote against wealthy delegates to the state’s constitutional convention,
explaining that wealthy men “will be too apt to be framing distinctions in
society, because they will reap the beneﬁts of all such distinctions.”146
Both Gary Nash and Eric Foner—who found this style of radicalism in
Thomas Paine’s milieu in Philadelphia in the early 1770s—saw its origins
in the Great Awakening, an evangelical religious movement that swept the
colonies in the late 1730s. The movement’s ﬁery preachers spread a radical
message that common men should interpret the message of God for themselves and should be “skeptical toward dogma” rather than “bow passively
to established hierarchy.”147 It was a fervor that “overﬂowed into civil
affairs,” teaching laboring people, Foner argued, to look forward to “the
establishment of governments that derived their power from the people,
and which were free from” the old world’s “great disparities of wealth.”148
Because British North Americans’ unwritten constitutionalism was rooted
in community consensus, a movement that ennobled the thoughts and
141. Gary B. Nash, Social Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Urban
Radicalism, in The American Revolution, supra note 60, at 3, 6 (noting that this “popular
ideology about which we know very little, also had deep roots in English culture” and
involved “a discussion of the proper distribution of wealth and power in the social system”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 19; see also id. at 12 (quoting a letter to a clergyman from 1721 expressing
resentment toward “the Rich, Great, and Potent,” who “with rapacious violence bear down
all before them, who have not wealth, or strength to encounter or avoid their fury”).
144. A view elites deplored as a “doctrine of reducing all to a level.” Id. at 13 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting a letter from David Barclay to Thomas Penn).
145. Id. at 30.
146. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting To the Several Battalions of
Military Associators in the Province of Pennsylvania (1776), reprinted in 1 Early American
Imprints, 1639–1800 (Clifford K. Shipton ed., 1955) (Evans no. 15115) (misquotation)).
147. Id. at 17–18.
148. Id.; see also Eric Foner, Tom Paine’s Republic: Radical Ideology and Social
Change, in The American Revolution, supra note 60, at 187, 203.
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opinions of more members of the community had revolutionary
implications.149
In rural popular insurrections, hostility toward the British
Constitution’s class-based hierarchies of power and deference came
through even more clearly. Historian Edward Countryman studied longrunning episodes of rural unrest, in which smallholders tracing their title
to Native conveyors fought with great landowners claiming ownership to
the same plots based on royal or colony grants.150 When large landowners
cherishing old-world aristocratic pretentions tried to extract feudal
obeisance and tribute from their tenants, they provoked explicit and
heated rejections of the traditional basis of those claims.151 Land rioters
149. See Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro,
1550–1812, at 181–220 (1968) (noting that the Great Awakening coincided with slave revolts
of the 1740s and that slave owners blamed the religious fervor for subsequent slave
rebelliousness).
150. Countryman distinguishes these from urban riots because they were about “how
and under what conditions and by whom a limited amount of land would be owned and
occupied”; because they were “cases that involved not sporadic rioting but rather
movements that lasted for years”; and because “the enemies of the rioters were willing to
use nearly any tactic to quell them, for real issues of property and power were at stake.”
Countryman, supra note 60, at 41, 42, 49. Countryman also references this helpful insight
by Huntington: “In agrarian society, a more equitable distribution of ownership is the
prerequisite to economic growth.” Id. at 56 (citing Samuel Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies 298–99 (1968)). While achieving more equitable ownership of the
means of production may be out of reach for the urban industrial worker, for the “peasant”
for whom “the basic factor of production is land,” “this is precisely the goal.” Samuel
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 298–99 (1968). Huntington observes that
this is “precisely” why “the tensions of the countryside are potentially so much more
revolutionary than those of the city”: “[T]he supply of land is limited if not ﬁxed; the
landlord loses what the peasant acquires.” Id. “Thus, the peasant . . . has no alternative but
to attack the existing system of ownership and control.” Id.
151. Countryman, supra note 60, at 42 (“[B]y mid-century . . . great owners were
revivifying the medieval technicalities of their tenure and bringing about a ‘feudal revival’
in America.” (quoting Rowland Berthoff & John M. Murrin, Feudalism, Communalism, and
the Yeoman Freeholder: The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident, in
Essays on the American Revolution, supra note 128, at 256, 272)); see also Rowland Berthoff
& John M. Murrin, Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman Freeholder: The American
Revolution Considered as a Social Accident, in Essays on the American Revolution, supra
note 128, at 256, 264–69 (exploring these feudal tenancies and their consequences).
Whereas in cities, a medieval spirit of carnival might disguise popular revolt as something
like pageantry right up to the minute it turned violent, in the land riots Countryman studied,
there was never any pretense of play. See William Pencak, Play as Prelude to Revolution:
Boston, 1765–1777, in Riot and Revelry in Early America 125, 127–48 (William Pencak,
Matthew Dennis & Simon P. Newman eds., 2002) (discussing ways in which popular protest
in Boston utilized various forms of “play” and playfulness). Protest in the city contained
within it what the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has described as the carnivalesque
tradition, a boisterous throwing-off of social hierarchy and mores, an “upside-down world.”
Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World 426 (Hélène Iswolsky trans., 1968).
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showed, said one of their fervent opponents in New Jersey, a “Natural ill
will to superior Power” and “inbred Malice to Authority.”152 One ﬁnds this
attitude in Thomas Paine’s most memorable lines urging Americans to
liberate themselves from the mentality of monarchical subjects. “Of more
worth is one honest man to society,” Paine said in Common Sense, “than all
the crowned ruffians that ever lived.”153 Or, as Vermont’s Ethan Allen put
it to a colony-grant settler as his men burned the settler’s house to the
ground, “God Damn your Governour, Laws, King, Council & Assembly.”154
Unlike the “Real Whig” framework, the lower-class constitutional
philosophy that historians like Nash and Countryman uncovered does not
readily ﬁt the neo-Whig historians’ narrative arc toward Federalist
constitutionalism. There is little precursor here to their “ordered liberty,”
It is ﬁtting that Ebenezer Mackintosh, the tradesman who led the mob in Boston protesting
the Stamp Act, had gotten his training, as it were, organizing Boston’s annual Pope’s Day
celebration, with its ritual costuming, effigies, crownings, and debasements. See Brendan
McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776, at 56–
63, 69 (2006); Benjamin L. Carp, Fire of Liberty: Fireﬁghters, Urban Voluntary Culture, and
the Revolutionary Movement, 58 Wm. & Mary Q. 781, 806–08 (2001) (explaining
Mackintosh’s training at Pope’s Day and involvement in Stamp Act protesting). By contrast,
in the land riots in New Jersey and Vermont, dissidents set up alternative governments, with
proper militias, courts, and jails. Countryman, supra note 60, at 43 (noting that “[t]hese
movements . . . created counter-governments that exercised . . . almost all of the functions
that government was expected to carry out in the eighteenth century”). In seriousness of
purpose and permanency of structure, the jurisdictions they created better resemble the
“campyng tyme” settlements erected for years during English commoner rebellions of the
1540s, which also had enough permanency and stability to need their own courts. Diarmaid
MacCulloch, Kett’s Rebellion in Context, 84 Past & Present 36, 44–46 (1979). After those
rebellions were forcibly put down, the judgments of the “campyng tyme” courts were
sometimes upheld in courts of regular jurisdiction! Id.
152. Countryman, supra note 60, at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Judge Samuel Nevill’s charge to a Middlesex County grand jury).
153. Paine, supra note 97, at 19. Pennsylvania’s ﬁrst constitution reﬂected this radical
optimism in its unicameral government structure and broad franchise, as did Vermont’s.
Pa. Const. of 1776, ch. I, §§ 1–2, ch. II, § 7, in The Proceedings Relative to the Calling of the
Conventions of 1776 and 1790, at 54, 55–57 (Harrisburg, John S. Wiestling 1825); Vt. Const.
of 1777, ch. I, § 8, ch. II, § 2, in Vermont State Papers 241, 245–46 (Middlebury, J.W.
Copeland 1823). The democratic simplicity of the resulting plans of government concerned
the future Federalists. John Adams, who criticized Paine’s ideas as too “democratical,”
thought Paine had “a better hand in pulling down than building.” John Adams,
Autobiography, in 2 The Works of John Adams 503, 508 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1850); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Mar. 19, 1776), in
Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife Abigail Adams, During the Revolution 145,
146 (Charles Francis Adams ed., New York, Hurd & Houghton 1876). Adams ﬂattered
himself that he “should have made a more respectable ﬁgure as an architect.” Letter from
John Adams to Abigail Adams (Mar. 19, 1776), in Familiar Letters of John Adams and His
Wife Abigail Adams During the Revolution, supra, at 145, 146. He believed Paine “seem[ed]
to have very inadequate ideas of what is proper and necessary to be done in order to form
constitutions for single colonies, as well as a great model of union for the whole.” Id.
154. Countryman, supra note 60, at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Warrant to Arrest Certain Rioters in Rupert, in 4 E.B. O’Callaghan, The Documentary
History of State of New-York 745, 746 (Albany, Charles van Benthuysen 1851)).
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less foreshadowing of a system that champions virtues like the protection
of property, deference to hierarchy, institution-building, and regard for
the past. But not all British North Americans identiﬁed with Real Whig
philosophy.155 And, as this Article will discuss, the more radical strains of
Patriot thinking only became more entrenched during the Revolutionary
War and its aftermath.156 It is only by seeing the wider scope of eighteenth155. There are necessarily other examples we do not have the space to explore. The
constitutionalism of this era was vigorously local and deﬁned by active enforcement of rights
by local communities. I have relied here on the studies of urban and rural radicalism by
Nash and Countryman to show a distinction between the Real Whig view and alternatives
that embraced theories of economic redistribution because they provide vivid and wellresearched examples. See supra notes 141–154 and accompanying text. But what the
localism of constitutionalism of this era means is that what Nash and Countryman offer are
by no means a complete or exhaustive picture. When we look elsewhere in the colonies, at
other instances of riot and insurrection, we will ﬁnd other styles of constitutional thought
and other justiﬁcations of violence that deserve inclusion in our catalog. And there were
many other examples of insurrection. See Brown, Violence and the American Revolution,
supra note 128, at 97 (ﬁnding that between 1760 to 1775, there were “at least forty-four riots
in the colonies”). The earlier four slave insurrections inspired by the Great Awakening likely
expressed their own constitutional visions. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 118–20. We will
also ﬁnd a constitutional order articulated in the justiﬁcations offered by the white
populaces that so brutally suppressed those insurrections, including a counterargument
going to those white communities’ understanding of the proper causes and justiﬁcations for
rebellion. Looking to the West, where colonists became increasingly resentful, after 1763,
of the British solicitude toward Native allies’ land rights, see infra Part II, and where, after
1774, the Quebec Act added anti-Papism to frontiersmen’s concerns, we will ﬁnd another
fully formed set of justiﬁcations for just rebellion. And in the dozens of riots in defense of
impressed sailors, we ﬁnd a straightforward claim of constitutional right to rebel in the name
of “liberty,” legal and literal. See The Declaration of Independence para. 29 (U.S. 1776)
(“He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms
against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall
themselves by their Hands.”); Lemisch, supra note 128, at 390 (discussing ways sailors
justiﬁed their resistance to impressment in terms of constitutional liberty).
156. Previously distinct intellectual traditions also mingled in interesting ways. While
many historians now think that Bailyn overemphasized Real Whig ideology prior to the
Revolution, some scholars believe that “it had achieved a hugely disproportionate impact
by 1775” as “[i]n times of crisis men turn to the most compelling explanation for their
predicament that they can ﬁnd.” Murrin, supra note 134, at 397–98. But the valence of “Real
Whig” rhetoric of the Revolutionary moment may not have been quite the same as the elite
version that preceded it. Nash points out that radical and Real Whig traditions “dynamically
interacted,” borrowing language and argument from each other in the lead up to war. Nash,
supra note 141, at 6. The lower-class radicals that Nash and Countryman described could
have easily adopted Real Whig concepts and terms, because what made that Real Whig
staple—Cato’s Letters—a success was its recourse to common cultural markers of moral
good and evil conveyed in a folksy tone. See Bailyn, Ideological Origins, supra note 10, at
35–36 (attributing the wide circulation of Cato’s Letters in colonial newspapers to their
“colorful, slashing, superbly readable pages”). These writings also contained some messages
that suited the antinomian themes of radical movements: Although “[m]ost of those who
manage” the science of government try to “make the lower World believe that there is . . .
Difficulty and Mystery in it, far above vulgar Understandings,” this was all a lie because
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century constitutional culture that we can hope to make sense of the world
that came next.
Because they saw an origin story in Real Whig notions of moderate
resistance, neo-Whig historians characterized eighteenth-century crowds
as biddable, respectful of class-based hierarchies, and relatively
peaceable.157 Maier focused her attention on those mobs that were “extrainstitutional in character more often than they were anti-institutional.”158
Wood argued that Revolutionary mobs “were not only excused but often
directed and abetted by respectable members of the community.”159 And,
the neo-Whig historians stressed, these crowds showed “discrimination in
the choice of victims and force,” often limiting their destruction to
property.160
But this gloss, downplaying violence, is hardly convincing. A crowd
that picks its victims with care is, if anything, even more menacing than a
crowd that doesn’t. Destroying a person’s property to coerce him into
abandoning his government office is an act of violent intimidation. And
when a crowd forces an official to resign under threat of physical
humiliation, torture, or murder, as crowds in every colony did in the 1760s,
that is the epitome of political terror, not “nonviolence,” even if the crowd
spares the official’s life when he complies.161
“[e]very Ploughman knows a good Government from a bad, from the Effects of it.” 1 John
Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters 303 (London, 1723). There were also
economic justice themes, especially as Real Whig thought had been translated in American
newspapers. See, e.g., Jan. 1748 Letter to the Editor, Indep. Advertiser, supra note 98, at 1
(“In Popish Countries it is publick Spirit, to build . . . Churches at the Expence of the poor
People . . . [and] for a Man to starve his Family . . . to endow a Monastery, [whereas] . . . in
Protestant Free Countries, Publick Spirit is . . . to maintain the People in Liberty, Plenty, Ease,
and Security.”). It is this phenomenon—the different reception of the same philosophy by
different audiences—that would cause elites to later reﬂect, with some dismay, that
“[o]pinions which perhaps were excessively dissimulated previous to and during the late
revolution seem to produce effects materially different from which were intended.” Letter
from Henry Knox to the Marquis de Lafayette (Feb. 13, 1787) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). “[F]or instance, the maxim that all power is derived from the people . . . .” Id.
157. See Thomas P. Slaughter, Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America, supra note 10,
at 3, 4–6 & n.7 (canvassing scholars writing about crowds from the “consensus” or neo-Whig
perspective). Bailyn’s 1974 work, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, is the exception, but this
revision of his earlier perspective did not change the direction of the school of thought he
inaugurated. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, at vii (1974)
[hereinafter Bailyn, Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson].
158. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 7–8.
159. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 321.
160. Id.; see also Supplement to Boston-Gazette & Country J., Aug. 19, 1765, at 1
(describing how a mob destroyed Andrew Oliver’s furniture and valuables to send a
message).
161. There was a brisk discussion among historians from the 1960s to the 1990s about
just how violent mobs were in the eighteenth century, under what circumstances, and how
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The “restrained” mobs of the Stamp Act crisis intended to and did
strike terror into the hearts of the officials and accused collaborators they
targeted. When a Bostonian crowd leveled a brick building intended for
use as a stamp office on August 14, 1765, John Adams observed
approvingly that “[n]one were indicted” because “this was thought an
honorable and glorious action, not a riot.”162 Neo-Whig scholars pointed
to the incident as a model of restrained or “lawful” revolutionary
rioting.163 But the mob did not stop there. After pulling down the customs
house, it went on to ransack the stamp master’s home as well, destroying
one of the largest mirrors in the colony, breaking the trees in his garden,
drinking his wine, and setting ﬁre to his carriage.164 The stamp master
himself, who had “scarcely” managed to escape the destruction, gave word
the following day of his intention to resign.165 But the crowd returned in
elites felt about it. See Slaughter, Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America, supra note 10, at
3–4 (summarizing this discussion). Bailyn may have provoked the controversy when he
claimed, in 1965, that Revolutionary era rioters were so committed to Real Whig order that
they committed “[n]ot a single murder.” Bernard Bailyn, Liberty and Property Vindicated,
in 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution, supra note 46, at 580, 581. Lemisch plainly
proved that this simply “does not hold up if extended to cover resistance to impressment”
as “there were murders on both sides.” Lemisch, supra note 128, at 389–90. Other
scholarship added to his ﬁndings. See Slaughter, Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America,
supra note 10, at 10 n.14 (collecting “conﬂict” scholarship). Writing after Lemisch, scholars
hewing to the neo-Whig view of the crowd as nonviolent had to ignore quite a bit of contrary
evidence. For Maier to maintain that eighteenth-century crowds showed a “striking”
“tendency” “to avoid bloodshed,” she had to decide that the framework ﬁt even though a
mob’s victims were “almost strangled,” or “nearly drowned,” or suffered “an hours-long
ritual of tarring and feathering” while crowds were “threatening” the victim’s “life.” See
Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 8–9, 13. She had to pass over the
Paxton Boys (twice) without mentioning that they slaughtered fourteen Native men,
women, and children and to dismiss the summary execution of Black people during riots as
exceptions to the rule. See id. at 5, 25, 283–84. In later scholarship, Bailyn would come back
to the theme of violence with quite a different perspective in The Ordeal of Thomas
Hutchinson, a book that reads as something like an internal critique of his earlier bald
pronouncements. See Bailyn, Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, supra note 157, at vii. But his
students, Wood and Maier, remained neo-Whiggish to the end. Some of their students went
further still, magnifying the impact of what I describe as an erroneous emphasis on the elite
perspective. Professor Paul A. Gilje’s characterization of the eighteenth-century mob, in The
Road to Mobocracy, typiﬁes this problem. Paul Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular
Disorder in New York City, 1763–1834, at vii (1987) (“[T]he eighteenth-century mob
respected both persons and property; seldom did it lash out in murderous assault” but
instead “minimized conﬂict by focusing their ire upon an object—like an effigy—which
symbolized their grievances.”).
162. For Adams’s reﬂections on the event, see John Adams, Novanglus, No. 5, in 4 The
Works of John Adams 57, 74 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851)
[hereinafter Adams, Novanglus, No. 5].
163. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 90, at 1065.
164. Supplement to Boston-Gazette & Country J., supra note 160, at 1; see also Reid,
supra note 90, at 1045 (quoting the poem attached to Andrew Oliver’s effigy hanging on
the liberty tree, just before the mob forced his resignation, which read: “How Glorious is it
to see / a Stamp officer hang on a Tree”).
165. Supplement to Boston-Gazette & Country J., supra note 160, at 1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4245352

1574

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1539

force and, having “erected a Number of Stages with Tar Barrels & c.,”
surrounded his house.166 The people were not satisﬁed until they learned
that the stamp master Andrew Oliver had sent a letter declining the office
of stamp master and avowing that the position would “endanger the Life
of any that did, it being contrary to the Rights and Privileges of
Englishmen.”167 Only this “seem’d to appease the Multitude, so that none
offer’d any Violence whatever their intentions may have been.”168
While some believed the attack on the stamp master’s home had gone
too far, others apparently thought it “a necessary declaration” of the
people’s “resolution not to submit to the Stamp Act.”169 The “cruel
treatment” of the stamp master “and his family,” Governor Francis
Bernard reported, was “justiﬁed” in the eyes of Bostonians “by the
consequences [of] frightening him into a resignation.”170
Just two weeks after the “honorable” Stamp Act riot, however, came a
riot inspired by “very different Motives” that elites could not countenance.171 On August 26, 1765, a crowd ransacked Thomas Hutchinson’s
house, destroying his furniture, his dishware, his papers, taking down the
cupula, ﬂattening the trees in his garden, ruining one of the “best ﬁnished
houses in the Province,” and staying until dawn to try to take down “the
slate and boards from the roof.”172 The Boston town meeting repudiated
the violence and instituted nightly patrols to prevent its recurrence.173
Historians in the neo-Whig school pointed to this very different reaction
as evidence that colonists embraced Real Whig distinctions between lawful
and unlawful violence.174
For neo-Whig scholars, the fact that the elite had these Real Whig
standards to distinguish lawful from lawless rioting only made the
extraordinary discipline of the people out-of-doors, when accomplished to
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Letter from Governor Francis Bernard to the Earl of Halifax (Aug. 31, 1765), in 9
English Historical Documents: American Colonial Documents to 1776, at 675, 678 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1955).
170. Id. But see Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 63 (suggesting
some elites may have disapproved of the house breaking).
171. Boston, September 2, Boston-Gazette & Country J., Sept. 2, 1765, at 2 (italics
omitted).
172. Reid, supra note 90, at 1046 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter
from Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson (Aug. 30, 1765), reprinted in James K.
Hosmer, The Life of Thomas Hutchinson: Royal Governor of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay 91 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1896)).
173. Id. at 1048.
174. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 62 (“There were, it
was understood, just and unjust uprisings; and from the start Boston’s upheavals of August
14 and 26 were seen as the prototypes of acceptable and unacceptable uses of mass force.”);
see also Reid, supra note 90, at 1043–47 (pointing to August 26 as an example and arguing
that colonial subjects of the 1760s recognized lawful and lawless riots).
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everyone’s satisfaction, all the more striking and marvelous. These
historians highlighted the fact that elites were often glad to ratify the
violence of the people when appeals and petitions through traditional
legal channels had been ineffective. Wood explained that “Good
Whigs . . . were even willing to grant a measure of legitimacy to” mob
actions because they “recognized and appreciated the political existence
of the people ‘out-of-doors,’ that is, outside of the legal representative
institutions.”175 Maier quoted members of the House of Lords arguing that
“rioting is an essential part of our constitution,” and Hutchinson
admitting that “[m]obs, a sort of them at least, are constitutional.”176
But of course, mobs would have been constitutional even without the
explicit approval of the ruling class. What the neo-Whigs identiﬁed as a
colonial American tradition distinguishing between lawful and lawless political violence was instead consistently the elite perspective on what constituted lawful resistance. And the elites who deplored the destruction of
Hutchinson’s house did not speak for everyone.177 In his research on lowerclass crowds, Nash studied the August 26 riot quite closely. This was an
example, he explained, of the fact that while mobs composed of “several
socioeconomic groups” sometimes “found it proﬁtable to coordinate their
actions,” they had differing “interests”—interests that “often coincided”
but “sometimes diverged.”178 Time and again, crowds showed that they had
their own “moral economy” and “political consciousness” and that in
pursuing their own ends, they might go well beyond what elites “wished to
countenance.”179 Nash explained that the crowd that attacked
175. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 320–21; see also
Gordon S. Wood, A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution, 23 Wm. & Mary Q. 635, 639
(1966) (“What particularly seems to set mob violence in the colonies apart from the popular
disturbances in England and France is . . . the almost total absence of resistance by the
constituted authorities . . . .”).
176. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 24.
177. Complicating matters, some historians have suggested that the elites we meet in
our primary sources can be unreliable narrators. Lax and Pencak found that during the
Knowles Riot, the Boston elite abetted or even directed the violence of the crowd and then,
in a joint effort with the newspapers, repudiated that violence as “‘a tumultuous riotous
assembling of armed seamen, servants, negroes, and others,’” to allow the “town” to avoid
Commodore “Knowles’s guns.” Lax & Pencak, supra note 127, at 3, 4, 29 (quoting Resolves
on the Riotous Proceedings (Nov. 19, 1747), reprinted in 24 Journals of the House of
Representatives of Massachusetts, 1715–1779, at 212–13 (1949)). This is an instance in
which the Boston town meeting was only “appearing to suppress a crowd it had in fact
supported.” Id. at 4; see also At a Meeting of the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the
Town of Boston, Bos. Wkly. Post-Boy, Dec. 21, 1747, at 1 (voicing the town’s ostentatious
repudiation of the riot and adding that as “f[u]rther proof that the Tumult and Disorders
were against the Mind of the Inhabitants of the Town, there was the most numerous and
best Appearance of the Militia under Arms, that has been known for divers Years past”).
178. Nash, supra note 141, at 27.
179. See id. “Moral economy” is E.P. Thompson’s concept. See E.P. Thompson, The
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50 Past & Present 76, 79
(1971).
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Hutchinson’s home was pursuing its own radical populist theory of justiﬁed rebellion and was especially vicious and thorough in its destruction of
Hutchinson’s possessions to send a message of disapproval about his longrunning disdain for the poor during his tenure in office.180
Lower-class rioters sent a similar message in a November 1765 Stamp
Act riot in New York City. What began as an orderly procession led by ships’
officers turned destructive when the officers ended their participation and
the regular sailors continued on to “demolish the elegantly furnished
home” of a wealthy English major “with a thoroughness unparalleled even
in Boston.”181 Maier credited elites’ description of that incident as a “threat
of anarchy,” using it as evidence that things could get out of hand unless
elites exercised ﬁrm control over the course of events.182 But Jesse Lemisch
pointed out that if the lower-class sailors were interested in looting, it is
hard to explain why they passed through the wealthy center of town
leaving so many tempting targets unmolested.183 Instead, they marched in
an orderly fashion “clear across town to do violence to the home and
possessions of an English major whose provocative conduct had made him
[their] obvious political enemy.”184
180. See Nash, supra note 141, at 29.
181. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 68; see also Lemisch, supra
note 128, at 396.
182. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 67.
183. Lemisch, supra note 128, at 396.
184. Id. Another example of dueling perspectives: John Adams famously won acquittal
for Captain John Preston and his men, the British soldiers responsible for the Boston
Massacre. Adams believed it was “as important a cause as was ever tried in any court or
country” because of what the case suggested about colonial constitutionalism. Farah
Peterson, Black Lives and the Boston Massacre, 88 Am. Scholar 34, 38, 42 (2019)
[hereinafter Peterson, Black Lives and the Boston Massacre]. By suggesting to the watching
world that Bostonians were capable of setting aside their immediate resentments toward the
soldiers for the massacre, an acquittal served the broader argument “that Bostonians were
principled in a classic legal sense” and that “Boston’s position in its quarrel with Britain was
based on a constitutional argument, not provincial egoism.” Id. at 41. As part of his trial
strategy, Adams demeaned the crowd the officers had ﬁred upon as “a motley rabble of
saucy boys, negroes and molattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish jack tars” unrepresentative
of the “good people of this town.” Id. at 38, 40. Adams has been celebrated for his principled
lawyering ever since.
In 1774, another crowd of Bostonian sailors seized John Malcolm, a customs official
with a long history of abusive behavior in office. From the Massachusetts-Spy of Thursday
Last, Boston-Gazette & Country J., Jan. 31, 1774, at 2. When several gentlemen tried to divert
the crowd, reassuring them that “the law would have its course with him,” the sailors “asked
what course had the law with Preston or his soldiers.” Id. They said they had seen “so much
partiality to the soldiers and custom-house officers by the present Judges, that while things
remained as they were, they would, on all such occasions, take satisfaction their own way.”
Id. They proceeded to strip Malcolm, tar and feather him, and cart him through the streets.
Boston, January 31, 1774, Boston-Gazette & Country J., Jan. 31, 1774, at 2. They threatened
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What the record reveals, then, is not so much a distinction between
lawful and lawless rioting but rather a persistent disagreement between
men of different social classes over which constitutional settlement the
people ought to be striving toward. While these groups concurred on the
legitimacy of violent resistance, they diverged on the appropriate scope,
aims, and character of that resistance. John Adams thought that the
Boston Tea Party was “absolutely and indispensably . . . necessary” because
allowing the tea to come ashore “would be giving up the principle of
taxation by parliamentary authority” and would consign colonial subjects
“and our posterity forever to Egyptian task-masters; to burthens,
indignities . . . to desolation and oppression; to poverty and servitude.”185
It was in part the “Real Whig” method the Tea Partiers used, harming no
person, destroying tea and tea alone, and accomplishing their work almost
in total silence, that made him exclaim that “the [s]ublimity of it, charms
me!”186 But the crowd attacking Hutchinson’s house was not meaningfully
different. The main difference was the “principle” they were asserting.
There’s no reason we, as historians, should privilege what Adams—a
member of the elite threatened personally by demands for a redistribution
of wealth—found “charming” and what he found distasteful.187 After all,
to hang him, beat him with a rope, and threatened to cut off his ears, until he ﬁnally
promised “to renounce his present commission, and swear that he would never hold
another inconsistent with the liberties of his country.” Id. In the newspaper report
memorializing these events, the author ﬁnishes: “See reader, the effects of a government in
which the people have no conﬁdence!” Id.
John Adams thought he was following a course consistent with the constitution and
the jury agreed. Peterson, Black Lives and the Boston Massacre, supra, at 41. But the sense
of the crowd in the following years was that the Boston Massacre trial had been a miscarriage
of justice. That trial had taught them not to look to the courts for the defense of
constitutional liberty.
185. John Adams, Diary Entry (Dec. 17, 1773), in 2 The Works of John Adams, supra
note 153, at 323, 324.
186. Letter from John Adams to James Warren (Dec. 17, 1773), in 2 Papers of John
Adams 1, 2 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977).
187. Governor Francis Bernard warned that the crowd would embark upon “a War of
Plunder, of general levelling & taking away the distinction of rich & poor.” Letter from
Francis Bernard to the Earl of Halifax (Aug. 31, 1765), in 2 The Papers of Francis Bernard:
Governor of Colonial Massachusetts, 1760–69, at 337, 339 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2015).
Fearing this, wealthy Bostonians took the precaution of “moveing their cash & valuable
furniture” to the homes of poorer friends. Nash, supra note 141, at 29 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Letter from James Gordon to William Martin (Sept. 10, 1765),
reprinted in 13 Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings 392, 393 (1900)). This is not
to suggest that John Adams had amassed great wealth at this point in his career, because of
course his means did not then compare to Hutchinson’s. John Ferling, John Adams: A Life
10 (1992) (noting that none “of the Adamses had ever been part of the truly elite”). But he
was comfortable during a time of wealth inequality and a member of the elite in terms of
his connections, his marriage, his social milieu, and his aspirations. See id. at 12, 17, 316
(noting that Adams “feared the wealthy few as much as he was disturbed by the humble”);
see also Woody Holton, Abigail Adams: A Life 2 (2009) (describing Abigail Adams’s family
as “among the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s most prominent families”).
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one man’s anarchy might be another man’s justice. And in an era when
the constitution was a matter of praxis, the constitutional ideas of the poor
no less than the rich must be attended to, especially as they acted out their
views so obviously, consistently, and repeatedly.
The production of the shared constitution of eighteenth-century
communities was not a top-down operation but one that, to elites’ enduring frustration, remained a collaboration with the middling and laboring
classes.188 Because the constitution of British North America was community consensus acted out over time, we cannot use the voices of the elite as
a guide to what was within the law the community deﬁned together. We
cannot listen to John Adams alone and rest satisﬁed that we have the entire
picture.
While we are now used to thinking of law as something imposed from
above by a government with its own independent and salaried agents
sworn to implement rules as written, things were then very different.189 It
was then impossible for a person at the top of the social or political hierarchy to issue a controversial rule or a command in the expectation that
his word would govern simply because of his status.190 In eighteenthcentury colonies, law and policing were managed by communities through
posse comitatus, the militia, and eventually, the summoning of the local
grand jury to indict offenders.191 That meant that when a local community
agreed with the moral sentiment expressed by a mob, there was no way to
overcome the community’s judgement without outside military intervention.192 As historian Jack P. Greene has explained, “Even the sheriffs
188. As Governor William Shirley complained in 1747:
[W]hat I think may be esteem’d the principal cause of the Mobbish turn
in this Town, is it’s Constitution; by which the Management of it is
devolv’d upon the populace assembled in their Town Meetings . . .
[where] the meanest Inhabitants . . . by their Constant attendance there
generally are the majority and outvote the Gentlemen, Merchants,
Substantial Traders and all the better part of the Inhabitants; to whom it
is Irksome to attend . . . .
Letter from William Shirley to the Lords of Trade (Dec. 1, 1747), in 1 Correspondence of
William Shirley: Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America 1731–
1760, at 412, 418 (Charles Henry Lincoln ed., 1912). Before the struggle with Britain, there
was a long-running contest in Boston over who should rule at home, an electoral struggle
for control of government between the wealthier and lower classes of the community. See
Nash, supra note 141, at 22–23.
189. See Greene, supra note 48, at 471.
190. Id.
191. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 17–18 (describing the
use of “peacetime garrisons” and militias).
192. See Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743–1776, at 297
(1967) (“Apart from the distasteful use of the military for constabulary duty, no colonial
official broached a feasible plan for keeping the peace, nor, it may be noted, did anyone in
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and constables responsible for enforcing court judgments could only do
so when local communities were willing to allow the judgments to be
carried out,” and “officials charged with” law enforcement “were helpless
without the support of the local community.”193 It does not make sense,
therefore, for a historian to look to the top of the era’s hierarchy for an
articulation of legal rules, and trust that those voices provide deﬁnitive
answers to questions that were obviously the subject of sustained
community contention.
The historical record shows substantial agreement on the view that
violence was an appropriate tool of constitutional argument. Everyone
seems to have embraced the use of violence in their own causes.194 But the
record shows sustained conﬂict over which constitutional settlement the
people should be striving toward.195 And the record also suggests that elites
saw the lead-up to war as a moment of great precarity—not only because
of the looming conﬂict with London but because of the risk to order at
home.196 Gentlemen of the eighteenth century looked at the violence of
the crowd and the urgency of its claims and felt afraid.197 Gouverneur
Morris, observing a crowd in the streets in 1774 New York, wrote that the
“mob begin[s] to think and to reason.”198 Unless gentlemen found a
method to keep the people uninformed: “[F]arewell aristocracy.”199
Elites’ worry that they could not control lower-class protest made
them recoil from the excesses of early Stamp Act incidents and gather into
associations intended to provide a moderating effect on popular
engagement.200 But as protest evolved toward active Revolution, this
became harder.201 After all, Patriot leaders needed the violence of
common people to win a long and difficult war. And they were right to be
afraid. The violence of the Revolution, by itself, would have a leveling
effect. The sheer brutality of war would play a role in “the rapid erosion of

London, Paris, or Rome, either.”); id. at 18; Greene, supra note 48, at 471 (noting that
because officials relied upon the community for the implementation or enforcement of any
legal rule or judgment, “[c]olonial Massachusetts was thus a standing example of one of
early modern British political theorists’ favorite maxims: all government depends on
opinion”).
193. Greene, supra note 48, at 471.
194. See supra notes 101, 177–180 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 101, 177–180 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
197. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Penn (May 20, 1774), in 1 Jared Sparks,
The Life of Gouverneur Morris, With Selections From His Correspondence and
Miscellaneous Papers, at 23, 25 (Boston, Gray & Bowen 1832) (“The gentry begin to fear
this . . . . We shall be under the dominion of a riotous mob.”).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 76, 86, 96–100.
201. Id. at 100.
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deferential political behavior.”202 After common men had “taken part in
hounding, humiliating, perhaps killing men known to them as social
superiors, they could not easily reacquire the unthinking respect for
wealth and status that underpinned the old order.”203
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF FORCE AT WAR
The Revolution changed everything it touched, including the former
colonists’ understanding of when and for what causes violence was legally
legitimate. It changed Americans’ understanding of the legality of violence
in two ways. First, trends hardening America’s racial categories would
become an enduring legacy, associating the liberty Americans fought for
with white racial identity.204 Second, the economic and political
egalitarianism of prewar radical movements became much more
mainstream.205 Men who had been drawn to Real Whig ideas looked for a
return to deferential, elite-driven, post-war governance.206 But those who
had joined the Revolution because of their hopes for a more economically
and politically just society had very different goals indeed.207 These
differences were temporarily disguised by common grievances and
challenges while the war was ongoing. Disagreements over which part of
society should bear the burden of the economic recovery after the war
would reveal the depth of this schism.
A.

Race

Racial justiﬁcations for the Revolution added a new dimension to
Americans’ theory of constitutional violence. For white settlers in the West,
primarily concerned about Native Nations, and whites in the South, who
wanted to be left alone to brutalize their slaves, Real Whig rhetoric
suggested more than the libertarian message that it conveyed to the taxobsessed Bostonians. In addition to a right to ﬁght for freedom from
oppressive rule, these Americans heard an imperative to earn through
violence what they viewed as their proper place on top of a racial hierarchy
threatened by the British. That is what defense of their status quo and
community consensus, their local constitutional order, necessarily entailed.
Making these causes national and legitimizing the Revolution this way
would leave a powerful legacy.
The Declaration of Independence blamed King George III for
“excit[ing] domestic insurrections amongst us, and . . . endeavour[ing] to
202. John Shy, The Military Conﬂict Considered as a Revolutionary War, in John Shy, A
People Numerous and Armed 213, 242–43 (1990).
203. Id.
204. See infra section II.A.
205. See infra section II.B.
206. See infra notes 295–298 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 299–304 and accompanying text.
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bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages.”208
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense likewise accused the king of having “stirred
up the Indians and Negroes to destroy us.”209 Had not the British, a
Philadelphia columnist writing in 1776 urged, “attempted to spirit up the
Indian savages to ravage our frontiers, and murder, after their inhuman
manner, our defenceless wives and children?”210 “Have not our Negro
slaves been inticed to rebel against their masters, and arms put into their
hands to murder them?”211 To compromise, the author urged without
irony, was “SLAVERY.”212
Few Southern Patriots were troubled by the fact that they fought for
their own liberty while holding others in bondage. The bondage of others
gave their ﬁght content and form. As historian Alan Taylor has argued,
“Freedom seemed all the more precious because colonists daily saw the
humiliation and exploitation of the enslaved.”213 “Slavery” had long been
a ﬁxation for British political theorists,214 but for North American slave
owners, it was hardly an abstraction. The oppression white Patriots feared
was the condition they imposed on Black people.215 Indeed, American
revolutionaries frequently compared their own situation to that of their
African captives.216 Left unchallenged, George Washington warned in
1774, the “Imposition[s] . . . heap’d upon us” by the British Crown would
“make us as tame, & abject Slaves, as the Blacks we Rule over with such
arbitrary Sway.”217
The experience of ﬁghting a war for “liberty” in which their slaves
took up arms against them only conﬁrmed the connection white
Southerners had long drawn between constitutional liberty and slave
ownership. White Southerners had long been locked in what they saw as a

208. The Declaration of Independence para. 29 (U.S. 1776).
209. Paine, supra note 97, at 35.
210. Honest Farmer, Pa. J., Feb. 28, 1776, at 1.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also Robert G. Parkinson, The Common Cause: Creating Race and Nation
in the American Revolution 193–94, 194 n.12 (2016) (contextualizing the prior citation and
collecting other examples of similar rhetoric).
213. Alan Taylor, American Revolutions 22 (2016) [hereinafter Taylor, American
Revolutions].
214. See, e.g., F. Nwabueze Okoye, Chattel Slavery as the Nightmare of the American
Revolutionaries, 37 Wm. & Mary Q. 3, 10–11 (1980).
215. See id. at 12–14 (showing how the colonial pamphleteers envisioned and feared
chattel slavery).
216. See, e.g., id. at 4, 12–14 (“You will become slaves indeed, in no respect different
from the sooty Africans, whose persons and properties are subject to the disposal of their
tyrannical masters.” (quoting Joseph Galloway, A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania 38–
39 (Philadelphia, 1760))).
217. Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Letter from George Washington to Bryan Fairfax (Aug. 24, 1774)).
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state of suppressed war with their slaves.218 Both before and during the
Revolution, slave overseers in Virginia and South Carolina were exempt
from militia musters: They already served a critical role on that other front
line.219 White Southerners experienced British overtures to these “internal
enemies,” including Lord Dunmore’s 1775 offer of freedom to slaves
willing to abandon patriot masters, as an acute betrayal.220 Indeed, the
prospect of slave rebellion was so terrifying that for a moment during the
war, in 1779, white Patriots and Loyalists in Wilmington, North Carolina
put their differences aside and united against the common threat of Black
self-determination.221
Fears that slaves would free themselves, as historians estimate that
more than 20,000 did,222 and fear of former slaves’ vengeance, left a lasting
impression on Southern Patriots.223 Because of that trauma and the
South’s postwar economic crisis, “the majority of [white] Southerners
came out of the war convinced that the promises of the Declaration of
Independence could only be secured to them by the continuation of
slavery.”224

218. They were of course familiar with Locke’s analysis of the relationship between
master and slave. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 110 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Hackett 2003) (1689) (“This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but
the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive . . . .”); Okoye, supra
note 214, at 10 (noting early Americans’ familiarity with John Locke).
219. See Laura Sandy, Divided Loyalties in a “Predatory War”: Plantation Overseers and
Slavery During the American Revolution, 48 J. Am. Stud. 357, 374 (2014) (“From the
seventeenth century onwards, statute books in both Virginia and South Carolina show that
plantation overseers were exempt from military muster, in order that they might remain on
the plantation, keeping watch over their slaves.”).
220. See Douglas R. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary
America 72 (2009) [hereinafter Egerton, Death or Liberty] (“The fact that British soldiers
were increasingly willing to encourage slaves ‘to leave their masters [and] to take up arms
against them’ only convinced irresolute masters to endorse calls for independence.”
(alteration in original)); Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia,
1772–1832, at 23–27 (2013) [hereinafter Taylor, The Internal Enemy].
221. Jeffrey J. Crow, Slave Rebelliousness and Social Conﬂict in North Carolina, 1775 to
1802, 37 Wm. & Mary Q. 79, 84, 101 (1980).
222. Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World app.
at 352 (2011).
223. A Scottish gentlewoman traveling in North Carolina in 1775 wrote that patriot
officers were telling soldiers they enlisted that a proclamation issued by the royal governor
“was ordering the tories to murder the whigs, and promising every Negro that would murder
his Master and family that he should have his Master’s plantation.” Janet Schaw, Journal of
a Lady of Quality 199 (Evangeline Walker Andrews & Charles McLean Andrews eds., 1921).
The Scotswoman thought these were all lies but believed “[t]his last Artiﬁce they may pay
for, as the Negroes have got it amongst them and believe it to be true. Tis ten to one they
may try the experiment, and in that case friends and foes will be all one.” Id.; see also Crow,
supra note 221, at 84 (situating this quote in its context in revolutionary North Carolina).
224. Sylvia Frey, Liberty, Equality, and Slavery, in The American Revolution: Its
Character and Limits 230, 238–39 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1989).
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When, buoyed by Revolutionary idealism, two Methodists submitted a
petition to Virginia’s legislature in 1785 advocating for general
emancipation, the reaction was swift.225 Proslavery petitions from Virginia’s
highest tobacco-producing counties drew hundreds of signatures.226
Patriots, the petitions urged, had “waded thro’ Deluges of civil Blood to
that unequivocal Liberty, which alone characterises the free independent
Citizen, and distinguishes him from the subjugated Vassal of despotic
Rule.”227 That liberty was, unequivocally, the freedom to own others. The
proslavery petitions asserted that white Virginians had “seald with our
Blood, a Title to the full, free, and absolute Enjoyment of every species of
our Property,”228 and they rejected the call for general emancipation as “a
daring attack on that sacred Constitution thereby establishd.”229
All of the themes of the constitutionalism of force are here—a claim
to legal rights asserted in battle and paid for in blood—but with a new
justiﬁcation this time: the right to a privileged place in a racial hierarchy.
That is not to say the Founders’ constitutionalism required a racially
oppressive outcome. It was in part these same justiﬁcations that motivated
the emancipation of slaves who joined in the Patriot cause in the North.
Rhode Island, New York, and Connecticut allowed masters to free enslaved
men to serve in their place in the militia.230 The states were short on troops
and the war was punishing, but we need not probe the rationale too
hard.231 Whatever their mix of motivations, these states applied the idea
that liberty could be earned through battle-proven virtue for men with
black skin. And in some Northern states, the participation of Black troops
in the Revolution helped inspire gradual emancipation laws.232
225. Fredrika Teute Schmidt & Barbara Ripel Wilhelm, Early Proslavery Petitions in
Virginia, 30 Wm. & Mary Q. 133, 134–35 (1973).
226. Id. at 137.
227. Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Remonstrance and
Petition of the Free Inhabitants of the County of Lunenberg (Nov. 29, 1785)).
228. Id. at 141.
229. Id.
230. Egerton, Death or Liberty, supra note 220, at 74–77; Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s
Cause: A History of Abolition 49 (2016) (“All the Northern States followed Rhode Island in
allowing slaves to enlist and granting them freedom for their military service.”). It would
become a tradition for “slave regimes at war and chronically short of men,” to be “forced
into negotiations with their own slaves, usually to recruit them as soldiers, often on condition
of emancipation.” Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the
Civil War South 4 (2010). Even Virginia enacted legislation after the Revolution, freeing the
much smaller number of slaves who had fought against the British. Of Dealing With Slaves
and Suffering Them to Go at Large, Code of Va. tit. 30, ch. 104, at 512 (2d ed., Richmond,
Ritchie, Dunnavant & Co. 1860) (noting that in 1782, “an act passed to authorize the
manumission of slaves,” and “[i]t was followed by that of 1783, emancipating those slaves
who had served as soldiers in the war,” and that these laws had not since been repealed).
But Virginia “also sold state-owned slaves who had served in the navy.” Sinha, supra, at 49.
231. Egerton, Death or Liberty, supra note 220, at 74 (“Within just a few months of declaring independence, the American government faced a severe crisis in military manpower.”).
232. Id. at 95–96.
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In part for this reason, notwithstanding the hardening of racial
hierarchies in the South, Black Americans would continue to see
belligerent constitutional themes—“live free or die”—as part of their own
heritage as Americans.233 At the same time, however, François Furstenberg
has argued that the Revolution’s “live free or die” rhetoric “linked
freedom to resistance,” grounding “slavery in an act of individual choice”
or even consent, and in doing so legitimated “slavery on principles
consistent with the American Revolution.”234 Looking at this rhetoric,
Historian David Brion Davis has wondered whether the American
Revolution may have made some whites less open to emancipation. “Since
the Revolution tended to deﬁne liberty as the reward for righteous
struggle,” he explained, it may have become more “difficult to think of
freedom as something that could be granted to supposedly passive
slaves.”235
In western colonies, British sympathy for Native Nations helped make
a national issue of the longstanding racial grievances of frontiersmen. A
major part of the Patriot cause in that region was that the British “car[ed]
too much for Indians” and that they were “indifferent to or even complicit
in ordinary country people’s sufferings at Indian hands.”236 Violence
between colonists and Native peoples never truly ended after the Seven
Years War. Instead, the 1760s saw a cycle of attacks and retaliation—
including episodes in which colonist mobs slaughtered entire Native
communities in the Pennsylvania hinterlands.237 Anger over the British
Proclamation Line of 1763, which had forbidden colonists from
dispossessing Native peoples, and a “horror and fear” of “Indian” “attacks”
233. It was not only because white Americans moved toward emancipation in the North
that Black Americans saw this intellectual heritage as their own, of course. Black North
Americans should not be seen as a population of objects, acted upon but not changed by
historical moments. Indeed, Black Americans in the North and South were also radicalized
by the age of Revolution. For an account of Black Americans who saw these “live free or die”
themes as their own, see Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 1324–26 (noting this theme in
Frederick Douglass’s autobiography). See generally Kellie Carter Jackson, Force and
Freedom: Black Abolitionists and the Politics of Violence (2019) (exploring the use and
justiﬁcations of violence by antebellum Black abolitionists); Shaun Ossei-Owusu, The
People’s Champ: Legal Aid From Slavery to Mass Incarceration (forthcoming) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the violent defense of refugees from slavery by Black
abolitionist organizations and those abolitionists’ reliance on some of these themes). But
see Farah Peterson, The Patriot Slave: The Dangerous Myth that Blacks in Bondage Chose
Not to Be Free in Revolutionary America, 89 Am. Scholar 32, 32 (2020) (discussing the
cultural theme of the grateful, happy, and loyal slave that developed to “suppress and
obscure” memories of “black self-determination during the Revolution”).
234. Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 1296–97.
235. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823, at
257 (1975).
236. Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America,
at xviii, xxiii (2008).
237. See Rob Harper, Looking the Other Way: The Gnadenhutten Massacre and the
Contextual Interpretation of Violence, 64 Wm. & Mary Q. 621, 621 (2007).
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became “a vital means of forming public coalitions.”238 One of the
freedoms Patriots from the western frontier fought for was, in short, the
freedom to kill more Indians and to take their lands without hindrance.
The Revolution made this brutality respectable. Previously intolerable
ﬁgures like Michael Cresap, a frontiersman Thomas Jefferson called
“infamous” for his role in a massacre of Native women and children,
became celebrated for their military prowess during the war years.239 The
Paxton Boys, a posse denounced as “barbarous Men” by Benjamin
Franklin for their 1764 massacre of fourteen unarmed Native men,
women, and children, would go from being outlaws under British rule to
folk heroes.240 The royal government of Pennsylvania had shared both
Franklin’s disapproval of the Paxton Boys and a long-range interest in
reducing the defense costs of interethnic violence. But after
Independence, Franklin’s government would no longer share his views.
Where the British had feared western expansion as the prelude to a
loss of imperial control, the new nation was committed to expansion and
the violence expansion entailed.241 The Revolution’s “closing years”
included “extraordinary anti-Indian violence.”242 Officers under General
John Sullivan, pausing on their march into Iroquois Territory, raised a
toast on July 4, 1779, to “Civilization or death to all American Savages,” a
phrase that historian James Merrell argues would soon “become common
among those interested in Indian affairs.”243 Franklin and Jefferson had
secured a place in the new nation’s cultural ﬁrmament, but so had the
formerly liminal frontiersman.244

238. Silver, supra note 236, at xviii, xix.
239. Robert G. Parkinson, From Indian Killer to Worthy Citizen: The Revolutionary
Transformation of Michael Cresap, 63 Wm. & Mary Q. 97, 97–99 (2006) [hereinafter
Parkinson, The Revolutionary Transformation of Michael Cresap]; see also Extract of a
Letter from Frederick-Town, August 1, N.Y. Gazette & Wkly. Mercury, Aug. 21, 1775, at 3
(publishing an article written in fawning tones, marking Cresap’s progress through
Pennsylvania and New York on his way to the front lines).
240. Benjamin Franklin, A Narrative of the Late Massacres 9 (Philadelphia, Franklin &
Hall 1764); see also Slaughter, Crowds in Eighteenth-Century America, supra note 9, at 21
n.23.
241. See Andrew Shankman, Toward a Social History of Federalism: The State and
Capitalism to and From the American Revolution, 37 J. Early Republic 615, 616–28 (2017)
(explaining that British authority was strongest at the coasts and dwindled further into the
interior of the continent).
242. Silver, supra note 236, at xxiii.
243. James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian–White Relations in the New
Nation, in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, supra note 224, at 197, 198.
244. See Gautham Rao, The New Historiography of the Early Federal Government:
Institutions, Contexts, and the Imperial State, 77 Wm. & Mary Q. 97, 117 (2020) (explaining
that the new federal government “helped channel settler colonist circulation, provided
military and commercial support, and ultimately actualized the ideology of Indian removal”
and that “white settler colonists” would become “at times the state itself”).
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The war thus “generated racial distinctions that associated freedom
with whiteness.”245 Southern colonists’ protests against British efforts to
end slavery in the decades before Independence had focused on the
contention, said historian Alan Taylor, that “white men became fully free
by owning blacks.”246 Likewise, argues historian Peter Silver, the persistent
conﬂict with Native Nations in the western colonies helped disparate
European groups forge a new identity as “the white people.”247 The
Revolution only entrenched these racial categories in the Founding
generation’s constitution.
Over the long run, the emphasis on white racial identity inaugurated
during the Revolution would become an even more important element of
American constitutional culture. The jingoistic rhetoric of the War of 1812
would strengthen a national politics of racial exclusion.248 It would rise
ascendant with Jacksonian Democracy, a party orientation that easily
combined populism for white men with anti-Indian and pro-slavery
politics.249 These shifts would eventually limit the gains that some nonwhites had made in the ﬁght for Independence in the North. New York’s
1821 constitutional convention voted to strip Black men of the vote in that
state.250 In Pennsylvania, white men of the same social milieu that had
gathered to pass the gradual emancipation statute in 1801 would make up
the mobs that torched an abolitionist meeting house in 1838 and then
burned a Black orphanage in Philadelphia to the ground, standing “guard
around the burning building so that ﬁre companies could not reach the
ﬂames.”251 That year, Pennsylvania state leaders also amended the
constitution to restrict the franchise to whites and purged Black voters
from the rolls.252
The constitution that emerged from the Revolution made it a virtue
to turn a cannibalistic hunger on the rights of others. Future generations
of white Americans would continue to see violence as a legitimate tool of
constitutional engagement but only when employed by other whites—and
245. This pithy phrase is from Alan Taylor, Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New
Empire, 37 J. Early Republic 599, 614 (2017) [hereinafter Taylor, Expand or Die], but he
relies upon Parkinson, The Revolutionary Transformation of Michael Cresap, supra note
239, whose book is devoted to proving this thesis. See Robert G. Parkinson, Thirteen Clocks:
How Race United the Colonies and Made the Declaration of Independence, at ix (2021).
246. Taylor, American Revolutions, supra note 213, at 21.
247. Silver, supra note 236, at xxi.
248. For the origin, rise, and progress of these themes, see Taylor, The Internal Enemy,
supra note 220, at 137–38.
249. Id. at 137–38, 347.
250. See Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821: Assembled
for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New York 376–77 (Albany, E.
& E. Hosford 1821).
251. Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled
Ending of the American Revolution 265 (2007).
252. Id.
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often in the cause of white racial domination.253 This style of American
constitutional thought has persisted ever since,254 in part because elites
have ever needed the men of the periphery, the liminal types, to serve as
overseers on their plantations and as the foot soldiers of western expansion
and so could not repudiate the violence those roles require. And in part
they have not rejected this strain of constitutional thought because
generations of American elite have, of course, believed that the strong
should dominate the weak—or, at least, have not been very interested in
asking difficult questions about a moral worldview that supports and
furthers their own power.
B.

Democracy and Schism

The war also moved egalitarian ideas to the fore. The experience of
war and the way Patriots justiﬁed its hardships made the American people
who emerged from the Revolution quite different from the colonists who
had started it. The pamphlet litany of British wrongs emphasized the
tyranny of British taxation and credit collection and the cycle of “slavish”
dependence they created.255 Elites justiﬁed the extraordinary taxation and
service demands of wartime in increasingly inclusive ways, using a

253. Although we don’t have the space to discuss it, the persistence of this style of
constitutional thought in the late nineteenth-century South is well documented. Subsequent
generations would be able to look back on the Revolution as having conﬁrmed the
legitimacy of violence in the cause of white supremacy. See, e.g., Andrew Slap, The Spirit of
‘76: The Reconstruction of History in the Redemption of South Carolina, 63 Historian 769
(2001); see also Daly, supra note 37, at 2–3, 19; Hahn, supra note 37, at 266; George C.
Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction 1
(1984) (“By the time the federal government retreated from its reconstruction of the South,
former confederates had achieved through political terrorism . . . the freedom to order
their own society and particularly race relations as they saw ﬁt.”).
254. This style of constitutionalism also persisted in the American Southwest. See, e.g.,
Monica Muñoz Martinez, The Injustice Never Leaves You: Anti-Mexican Violence in Texas
11 (2018) (discussing the nineteenth-century “Texas Rangers,” an organization that
“blurred the lines between enforcing state laws, practicing vigilantism, and inciting racial
terror”). White settlers—“inheritors of a tradition of vigilantism and popular justice from
the eastern states”—believed that victory in the Mexican-American War “meant the
fulﬁllment of the nation’s manifest destiny and the acquisition of California and the
Southwest for the use by white men” and turned to “mob violence” to drive out Mexican
competitors for land or gold, out of frustration with local courts too ready to deal on fairer
terms with Mexicans. William D. Carrigan & Clive Webb, Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence
Against Mexicans in the United States, 1848–1928, at 21, 23–28 (2013) (“[L]ynchers
consistently defended their actions as rational responses to the ineffectual state of the
frontier courts.”). Indeed, looking at the legislative and legal compromises over civil rights
that have followed in the wake of white racial vigilantism—and in the wake of the forced
dispossession of Native Nations—one could argue that important aspects of our
constitutional order have evolved through concessions to violent movements.
255. See Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 575
(describing how tax increases to repay war debt and tightening of British credit in the 1760s
created resentment among American colonists).
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language of popular sovereignty and touting the possibilities of self-rule.256
Newly independent state legislatures, eager to gather support for the
revolutionary cause, also fostered popular participation.257 As the ﬁghting
drew to a close, men with egalitarian beliefs “saw themselves as upholding
the mainstream understanding of the Revolution” and no longer as
“radicals or outsiders.”258 They believed that “their notions of democracy
were rights they had secured through the struggle with Britain.”259
The American population had put eighteenth-century theories of just
rebellion into practice. They were to ﬁnd out, however, that they were
sharply divided about what came next: whether it should be a Real Whig
denouement, in which “the people” subsided into their deferential role as
a balance to the ruling aristocracy, or instead, “the people” themselves
enthroned as sovereign, as the rhetoric of Revolution had seemed to
guarantee.
The new state legislatures, led generally by the same men in
leadership positions before Independence, alienated this newly awakened
electorate even before the war was over.260 At the close of a war that had
been sold to common men with what sounded like appeals to
redistributive justice, including a great deal of discussion of the unfair
“servitude” imposed by American debtors’ obligations to British
creditors,261 courts reopened for business and started conﬁscating
property for unpaid debts.262 Although patriotic rhetoric had explained
the war as a reaction to ruinous taxation, state legislatures imposed tax

256. See id. at 586 (explaining how populist, pro-debtor rhetoric by American elites
engendered an expectation of economic fairness after the revolution); Taylor, Expand or
Die, supra note 245, at 607 (“The demands of war rendered the revolution more
transformative as patriot leaders had to make concessions to common people.”).
257. Pole, supra note 50, at 340–41; see also Farah Peterson, Statutory Interpretation
and Judicial Authority, 1776–1860, at 40–41 (Sept. 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Peterson, Statutory
Interpretation and Judicial Authority] (“In Massachusetts, the assembly erected a public
gallery in its chamber; Pennsylvania increased representation for more populous counties;
and in Virginia, a new interest in politics in 1776 produced the ﬁrst hotly contested
elections.”).
258. Bouton, supra note 251, at 258.
259. Id.
260. See Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 585–91
(describing legislative economic policies that exacerbated inﬂation and increased wealth
inequalities coupled with harsh judicial enforcement of debtor obligations); see also Gary J.
Kornblith & John M. Murrin, The Making and Unmaking of an American Ruling Class, in
Beyond the American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism 27,
28–79 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1993) [hereinafter Beyond the American Revolution] (tracing
the class politics and sharp political reversals that followed the Revolution, largely in
reaction to these unpopular early legislative choices).
261. Peterson, Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Authority, supra note 257, at 41.
262. Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 573, 586.
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rates in the 1780s averaging three or four times those of the colonial era.263
Some of these choices were driven by necessity, as governments turned to
tax revenues to settle foreign war debts and preserve state credit.264 But the
values of the governing class, and not just the post-war difficulties
themselves, better explain many of these ﬁscal measures.265 In effect, state
leaders decided to place the burden of a severe post-war economic slump
on the poorer, agrarian populations. This was a part of the citizenry that
was, in many cases, not as well represented in state assemblies because of
legislative apportionments that favored eastern areas.266
It was these legislatures’ decisions about the debt states owed to
Revolutionary War veterans that ﬁnally triggered a major political crisis.267
Continental soldiers had accepted pay in the form of government bonds—
essentially, promissory notes. When they returned home, soldiers who
needed cash immediately “to prevent their families from actually starving”
began selling their bonds for whatever coin they could get at prices far
below their face value.268 Wealthier Americans bought up the bonds at
these discounted prices and then used their inﬂuence in legislatures to
levy taxes sufficient to redeem them at their full printed value with an
added annual interest fee for bondholders.269 Not without justice, the
soldiers “complain[ed] that shadows have been offered to us while the
substance has been gleaned by others.”270 Farmers, many of them veterans,
saw their last cow conﬁscated because they could not afford to pay these
taxes271—taxes that were high in order to pay the interest to “opulent
gentlemen” now holding the “publick securities” that the veterans had
been forced to sell for pennies.272
Conservative legislators argued that this massive redistribution of
wealth served to “put . . . property into the hands of those who would
263. Woody Holton, Did Democracy Cause the Recession that Led to the Constitution?,
91 J. Am. Hist. 442, 445 (2005) [hereinafter Holton, Did Democracy Cause the Recession
that Led to the Constitution?].
264. Allen Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775–1789,
at 479 (1924) (demonstrating the difficulty of paying war costs and states’ obligations as
creditors).
265. See Sean Condon, Shays’s Rebellion: Authority and Distress in Post-Revolutionary
America 40 (2015) (describing the ﬁscal issues, policy proposals, and government choices
that prompted the political crisis in Massachusetts).
266. See Holton, Did Democracy Cause the Recession that Led to the Constitution?,
supra note 263, at 442.
267. See Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 586–87.
268. The Address and Petition of the Officers of the Army of the United States, in 24
Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774–1789, at 291, 291 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922).
269. Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places, supra note 32, at 586.
270. The Address and Petition of the Officers of the Army of the United States, supra
note 268, at 291.
271. Condon, supra note 265, at 18–20.
272. Objections Against Reducing the Publick Debt Examined, Mass. Centinel, Mar. 1,
1786, at 1 [hereinafter Objections].
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manage it better.”273 To poorer citizens, however, it was obvious that “every
tax laid on the community [was] virtually a tax to [the wealthy]; the greater
the debt, the greater is their gain; they are accumulating fortunes by the
general distress.”274 Many were forced to give up their land, the most
effective guarantee of independence, to satisfy their pettiest debts. The
same leaders who had promoted the Revolution as a moral imperative now
sat in the assemblies. Some of their constituents now began to feel that
they had been “horribly deceived and deluded” by the very men who had
urged them to ﬁght against British taxation.275 These same men were now
imposing the “burdens” that veterans had been “told they should have
been forever free from.”276 But the Revolution itself had taught the
citizenry how to respond to such provocations.
The Revolution, fought in defense of fundamental rights, had
heightened the antinomian impulse in civic life that had originated in the
Great Awakening. It had encouraged the idea that common men were
qualiﬁed to identify constitutional rights and determine for themselves
when they had been violated. As a Massachusetts man argued, “By the
Constitution, our General Court [that is, the legislature] are empowered
to make laws, levy taxes, &c. that are founded in equity and justice, and
they have no power by [that], to make any other.”277 Common men would
be at their most conﬁdent asserting claims against government actions that
had been directly at issue during the struggle with Britain: as here, an
attempt to impose ruinous taxes or give unfair advantages to the creditor
class; or, as during the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries’s Rebellion, an attempt
to impose internal taxes and stamp taxes on a population that felt
inadequately represented; or, as would come later, attempts to extend
government protection to Black people or Native peoples. In such cases,
Revolutionary War veterans and their descendants asserted that they did
273. Holton, Did Democracy Cause the Recession that Led to the Constitution?, supra
note 263, at 455 & n.23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Amicus, Va. Indep.
Chron., July 4, 1787).
274. Objections, supra note 272, at 4.
275. Robert E. Moody, Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays, 5 New Eng. Q. 105, 113 (1932).
276. Id.
277. Letter to the Editor, Falmouth Gazette & Wkly. Advertiser, June 11, 1785, at 3. In
1786, for example, a community of squatters moved from the Connecticut River Valley to
occupy land in Pennsylvania. Alan Taylor, Agrarian Independence: Northern Land Rioters
After the Revolution, in Beyond the American Revolution, supra note 260, at 221, 233. When
the proprietors of those lands asked them to move, they refused, calling for an “[e]qual
distribution of property” and arguing that “the labours bestowed in subduing a rugged
wilderness were our own, and can never be wrested from us without infringing the eternal
rules of right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baptist preacher James
Finn). A preacher ministering to these squatters informed Pennsylvania’s agent in the
county that these “lands belonged to the Con[necticu]t people, by the laws of God & nature;
but that the laws of Penn[sylvani]a would take them from them: that laws contrary to the
laws of God & Nature were not to be obeyed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Reverend Jacob Johnson).
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not “contend against the Powers of Great-Britain, in order to displace one
Set of Villains to make Room for another; but . . . to contend for
permanent Freedom.”278
Common folk started gathering in country conventions to voice their
dissatisfaction with state governance in Massachusetts even before the end
of the Revolutionary War. In January 1782, an itinerant preacher named
Samuel Ely stood up at one of those conventions to urge men to overthrow
the Massachusetts constitution.279 In April, Ely led a body of men to
prevent the courts from sitting by force.280 Arming himself with a club, he
told the “riotous mob,” “Come on, my brave boys, we’ll go to the woodpile
and get clubs enough and knock their Grey Wiggs off and send them out
of the World in an Instant.”281 Ely was arrested, but Massachusetts could
not hold him. In mid-June, a group of about 130 armed men marched to
the jail to rescue Ely.282 Massachusetts could muster only about ﬁfty men
to respond.283
The encounter between Ely’s rescuers and the officers of the state
would reveal what would become an enduring dynamic. Despite all the
efforts Massachusetts citizens had taken to craft a written constitution and
to form a government under its aegis, the people still understood their
fundamental law as community consensus. When the outgunned
government forces ﬁnally caught up and engaged with Ely’s rescue party,
Ely himself escaped during the scuffle.284 The outcome was a parlay: The
two sides agreed to sit down together, and after a discussion that lasted
several hours, the sheriff and other government officials agreed to join
with the insurgents in a cosponsored petition asking the legislature to
consider the Hampshire County Convention’s grievances.285
278. Herman Husband, Proposals to Amend and Perfect the Policy of the Government
of the United States of America 32 (1782).
279. Moody, supra note 275, at 108 (citing Ely’s argument that the “Governor had too
much salary” and neither “the Supreme Court nor the General Court should be allowed to
sit” as reasons for rejecting the Massachusetts constitution). He further argued that “the
Attornies [sic], Sheriffs, & all Officers should be sacriﬁced,” especially the Justice of the
Peace, whose “Body should be given to the Fowls of the Air and to the Beasts of the Field.”
John L. Brooke, To the Quiet of the People: Revolutionary Settlements and Civil Unrest in
Western Massachusetts, 1774–1789, 46 Wm. & Mary Q. 425, 425 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket Book, 1781–1782,
at 179–80 (1782)).
280. Moody, supra note 275, at 109.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.; see also Condon, supra note 265, at 24.
284. Moody, supra note 275, at 110.
285. See Condon, supra note 265, at 25. When the violence resumed, government
officials again relied on parlay and diplomacy. In the days that followed the insurgents took
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When, in 1786, the yeomanry of Massachusetts began gathering in
conventions again, they felt conﬁdent that their efforts were consistent
with “the principles of [the] constitution, which was instituted for the common good” and for the “happiness of the people; and not for the honour
or interest of any man, family, or class of men.”286 The 1786 convention in
Worcester County drew up a petition carefully enumerating popular
grievances, including the scarcity of specie and other conditions that gave
“the creditor” “too great advantage” over “the debtor.”287 The convention
also expressed a “general disgust” with the courts, the high salaries of
government officials, the inconvenience of the probate courts, and the
unfairness of various parts of the tax scheme.288 It was time, the convention
argued, to gather public sentiments on “revising the constitution.”289
To critics, a convention amounted to “a government erected within a
government; a body assembling to consult and debate upon the degree of
submission due to the constitutional government.”290 This was, they urged,
“an idea directly subversive of all order.”291 Although many of the
conventions urged peaceful measures, Massachusetts Governor James
Bowdoin classed the violent mobs and county conventions together. Now
government supporters as hostages and the sheriff learned that a crowd was “on the March
with Fire Arms & swear that if opposition is made to them they will lay the town in Ashes.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Sheriff Porter to Governor
John Hancock (June 14, 1782)). The unrest swelled until, estimated a sheriff, about “ﬁve or
six hundred” were “engaged in the riots.” Moody, supra note 275, at 111. A witness wrote
to warn a legislator that the rioters were threatening “houseburnings” and other violent
acts. Id. at 112. He urged that “an attempt to Subdue these People by force will at least be
very expensive, if not a very dangerous Course” as their “number . . . increase daily,” and he
advised that “a Comitee” of sensible and even-keeled politicians “come without loss of time
to endeavour to assuage the Storms and to Explore the Causes.” Id. at 113 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Letter from Joseph Hawley to Caleb Strong (June 24, 1782)). This was
the course the state government eventually followed. A local officer had also reduced
tensions with his own diplomatic gestures. Condon, supra note 265, at 26. The sheriff
explained he had complied with the insurgents’ demands to release some of their number
from jail in part because of the danger of bloodshed but also because the insurgency
included “a number of (otherwise) truly respectable People.” Id. Diplomacy was essential
because the confrontation between officers of the state and the insurgents was not just a
question of manpower. The insurgents asserted legal claims that could not be dismissed
without a hearing.
286. The Address of Worcester Convention to the People: An Address to the Inhabitants
of the County of Worcester, Worcester Mag., Second Week in October, 1786, at 327, 335,
reprinted in 2 Worcester Magazine (Isaiah Thomas ed., 1786).
287. Petition of the Worcester County Convention to the General Court, Worcester
Mag., Second Week in October, 1786, at 327, 334–35, reprinted in 2 Worcester Magazine,
supra note 286.
288. Id. at 334.
289. Id. at 335.
290. Another Citizen, Opinion, From the Massachusetts Gazette, to the Free and
Independent Citizens of Massachusetts, Indep. Chron. & Universal Advertiser (Boston),
Aug. 31, 1786, at 1.
291. Id.
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that the form of government was republican, he said, “every complaint, or
grievance” could be redressed by annually elected legislature, which was
“the only body within whose department it is, to redress publick
grievances.”292 Appeals to “all other bodies, and all other modes of redress,
are anti-constitutional, and of a very dangerous tendency, even when
attempted in a peaceable manner”—although, he admitted these appeals
were “more” dangerous “when attempted by acts of violence.”293
This became a recurring plea of anxious leadership: Now that
Massachusetts was a republic, the constitution had a ﬁxed method and calendar for channeling popular policy concerns. The people could end the
constant vigilance of 1760s constitutionalism. To the citizens meeting in
conventions, this sounded like rank hypocrisy. As one of them reﬂected,
“When we had other Rulers, Committees and Conventions of the people
were lawful—they were then necessary; but since I have myself become a
ruler, they cease to be lawful—the people have no right to examine into
my conduct.”294
Men preaching order were asking for a return to old patterns. They
wanted yeomen to go back to the social deference and political apathy that
characterized that class during the prewar decades.295 In answer to the
robust policy proposals that emerged from the conventions, gentlemen
insisted that government was hard work and that “the people” were
unqualiﬁed to do it. “What a growth of politicians in this country!” one
writer said, sneering at a convention’s argument that taxation unfairly
favored mercantile over landed estates.296 They “can conﬁdently decide
upon a question in ﬁfteen minutes, which the General Assembly thought
it hard to decide in twelve months.”297 In these elite critiques, one hears
gentlemen urging the people to let them rule and to go back to their
former status of being quietly ruled. “My dear sir,” said an author, who
didn’t quite believe the conventions’ complaints about the scarcity of
currency, “I will tell you what will make money plenty”—“Let the people
choose good rulers: let the rulers take care of the government,” “[t]ake
away the rod of violence,” and “let conventions return home to their
292. Governour Bowdoin’s Speech, Worcester Mag., Second Week in October, 1786, at
327, 330, reprinted in 2 Worcester Magazine, supra note 286.
293. Id.
294. Letter to the Editor, Worcester Mag., Second Week in October, 1786, at 327, 337,
reprinted in 2 Worcester Magazine, supra note 286.
295. On political apathy, see Pole, supra note 50, at 45–46. On deference, see Gordon
S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 145–68 (1991) [hereinafter Wood,
The Radicalism of the American Revolution]. See generally Richard Beeman, Deference,
Republicanism and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth Century America, 49
Wm. & Mary Q. 401 (1992).
296. An Old Republican, Opinion, Strictures Upon County Conventions in General,
and Upon the Late Meeting Holden at Hatﬁeld in Particular; Addressed to the Freeholders
of the County of Hampshire, Number III, Hampshire Gazette, Oct. 4, 1786, at 2.
297. Id.
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proper callings; meddle with government when they are called to it.”298
These men made little distinction between the conventions and more
violent methods of constitutional engagement because what most
bothered them was the challenge both posed to hierarchy, not the
particular form those challenges took.
But regular people had experienced the Revolutionary War as a
radical political education.299 And so the common folk of western
Massachusetts did not let down their guard but instead began to urge one
another that this was “the important period” to either “uphold that liberty
you have purchased with your blood” or lose the freeman’s constitution to
the efforts of the power hungry.300 “[A]fter expelling foreign domination,”
warned an anonymous author from Attleborough, Massachusetts, there
might be even “more dangerous enemies” at home “among the wealthy
men in this State.”301 The wealthy assumed common men were “so tired
with the late war” that they had relaxed their vigilance.302 He believed the
purpose in “continuing the heavy and insupportable taxes” was so that “in
a few, very few years” elites might extirpate the “independent spirit from
among us, and forge the chains for our liberties so strong that the greatest
exertions and convulsions will not break them.”303 This, the yeomanry
could not permit. When upstart legislators “play with laws, and laugh at
the calamities of the people with impunity, society must unhinge
government.”304
By the end of 1786, as it became clear that peaceful measures had
failed, the discontent became an uprising that would become known, in
Massachusetts, as Shays’ Rebellion.305 The broader unrest eventually
swelled to “almost 9,000 militants or about a quarter of the ‘ﬁghting men’
in rural areas” in almost every part of New England.306 In an echo of the
298. Id. He added the condescending advice: “Earn money, and you shall have money
enough.” Id.
299. See Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, supra note 295, at 229–38.
See generally John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reﬂections on the Military
Struggle of American Independence (1976) (discussing war as political education).
300. Attleborough, Opinion, To the Yeomanry of Massachusetts, Indep. Chron. &
Universal Advertiser (Boston), Aug. 31, 1786, at 3.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Rusticus, Opinion, To the Freemen of New-Hampshire, N.H. Gazette & Gen.
Advertiser, Aug. 10, 1786, at 1.
305. David P. Szatmary, Shays’ Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection 91
(1980).
306. Id. at 59 (quoting Jedidiah Morse, The American Geography 172 (Elizabethtown,
N.J., Shepard Kollack 1789)). The exception was Rhode Island, where the agrarian interest
took a majority in the legislature and passed debt-relief legislation. See id.; Woody Holton,
“Divide et Impera”: Federalist 10 in a Wider Sphere, 62 Wm. & Mary Q. 175, 184 (2005)
(detailing how Rhode Island farmers organized to elect council candidates who would go
on to pass paper money emission legislation).
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tactics of the early Revolutionary War years, in Hampshire, Bristol, and
Worcester County, Massachusetts, crowds calling themselves “Regulators”
gathered to intimidate and threaten officials.307 They shut down courts and
ordered the judges “to forbear doing any business” until the conventions
could obtain “the minds of the people” and have “an opportunity of
having their grievances redressed.”308 In September 1786, Regulators in
New Hampshire surrounded the legislature as it sat in session, explaining
that they had come “to do ourselves that justice which the laws of God and
man dictate to us” and demanded a favorable response to their
petitions.309 They posted sentinels “at the doors and windows, with
bayonets ﬁxed to their muskets, and forb[ade] any person from going in
or coming out.”310 One Massachusetts man admitted he “wished the
insurgents had not taken up arms so soon,” but said he “did not know
whether any other method than by arms would do.”311
When state leaders ﬁrst attempted to suppress the mobs, they found
themselves in the same difficult position that had mired the British, trying
to manage from above a constitution which was constituted, at least in part,
from below. Militiamen, called up to suppress a mob gathering to assault
a courthouse in Worcester County, refused—some giving their
commander an evasive answer, others a “ﬂat denial,” just as the colonial
militias had refused to suppress unrest in the 1760s.312 If the militia refused
to come when called, Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts complained,
even the “best remedial laws” were “as baseless as the fabrick of a vision.”313
307. Condon, supra note 265, at 57 (“[T]he regulators . . . organized as crowds to
intimidate and put pressure on courts . . . .”); Ray Raphael, The First American Revolution:
Before Lexington and Concord 130–38 (2002) (discussing court closings as a
prerevolutionary tactic).
308. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Address by John Thompson, Asa Miller, Thomas Ansolen, Luke Day, Simeon Vaughan &
Joel Billings to the Justices of the Northampton Court (Aug. 29, 1786), 189 Mass. Archives:
Shays’ Rebellion, 1786–1787, at 111–13).
309. Letter from William Plumer to John Hale (Sept. 20, 1786), in 11 Publications of
The Colonial Society of Massachusetts: Transactions 1906–1907, at 390, 390–91 (Albert
Matthews ed., 1910) (recounting the Regulators’ demands).
310. Id. at 391.
311. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 67 (quoting Michael Hatch Testimony, Shays’
Rebellion Box, Robert Treat Paine Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc’y).
312. For the Worcester incident, see id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Letter from Jonathan Warner to Governor James Bowdoin, 190 Mass. Archives:
Shays’ Rebellion, 1787, at 230). For colonial-era militias refusing to comply with British
orders to suppress the mob, see Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, supra note 40, at 92
(“Militias had either refused to answer royal governors’ calls for support or were so clearly
behind the mobs that it seemed foolhardy to muster them . . . .”). A major general found
his country militia units equally reluctant to come to his call. Stephen T. Riley, Dr. William
Whiting and Shays’ Rebellion, 66 Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc’y 119, 125 (1956).
313. Governour Bowdoin’s Speech, supra note 292, at 330–31. He also suggested that
any “evils that have arisen, or may arise” from such lawlessness would be “chargeable” to
“the good people” “themselves.” Id.
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The problem, a Massachusetts historian writing in 1788 explained,
was that “[t]he stopping of the Judicial Courts had been blended, in the
minds of some people” with the legitimate “redress of grievances.”314 To
many militiamen, mobbing seemed a reasonable “mode of awakening the
attention of the legislature” to the people’s unaddressed concerns.315 On
another occasion, when a contingent of about a thousand militiamen was
called to protect the opening session of the court at Great Barrington,
Massachusetts, they found the Regulators already there in force.316 Instead
of protecting the court’s opening day from the mob, some seven to eight
hundred of the militia decided to join the Regulators.317
Militiamen frequently “excused themselves from military duty.”318
They may have taken the classic Whig position that government
suppression was an inappropriate response to citizen unrest.319 Or they
may have felt sympathetic to the mobs’ grievances.320 Whatever the reason,
this was still a people governed by a constitution of community consensus,
and the community was clearly open to the insurgents’ way of thinking.
For their part, the Regulators saw taking up arms as a tool of legal
reform. They said they “did not intend to destroy law, but only to reform
all those laws which were oppressive.”321 Or, as a veteran explained after
joining the mob at the Worcester courthouse, he had “no intention to
destroy the publick government” but had “stepped forth in the defence of
this country” to ﬁght for liberty.322 By turning to force, the Regulators
followed established precedent for making these kinds of claims. Daniel
Shays was conﬁdent that after marching on Boston “to destroy the nest of
devils, who by their inﬂuence, make the [legislature] enact what laws they
please, [and] burn it,” it would be “in his power to overthrow the present
314. George Richards Minot, The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts 40
(Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1788).
315. Id.
316. Condon, supra note 265, at 56 (describing the encounter with the Regulators).
317. Id. at 56–57. The court was unable to sit in session, and when the judges left the
courthouse, the insurgents followed to extract signatures from three out of the four on a
pledge not to hold court “until the Constitution of the Government shall be revised or a
new one made.” Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Sheriff
Caleb Hyde to Governor James Bowdoin (Sept. 13, 1786), 190 Mass. Archives: Shays’
Rebellion, 1787, at 263–64).
318. Minot, supra note 314, at 40.
319. See supra Part I (discussing eighteenth-century British North Americans’ theory
about how governments should respond to citizen violence).
320. See Szatmary, supra note 305, at 80 (quoting Artemus Ward’s explanation that the
militia in Worcester “were too generally in favor of the people’s measures” to suppress the
mobs (citing Letter from Ward to Governor James Bowdoin (Sept. 5, 1786), 190 Mass.
Archives: Shays’ Rebellion, 1787, at 233)).
321. Id. at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daniel Mathews, To the
Inhabitants of New-Braintree, 2 Worcester Mag. 303, 311 (1786)).
322. Condon, supra note 265, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adam
Wheeler).
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Constitution, and that he would do it.”323 Their critics may have sneered at
the yeomanry for “seem[ing] to think it as easy and safe to change the
government as the representatives,” but the fact was, both sides believed
the insurrections might succeed.324
Governor Bowdoin’s best hope was to portray the Shaysites’ possible
“success” as something distinct from the righteous riots of the 1760s or the
justiﬁed rebellion of the Revolution: “the result of force, undirected by
any moral principle.”325 He took his case directly to the people with a newspaper address, calling on “men of principle” to “take their stations, and
unite under the government, in every effort for suppressing the present
commotions” or else stand “accessory to their own and their country’s
ruin.”326 After ﬁrst attempting to quiet the unrest with concessions, the
government turned to a more forceful response. If the violence of the
Regulators was at once political speech and a bid to alter the constitution,
then violence of the government was, in part, the government’s counter
speech. Bowdoin eventually recruited an army of volunteers drawn mostly
from coastal mercantile communities, a contingent that he hoped would
be sufficiently impressive as it “march[ed] . . . through the western
counties” to convince “the misguided of the abilities of government.”327
These recruits took up arms, said the Massachusetts State Secretary, in the
hopes of “totally defeat[ing]” the Shaysites by creating “a different way of
thinking among them.”328
At the same time, Bowdoin continued to urge the legislature to pass
measures “to vindicate the insulted dignity of government.”329 The legislature complied with a draconian Riot Act drawn up by Samuel Adams—
formerly a ﬁrebrand, in causes of his own.330 The legislature also passed
acts suspending habeas corpus, permitting the arrest and indeﬁnite detention of any person suspected of being “unfriendly to government” and
punishing seditious speech.331 After government troops routed the
323. A., Letter to the Editor, Mass. Centinel, Jan. 17, 1787, at 138.
324. Fisher Ames, Works of Fisher Ames 102 (1809).
325. Gov. James Bowdoin, An Address to the Good People of the Commonwealth, Mass.
Centinel, Jan. 17, 1787, at 137.
326. Id.
327. Letter from James Bowdoin, Governor, to Benjamin Lincoln (Jan. 19, 1787), in
George Richards Minot, The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts, in the Year 1768,
and the Rebellion Consequent Thereon 99, 99–100 (1788).
328. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 90. While “some” disliked the prospect of arming
against citizens, Fisher Ames called this “absurd[]” arguing that in the “zeal of their
philanthropy against shedding blood,” those who objected “seemed wholly to forget, that
the right of self defence belongs to rulers as plainly as to private men.” Ames, supra note
324, at 105; see also John W. Malsberger, The Political Thought of Fisher Ames, 2 J. Early
Republic 1, 2 (1982) (contextualizing Ames).
329. Governour Bowdoin’s Speech, supra note 292, at 331.
330. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 83.
331. Id. at 83–84.
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Regulators in a major confrontation in February 1787, the legislature tried
to reduce the threat the Shaysites posed to the constitutional order by passing a Disqualiﬁcation Act. The Act made insurrectionists ineligible for
juries or public office and stripped them of their vote.332 The Act also
barred them from serving as “school-masters, innkeepers, or retailers of
spiritous liquors,” in a nod to the importance of these professions as
community thought leaders.333 When Shaysite candidates were elected to
office in the next election in deﬁance of the law, the legislature refused to
seat them.334
But not everyone agreed with the government response, not even
those of the governing class. Judge William Whiting would endure having
his court shut down by one of the riots. But after seeing the plight of the
agrarian citizenry, he wrote under a pseudonym expressing sympathy with
the rioters. He argued that the fundamental purposes of government were
“the equal Protection, Prosperity, and Happiness of all its Subjects,” and
when one part of the citizenry was able to enrich themselves at the expense
of all the others, “that Government is either defective in its original
Constitution, or else the Laws are unjustly and unequally administered.”335
Further, when the people’s liberties or property were encroached upon
without any other avenue of redress, it was a “Virtue in them to disturb the
government.”336
Addressing the Regulators directly, Whiting wrote that while “those
that Now Stile themselves the Government” have asserted that “you have
done Extremely Wrong in adopting those Violent measures,” they had no
authority in the matter.337 “[A]s you Consist of a Major part of the
Inhabitants . . . None but God Almighty has a Right to Call you to an
account for That Wrong.”338 Giving voice to a theme that had matured
during the American Revolution, Judge Whiting pointed to the “maxim in
Monarchial Governments that the King Can Do no Wrong” and argued

332. Id. at 106.
333. Id. This measure reﬂected the worry, as Ames put it, that “almost every tavern and
conversation circle were infested with the harangues of the emissaries of treason, who
without fear or measure reviled the government, and without shame perverted the truth,
the opinions of the people at large were inevitably tainted.” Ames, supra note 324, at 105.
334. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 114.
335. Gracchus, Some Brief Remarks on the Present State of Publick Affairs, in Riley,
supra note 312, at 131, 131.
336. Riley, supra note 312, at 124.
337. William Whiting, Some Remarks on the Conduct of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Interrupting the Siting of the Judicial Courts in Several
Counties in that State: To Which Is Added an Appendix Extracted From the Antient Roman
History, in Riley, supra note 312, at 140, 152.
338. Id. at 152–53.
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that “[w]ith much greater propriety, may it be Said, that the people of a
free Republikin Government Can Do no Wrong.”339
The Governor of Vermont also refused, at ﬁrst, to help neighboring
states capture fugitive Shaysites, arguing that “whenever people were
oppressed[,] they will mob,” and as such, it was not “the duty of this state
to be aiding in hauling them away to the halter.”340 And Thomas Jefferson,
writing from France, deplored the overheated reaction to the Shaysites,
asking whether “history [can] produce an instance of a rebellion so honourably conducted?”341 For Jefferson, the violence of the insurrection was
part of what made it honorable. Was it possible for a country to remain
free, he asked, if “rulers are not warned from time to time that their people
preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. . . . The tree of liberty
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and
tyrants.”342 He granted that the people might be mistaken in their anger,
but he said that in those cases, “the remedy is to set them right as to facts,
pardon and pacify them.”343 After all, “the people” cannot always be “well
informed,” and “if they remain quiet under such misconceptions[,] it is a
lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty.”344
In conventional narratives of the Founding era, this is where our story
changes from a boisterous experiment to the sober commitment to
“ordered liberty,” establishing the great nation that endures to this day.345
Similar violent protests occurred in the same span of time in Maryland,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia, where, in 1787,
James Madison reported that prisons, courthouses, and clerk’s offices were
being “willfully burnt.”346 And it was these popular insurrections—
339. Id. at 153. When Judge Whiting was prosecuted for sedition for making these
remarks, he protested that these were ideas that he had learned from Trenchard and
Gordon, “Writings which I have always been taught to consider as authodox political
sentiments.” Id. at 128. He was amazed that it could now be considered “criminal to avow
such sentiments,” when “it would have been almost [a capital offense] Ten years ago to have
contradicted or denyed them.” Id. Whiting was not the only person to notice an
inconsistency in patriot leaders, so lately traitors against the British monarch, who now gave
no sympathetic ear to their own domestic insurgency. Time and again, elites had cause to
reﬂect that “[t]he people have turned against their teachers the doctrines, which were
inculcated in order to effect the late revolution.” See Ames, supra note 324, at 101.
340. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 117–18.
341. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in 12
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 355, 355–57 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Wood, Creation of the American Republic, supra note 10, at 606–15
(arguing that the “revolution marked an end of the classical conception of politics and the
beginning of what might be called a romantic view of politics”).
346. Szatmary, supra note 305, at 124–26; Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 The Papers of James Madison 163, 163–65 (Robert A.
Rudland, Charles F. Hobson, William M.E. Rachal & Frederika J. Teute eds., 1977).
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demanding debt relief, ignoring their betters, imagining an economically
equitable society (and, while they were at it, despising lawyers)—that
helped nationalists ﬁnally convince enough leading statesmen to gather in
convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.347
Once those men were gathered on the false pretext of considering
amendments to the Articles of Confederation, the recent unrest made
them more willing to hear the suggestion that they instead replace the
Articles wholesale so as to disempower the people in multiple ways.
Indeed, Jefferson worried that the “[Constitutional] Convention ha[d]
been too much impressed by the insurrection of Massachusets” and would
do too much in the new constitution to prevent similar unrest like it under
the new government.348 This was an instinct he compared to “setting up a
kite to keep the hen yard in order.”349
But the result of the constitutional convention’s efforts did not justify
Jefferson’s fears. Nor did the habits, attitudes, or constitutional thinking
of the Founding era justify the historians’ narrative shift away from
“licentiousness” and toward a staid and safe republicanism. For one thing,
ratiﬁcation almost failed in Massachusetts.350 Importantly, it almost failed
there because Massachusettsians were so angry about the draconian
measures that the state government had taken to suppress Shays’
Rebellion that they elected a wave of Anti-Federalist types into state office
the following year—in spite of the fact that hundreds of men in western
counties had been stripped of their vote under the Disqualiﬁcation Act.351
At the Ratiﬁcation Convention itself, a Federalist noted that “[m]any of
the insurgents” had been elected, “even some of Shays’s officers.”352 The
ﬁnal vote for ratiﬁcation was 187 to 168—an unimpressive victory,
especially given the traditional electoral heft of the mercantile eastern
portions of the state.353 If Massachusetts had not ratiﬁed the federal
Constitution, New York and Virginia may not have followed.354 And
347. Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States
Constitution 74 (2016) (“Shay’s Rebellion, together with the tax and debt relief measures
enacted in most states during the mid 1780s, played a critical role in . . . the calling of the
Constitutional Convention.”).
348. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, supra note 341, at 356–57.
349. Id. at 357.
350. Richard D. Brown, Shays’s Rebellion and the Ratiﬁcation of the Federal
Constitution, in Beyond Confederation, supra note 24, at 113, 122–23 [hereinafter Brown,
Shays’s Rebellion] (“This mobilization of country representatives threatened to swamp the
Constitution in a wave of antigovernment, antilawyer, antiestablishment reaction . . . .”) .
351. Id. at 115–16, 127 (“[I]n Massachusetts the heavy-handed repression of the
rebellion created a nearly disastrous backlash against the Constitution.”).
352. Letter from Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington (Feb. 3, 1788), in Debates
and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Held in the
Year 1788, and Which Finally Ratiﬁed the Constitution of the United States 404, 405 (1856).
353. Brown, Shays’s Rebellion, supra note 350, at 122, 125.
354. Id. at 127.
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without the four states in which the new nation’s legal, commercial,
intellectual, and reputational powers were concentrated (New York,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Virginia), it is unlikely that the United
States could have been a going concern.
III. ORDERED LIBERTY?
When the federal Constitution was ﬁnally ratiﬁed in 1788, it took
effect alongside Americans’ unwritten constitutions and the constitutionalism of force that had propelled the confrontation with British rule. The
Founders understood this. They drafted the Constitution and Bill of Rights
to complement, rather than replace, the customary rights they fought to
vindicate against the British—they said so explicitly.355 But Americans’
enduring belief that only constant vigilance and active, forceful opposition
to any encroachment could protect their freedoms put federal power on
a collision course with popular legitimacy from the start.356
During the Revolution, common men had come to believe that a
“Constitution, framed by the People” should work “for the advantage of
the governed ” to secure their “liberty.”357 That was its only “ﬁxed
principle”—everything else could “be changed or modiﬁed when and as
often as a majority of that People think ﬁt.”358 Having attained
Independence, the Federalists and their supporters saw this kind of
thinking, with all of its creative—and destructive—potential as a direct
threat to their national project. “The die long spun doubtful,” said one,
“whether anarchy and disgrace; or government and honor were to crown
our labors: Having secured the latter, the idea, that we have agreed on no
ﬁxed principles, must make us pause in anguish.”359
“Liberty,” leading Federalists urged, “is order.”360 They denounced
“innovation” and “change” in government as “anarchy.”361 And they
warned against “factious men” who “seem to think the business of
government consists in perpetual change” and that “to undo and to do well,
are things of synonymous import.”362 A “government of the people, and its
most necessary institutions,” they argued, cannot be “adapted to the

355. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. X.
356. See Bouton, supra note 251, at 261 (arguing that after the Revolution, common
folk in Pennsylvania believed that “politics was not . . . primarily about voting,” but instead
a year-round effort to “regulat[e] the government to act on behalf of the governed”).
357. Philadelphia, May 21, Gazette U.S., May 21, 1791, at 27.
358. Bouton, supra note 251, at 258; Philadelphia, May 21, Gazette U.S., supra note 357,
at 27.
359. Philadelphia, May 21, Gazette U.S., supra note 357, at 27.
360. Communication, Gazette U.S., Jan. 23, 1793, at 271.
361. Id.
362. Cato, Opinion, From the American Daily Advertiser, Gazette U.S., Oct. 3, 1792, at
141 [hereinafter Cato, From the American Daily Advertiser].
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passions of the day.”363 Instead, “A wise nation will prefer such regulations
as secure permanency.”364 This vision of “ordered liberty” turned Real
Whig rhetoric on its head, insisting that the vigilance and suspicion long
regarded as a public virtue was now vice and that it was government, not
the governed, that deserved solicitude and protection.365
It is unclear how many converts these efforts won. The administration’s opponents, including elites who would later align with the
Jeffersonian Republicans, worried that Federalists advocated stasis out of
a wrong-headed ambition, as Madison put it, that government “may by
degrees be narrowed into fewer hands, and approximated to an hereditary
form.”366 And these ideas about order appear to have had very little impact
on people they most needed to reach: those folk who continued to
violently resist government programs. Americans on the frontier may not
even have noticed these efforts in the press and congressional debates to
redeﬁne the terms of the constitutional order they continued to embrace.
Alexander Hamilton’s hated excise on distilled alcohol was the ﬁrst
attempt at a new top-down style of constitutional governance in the new
Republic. To Federalists, the excise soon became a test of whether “the
laws of the United States” could be “set aside and repealed in the corner
of one State”—the Pennsylvania hinterlands where popular resistance to
the excise would ignite the Whisky Rebellion.367 To its opponents, “[t]he
fate of this excise law” would “determine whether the powers of the
government” were “held by an aristocratic junto or by the people.”368 Its
ultimate failure in an outburst of violent resistance offered a vivid demonstration that Americans would remain vigilant and suspicious of their
government even with the beloved General Washington at its helm.

363. Communication, Gazette U.S., supra note 360, at 271.
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Cato, From the American Daily Advertiser, supra note 362, at 142 (“Are
there not men among us, who . . . seem to think . . . that the people can never be happy or
safe, but when they are uneasy and alarmed? . . . [L]et us be upon our guard against their
machinations . . . .”); Communications, Gazette U.S., June 5, 1793, at 423 (stating that some
“comfort themselves” that distrust of government will “keep the government right,” but “it
would be hard to see how a free government can be made honest and fair in its
administration, by the basest suspicions, and the most unmeasured abuse”). Another writer
explained:
Without this support of the lovers of order, the government of this
country would not have so much as the shadow of force. Its life is in every
man’s hand, and every good man will consider this trust as a sacred one.
It is such a man’s duty, as well as his interest, to watch for the government
which he has assisted to establish.
Original Communications, Gazette U.S., Feb. 8, 1792, at 327.
366. James Madison, Letter to the Editor, Nat’l Gazette, Sept. 22, 1792, at 378.
367. From the Connecticut Courant, Gazette U.S., Nov. 10, 1792, at 185.
368. Centinel, Excise Law, Nat’l Gazette, May 7, 1792, at 218.
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Hamilton himself anticipated the crisis he would provoke. During the
ratiﬁcation debates, Hamilton had argued that “[t]he genius of the people
will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws.”369 Yet,
just three years later, as Secretary of the Treasury, he made an excise on
distilled spirits a keystone of his federal budget strategy.370 This turnaround struck some as a stunning disregard for the popular will. The “table
of Congress was covered with petitions from the people complaining of
the excise law as a grievance,” opponents of the measure argued.371 And
yet, all of “[t]hese petitions were neglected.”372 To others, it seemed
deliberately provocative.373
The excise faced the united opposition of virtually every representative from frontier districts in Congress.374 These representatives knew that
Hamilton’s proposal would face determined resistance. Because of poor
road infrastructure leading east to state market centers, and because international politics complicated access to other markets via the Mississippi
River, distilling grain into alcohol might be the only way a frontier farmer
could make a proﬁt on his crop.375 A tax on distilled liquor thus imposed
its greatest burdens on those who had least to give and who believed they
beneﬁtted the least from federal services and protection.376 Further, westerners retained all the localist antipathy toward internal taxation that had
motivated Patriots in the 1760s, as well as old frontier resentments about
the burdens of serving on the front lines of an ongoing war for territory
with Native Nations.377 The American people had ever been governed un-

369. The Federalist No. 12, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
370. See Murrin, supra note 134, at 410 (“Through the whiskey excise Hamilton hoped
to establish beyond question the government’s power to tax internally.”); see also William
Maclay, The Journal of William Maclay 387 (1890) (assigning credit to Hamilton bitterly for
the excise—“Congress may go home[;] Mr. Hamilton is all-powerful and fails at nothing he
attempts”); Freeman W. Mayer, A Note on the Origins of the “Hamiltonian System”, 21
Wm. & Mary Q. 579, 581 (1964) (assigning the credit to Hamilton for the excise and the
funding program it ﬁt into).
371. Centinel, Excise Law, Nat’l Gazette, supra note 368, at 218.
372. Id.
373. Indeed, some have wondered whether Hamilton wanted to provoke a crisis. See
Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush the Whiskey
Rebellion, 59 J. Am. Hist. 567, 567 (1972) (describing the question about whether
“Hamilton provoked the rebellion in order to enhance the government’s stature with a show
of military power” as a “major historiographic controversy”). Historian Thomas P. Slaughter
cautions that “no one man, not even the forceful and brilliant Alexander Hamilton, could
create a ‘rebellion’ alone,” and to attribute the entire thing to him would be “foolish.”
Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American
Revolution 123 (1988) [hereinafter Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion].
374. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 105.
375. Id. (explaining adverse effects on frontier populations).
376. Id. at 108–10.
377. See id. at 93–94.
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der fulsome unwritten constitutions, and only very recently written ones.378
A very clear-cut precept of the frontiersman’s constitutionalism was that
excise taxes were unconstitutional.379
Perhaps Hamilton believed that westerners would pay his tax, but no
one who knew them seemed to think so. A Pennsylvania senator noted that
his home state had to “wink” at the loss of its own tax revenue in its western
counties.380 As for Hamilton’s excise, he said, “nothing short of a
permanent military force could effect it.”381 He wondered, darkly, whether
an excuse for a standing army was what Hamilton actually wanted. He
believed that “war and bloodshed” would be its “most likely
consequence.”382 An article written under the pseudonym “Centinel”
noted the same inevitable problems with enforcement or, as the author
put it, the fact that “the free citizens of America will not quietly suffer the
well born few to trample them under foot.”383 The author said that to
“support their weak, wicked and unjust laws” friends of the excise had
promoted a companion law that would allow the president “to make use
of the militia of one state to put the excise law and other laws in force in
another.”384 The use of “foreign” armies to subdue locals raised some of
the same concerns as a standing army.385
The questions savvy men were asking, therefore, even before the tax
became law, were what measures the federal government was prepared to
take against inevitable popular resistance and whether those measures
threatened tyranny. A year later, as active rebellion against the excise made
these questions concrete, Madison published anonymous articles warning
of a growing “division” of men who seemed to believe that “mankind are
incapable of governing themselves” and “that government can be carried

378. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Fundamental Constitution, 30 Stan. L.
Rev. 843, 874–75 (1978) (explaining ubiquity of unwritten constitutions in preRevolutionary United States). See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founder’s Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987) (exploring the “multiple sources of
fundamental law,” beyond the Constitution that “the founding generation . . . envisioned”).
379. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 112.
380. Id. at 98.
381. Maclay, supra note 370, at 388.
382. Id.
383. Centinel, Excise Law, Nat’l Gazette, supra note 368, at 218.
384. Id.
385. Id.; see also E. Wayne Carp, The Problem of National Defense in the Early
American Republic, in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits, supra note 224,
at 14, 19–22 (tracing the source, in Real Whig ideology and seventeenth-century British
history, of colonists’ distrust of professional standing armies and their preference for local
militia). This article possibly referred to the Militia Act, which became law in 1792. See Act
of Dec. 12, 1812, ch. 3, 2 Stat. 787, 787 (“An Act for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions . . . .”).
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on only by the pageantry of rank, the inﬂuence of money and
emoluments,” and also “the terror of military force.”386
It is tempting to see the Federalists and the other politicians of this
era who landed on the court side of a court–country divide as heralds of
the system we enjoy today because so many of their actions and arguments
seem familiar to us. But the similarities are misleading. Hamilton’s
apparent belief that getting his excise through Congress gave the
government the right to enforce it—a notion that might be taken as a
given now—was far from settled in his day. It was a “slavish doctrine,” said
a group of Germantown, Pennsylvania manufacturers, railing against
another of Hamilton’s proposed statutes, “that every law enacted by the
legislature ought to be obeyed.”387 Statutes, like other government actions,
might impair constitutional liberty, and “every attempt made by the
legislature to destroy” the “rights of man” “ought to be opposed by a free
people.”388 Hamilton knew that the excise was against “[t]he genius of” this
“people.”389 Their community consensus continued to deﬁne their rights.
Seen from the perspective of its time, Congress’s decision to impose the
excise on western regions was at least heedless, if not actually aggressive.
The excise immediately confronted resistance. One set of efforts was
limited to a series of conventions culminating in petitions, led by men like
future Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin.390 Others took up arms. In
Pennsylvania, an army officer who dared to rent space to an excise officer
was forced to rescind his hospitality after a mob in Indian dress threatened
to burn his home to the ground.391 Distillers in Augusta, Virginia resolved
to oppose the tax until they could “petition for redress or repeal [it] by
force.”392 The excise inspector in the western region of North Carolina
resigned because of violent threats.393 In western South Carolina, excise
agents likewise faced “obstructions” and “menaces so violent and serious
386. James Madison, For the National Gazette, A Candid State of Parties, Nat’l Gazette,
Sept. 26, 1792, at 378; see also Madison’s National Gazette Essays, 19 November 1791–20
December 1792 (Editorial Note), Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0103
[https://perma.cc/4GW8UE7U] (“JM wrote eighteen unsigned essays that Philip Freneau published in the National
Gazette between 21 November 1791 and 22 December 1792.”).
387. Madison, For the National Gazette, A Candid State of Parties, Nat’l Gazette, supra
note 386, at 378.
388. Id.
389. Hamilton, supra note 369, at 93.
390. See Declaration of the Committee of Fayette County, September, 1794, in 1 The
Writings of Albert Gallatin 4, 4–9 (Henry Adams ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879).
391. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 109, 114–15 (recounting
these incidents of violence); see also Peterson, Constitutionalism in Unexpected Places,
supra note 32, at 571–72 (providing context for the Indian dress of the rioters). For a
description of a similar incident, see Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at
113.
392. See Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 118.
393. Id. (“The excise inspector of the western region resigned because of harassment.”).
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as to occasion the collector to refrain from the execution of his duty.”394
The same was true in Georgia, and the U.S. Treasury received not a penny
of excise tax income from the entire state of Kentucky.395
In the face of this violent resistance, the federal government dithered.
Members of the administration were afraid to incur the political costs of
raising what looked like a “standing army” without a clear and effective
plan for its use.396 And they had real doubts that they could ﬁeld a force at
all. Pennsylvania’s governor, Thomas Mifflin, warned George Washington
that the willingness of the militia to take part in an operation to put down
the insurrection “would essentially depend on their opinion of its justice
and necessity.”397 There was also the possibility that federal forces might
suffer a humiliating defeat in the ﬁeld. As the conﬂict escalated in western
Pennsylvania in 1792, Alexander Hamilton fretted over whether

394. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Tench Coxe to
Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 19, 1792), in 7 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 599, 600–01
(Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1967)).
395. Id. at 117. A poet calling himself a “North-Carolina Planter” summarized some old
Revolutionary themes, renewed for this cause:
The countrys’ a’ in a greetin mood
An some are like to rin red-wud blud;
Some chaps whom freedom’s spirit warms
Are threatning hard to take up arms,
And headstrong in rebellion rise
‘Fore they’ll submit to that excise: Their liberty they will maintain,
They fought for’t, and they’ll ﬁght again
A Member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, and a Delegate From the Counties that Oppose
the Excise-Law, South-Carolina State Gazette, Oct. 9, 1794, at 2. The entire poem is well
worth a read.
396. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Sept. 17, 1792), in 11
The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series 126, 126 (Christine Sternberg Patrick
ed., 2002) (stating that “the employing of the regular Troops” should be “avoided, if it be
possible to effect order without their aid; otherwise, there would be a cry at once ‘The cat is
let out; We now see for what purpose an Army was raised’”).
397. See Letter from Thomas Mifflin to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1794), in 16 The
Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, supra note 396, at 514, 517 (“I [do] not
think it [will] be an easy task to embody the Militia, on the present occasion.”). Mifflin
further wrote:
The Citizens of Pennsylvania (however a part of them may, for a while, be
deluded) are the friends of law and order: but when the inhabitants of
one district shall be required to take arms against the inhabitants of
another, their general character does not authorise me to promise a
passive obedience to the mandates of Government.
Id. “As freemen,” Mifflin argued, “they would enquire into the cause and nature of the
service proposed to them; and, I believe, that their alacrity in performing, as well as in
accepting it, would essentially depend on their opinion of its justice and necessity.” Id.; see
also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington (July 25, 1792), in 12 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra note 394, at 83, 84 (asking whether the Virginia militia
was reliable—“If process should be violently resisted in the parts of N Carolina bordering
on your state, how much could be hoped from the aid of the Militia of your State”).
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Washington himself should command the troops in the event that
“application of force” became “unavoidable.”398 If “such outrages
[should] be committed as to force the attention of Govt. to its Dignity,”
John Jay advised him, it was essential that the government leave “nothing
to Hazard.”399
By the summer of 1794, the resistance had become intolerable. After
an angry crowd of men descended on his lodging, a tax collector named
John Neville opened ﬁre, killing a man.400 In the exchange of gunﬁre that
ensued, several more were injured.401 A few weeks later, a group of between
ﬁve and seven hundred men led by a major in the Pennsylvania militia
marched to Neville’s home.402 After exchanging gunﬁre for an hour with
federal soldiers guarding the residence, the mob’s leader was killed.403 The
men then torched Neville’s home and forced the soldiers’ surrender.404
About a week later, agitators heard that moderates in Pittsburgh had
written letters criticizing the insurrectionists.405 This was excuse enough to
rally about seven thousand men, who threatened to reduce the town to
ashes.406 It was in part a well-timed delegation of emissaries from
Pittsburgh, promising that its offending citizens had been expelled—and
offering the men a gift of several barrels of whiskey—that saved the town
from destruction.407
These outrages drove Washington to agree at last to the military
response for which Hamilton had been advocating for two years.408 The
conﬂict over the excise had become a test not only of the national
government’s capacity to enforce its laws as a practical matter but of its
authority to do so. It was, in Hamilton’s words, no less than a “crisis” over
“whether Government can maintain itself.”409 The excise was a national tax
meant to support shared expenses. It made no sense to collect it only from
the willing—to do so would make the “[b]urdens” of the law “unequal.”410
But if Pennsylvanian frontiersmen could render the law a dead letter in
398. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Sept. 3, 1792), in 12 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton, supra note 394, at 316, 317.
399. Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Sept. 8, 1792), in 12 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton, supra note 394, at 334, 335.
400. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 179.
401. Id.
402. Id.; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1794), in 17
The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra note 394, at 24, 54–57.
403. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 180.
404. Id.
405. See id. at 185.
406. See id. at 186–87.
407. Id. at 187–88.
408. Id. at 192–93, 196.
409. Kohn, supra note 373, at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Alexander Hamilton).
410. From the Connecticut Courant, Gazette U.S., supra note 367, at 185.
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their region, then government would be conﬁned to legislation by
consensus—an impossible task on a national scale.411 The question was
therefore whether the frontiersmen’s “resistance” would “controul the
government.”412 “If such proceedings were tolerated,” Washington argued,
“there was an end to our Constitution & laws.”413
But committing troops to the insurgency posed its own, potentially
catastrophic risks to the national government. Secretary of State Edmund
Randolph warned that the four Pennsylvania counties where a “radical and
universal dissatisfaction with the excise” was “perva[sive]” were home to
“more than ﬁfteen thousand white males” of ﬁghting age.414 This number
would be augmented, Randolph thought, by friends and kindred who
might come to their aid: “If the militia of other states are to be called forth,
it is not a decided thing, that many of them may not refuse.”415 And even
if other states’ militia did come, the presence of foreign troops
“introduced into the bosom of their country” might forge a “strong
cement” between otherwise loyal Pennsylvanian militia and those sympathetic to the insurgency.416 A conﬂict among white citizens, moreover,
would draw manpower away from another battlefront. “[I]s it possible to
foresee,” Randolph asked, “what may be the effect of ten, twenty or thirty
thousand of our citizens being drawn into the ﬁeld against as many
more[?]”417 He urged Washington to consider that “[t]here is another
enemy in the heart of the Southern States, which would not sleep, with
such an opportunity of advantage.”418 He spoke, of course, of the slaves.
Even if the government could muster enough troops to put down the
insurgents, the legitimacy of popular violence meant that victory in battle
carried its own risks.419 “[N]otwithstanding the indignation, which may be
raised against the insurgents,” Randolph warned, “if measures,
unnecessarily harsh, disproportionately harsh, and without a previous trial
of every thing, which law and the spirit of conciliation can do, be executed,
that indignation will give way, and the people will be estranged from the
411. Id.; see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, supra note
402, at 58 n.88 (expressing the same sentiment as this Article in crossed-out paragraphs at
the end of the letter).
412. From the Connecticut Courant, Gazette U.S., supra note 367, at 185.
413. Kohn, supra note 373, at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting George
Washington).
414. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1794), in 16 The
Papers of George Washington, supra note 397, at 523, 525.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 526.
418. Id.
419. See Kohn, supra note 373, at 568 (“The most vexing problems for George
Washington and his advisers were . . . whether a military expedition would restore order and
respect for the law [or would instead] provoke . . . deeper disrespect for the whiskey excise
and the federal government’s authority generally.”).
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administration.”420 What Randolph here described was the very dynamic
that almost defeated ratiﬁcation in Massachusetts in the wake of Shays’
Rebellion.421 Americans felt this way, Randolph explained, because “they
are conﬁdent, that they know the ultimate sense of the people” and that
in the end, “the will of the people must force its way in the government.”422
Heeding this advice, Washington ﬁrst dispatched a peace commission
authorized to “grant blanket amnesty for all unlawful acts as well as
absolution from previously uncollected excise taxes.”423 At the same time,
the administration carefully embarked on a strategy to test public
sentiment and to bring, if it could, “the weight of the public opinion”
behind the use of military force.424 This public relations campaign
included the wide publication of a letter Washington commissioned from
Hamilton explaining in Real Whig terms that what was happening in
western Pennsylvania was nothing like the wholesome riots in the lead-up
to the Revolution.425
420. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 414, at 527.
421. See supra notes 305–313 and accompanying text.
422. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 414, at 527.
423. Kohn, supra note 373, at 575–78. These efforts at conciliation would fail. When the
commission arrived, they were soon convinced that the rebels would never submit to the law
and were only stalling “until cold weather made military operations impossible.” Id. at 577–
78; see also Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 192–94 (articulating other
reasons, including worries about international affairs, that made a confrontation in
Pennsylvania seem necessary).
424. Letter from William Bradford to Elias Boudinot, in 2 The Life, Public Services,
Addresses and Letters of Elias Boudinot, LL. D., President of the Continental Congress 86,
87 (J.J. Boudinot ed., 1896).
425. See Kohn, supra note 373, at 575–76 n.38 (noting that “Washington asked
Hamilton to prepare” the document at a cabinet meeting on August 6 but that “it was not
published until two weeks later”). This letter was reprinted around the country. See A
Statement From the Secretary of the Treasury of the Rise and Progress of the Malcontents
in the Inland Counties of Pennsylvania and the Southern States, With Regard to the Excise,
Norwich Packet, Sept. 4, 1794, at 1; A Statement From the Secretary of the Treasury of the
Rise and Progress of the Malcontents in the Inland Counties of Pennsylvania and the
Southern States, With Regard to the Excise, Wkly. Reg. (Norwich, Conn.), Sept. 9, 1794, at
1; A Statement From the Secretary of the Treasury of the Rise and Progress of the
Malcontents in the Inland Counties of Pennsylvania and the Southern States, With Regard
to the Excise, Rhode-Island Museum, Sept. 22, 1794, at 1; A Statement From the Secretary
of the Treasury on the Rise and Progress of the Malcontents of the Inland Counties of
Pennsylvania, and the Southern States, With Regard to the Excise, Spooner’s Vt. J., Sept. 29,
1794, at 1; From the American (Phil.) Daily Advertiser, Treasury Department, August 16,
1794, Greenﬁeld Gazette, Sept. 18, 1794, at 2; Treasury Department, August 5th, 1794,
Dunlap & Claypoole’s Am. Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), Aug. 21, 1794, at 1; Treasury
Department, August 5th, 1794, Gazette U.S. & Daily Evening Advertiser, Aug. 21, 1794, at 1;
Treasury Department, August 16, 1794, Am. Minerva & New-York (Evening) Advertiser,
Aug. 23, 1794 at 2; Treasury Department, August 5th, 1794, Conn. Courant, Sept. 1, 1794,
at 2; Treasury Department, Report on the Disturbances in the Western Part of Pennsylvania,
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Without questioning the legitimacy of popular resistance to unjust
laws, Hamilton tried to paint the protest as something very different. The
rebels, he contended, were “actuated not merely by the dislike of a
particular law, but by a disposition to render the Government itself
unpopular and odious.”426 This was not, in other words, a salutary example
of the people out-of-doors assembling to enforce the constitution. It was
instead, in Hamilton’s telling, a lawless, brutal rabble whose many outrages
included the senseless maiming of a deluded young man and the beating
of a citizen who had merely expressed an unpopular opinion.427 A man
sent to serve process on a group that had attacked a tax collector frankly
refused, for fear that “he should not have returned alive.”428 Another man
sent to serve writs in the rebellious counties was seized, whipped, tarred,
and feathered, and “after having his money and horse taken from him,
was blindfolded and tied in the woods, in which condition he remained
for ﬁve hours.”429 Mobs punished those who complied with the excise by
burning their homes and businesses, and officers of the law were
threatened with death unless they resigned their stations.430 In short, “the
ordinary course of civil process” had been found “ineffectual for enforcing
the execution of the law.”431
At the same time, Hamilton’s letter highlighted Washington’s efforts,
in keeping with Real Whig sensibilities, to humbly engage with
insurrectionists’ concerns. He catalogued the administration’s efforts to
revise the law, to parlay with the rebels, and to take other actions short of
confrontation, “evincing, unequivocally, the sincere disposition to avoid
this painful resort” to a military response, “and the steady moderation,
which have characterised the measures of the Government.”432
This groundwork freed George Washington, in the proclamation he
issued on the eve of his eventual military campaign, to make a strong
closing argument for the justice of government suppression. Washington
there characterized the Whiskey Rebels as a “treasonable opposition,”

Aug. 5th, 1794, Salem Gazette, Sept. 2, 1794, at 2; Treasury Department, August 16, 1794,
Guardian; or, New-Brunswick Advertiser, Sept. 2, 1794, at 1; Treasury Department, August
16, 1794, Potowmac Guardian & Berkeley Advertiser (Martinsburg, W. Va.), Sept. 8, 1794,
at 2; Treasury Department, August 16th, 1794, Hampshire Gazette, Sept. 10, 1794, at 2;
Treasury Department, August 16, 1794, Newhampshire & Vt. J.: or, Farmer’s Wkly. Museum,
Sept. 12, 1794, at 1; Treasury Department, August 16, 1794, S.C. State-Gazette & Timothy &
Mason’s Daily Advertiser, Sept. 17, 1794, at 1.
426. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, supra note 402, at 30.
427. Id. at 34.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 49.
431. Id. at 34.
432. Id. at 44–45.
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“propagating principles of anarchy” and “acts of insurrection.”433 The
time for popular resistance to duly enacted laws, Washington explained,
had passed. Now that Americans had the right to elect their
representatives, there could be no justiﬁcation for armed opposition.434
It would have been ironic indeed if Washington had won this point
on a battleﬁeld. But he did not. The conﬂict over the excise and its
aftermath instead attests to the endurance, after ratiﬁcation, of a
constitutionalism of force. Washington handily defeated the rebels, many
of whom ﬂed before his more organized forces.435 It was such a rout that,
after issuing a general amnesty to everyone in the area except a few
ringleaders, Washington felt compelled the following year to issue a full
pardon to the only two men unsympathetic enough to have been adjudged
guilty by Pennsylvania juries. But this military victory did not win the legal
argument Washington advanced in his proclamation.
Washington had been determined “to reduce the refractory to a due
subordination to the law.”436 “The misled,” he proclaimed triumphantly in
pardoning the defeated leaders of the resistance, had “abandoned their
errors, and pay the respect to our Constitution and laws which is due from
good citizens.”437 Yet the excise tax remained dead letter in the places
where it had faced resistance. Even after the defeat of the rebellion,
historian Thomas Slaughter explains that the government “still could not
collect internal taxes on the frontier.”438 Indeed, it became “a folk belief
that any attempt to enforce a national excise on liquor, except during time
433. George Washington, Proclamation of Sept. 25, 1794, in 3 Annals of Cong. app. at
1413, 1414 (1849).
434. Id. at 1415. This was not quite the unanswerable argument it seems as, rightly or
wrongly, westerners did not believe that their balance of representation in state and national
councils had ever been fairly apportioned or adequate to protect their unique interests. See
Bouton, supra note 251, at 261 (noting that after the Revolution, common folk in
Pennsylvania believed that “politics was not . . . primarily about voting,” but instead about
“regulating the government to act on behalf of the governed happened mostly outside the
polling place” and year-round, rather than “just on Election Day”). They would retain “a
political culture that valorized petitions and crowd protests over electoral politics.” Id. at
258. In the 1790s, “[t]he founding elite attempted to obliterate that idea of politics . . . and
to conﬁne political self-expression within an electoral system replete with barriers against
democracy.” Id. at 261; see also Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in
Pennsylvania, 1776–1790, at 221–27 (1942).
435. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 218, 220.
436. Washington, supra note 433, at 1414.
437. President George Washington, Seventh Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 8,
1795), in 4 Annals of Cong. 10, 12 (1855). “[T]he part of our country which was lately the
scene of disorder and insurrection, now enjoys the blessings of quiet and order.” Id.
438. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, supra note 373, at 226. In marching on the
Pennsylvanians, Slaughter observed, the Washington administration “helped to create” the
Jeffersonian-Republican “constituency.” Id. After that constituency elected Jefferson
President in 1800, the excise and all other internal taxes were repealed, and “[t]he
dominant ideological faith from 1800 through 1860 interpreted constitutional authority to
levy [internal] taxes . . . as reserved only for grave national emergencies.” Id.
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of war, would be met with another insurrection by liberty-loving
Americans.”439 This belief, “established by the Whiskey Rebellion,” was one
the “federal government never challenged” until “the Civil War.”440 The
rebellion ended, in other words, in a constitutional stalemate.
That has not stopped some from pointing to this episode as a turning
point. As recently as 2021, Akhil Amar—in a book that heavily glosses neoWhig scholarship—insisted that the military victory succeeded in making
Washington’s point that Americans could no longer “beat, maim, torture,
or kill” as a mode of protest.441 Setting aside Amar’s failure to engage with
the rebels’ constitutional claims, the story of the Whiskey Rebellion is
hardly a triumph for the forces of ordered liberty, much less a proud
assertion of a new method of interpreting the constitution and engaging
in disagreement over its meaning.442
In eighteenth-century America, a constitutional change of that
magnitude would have required a massive shift in the way people related
to one another and understood themselves as members of political
communities. Amar paints the defeat of the rebels as an example of
Washington harnessing “Hamilton’s greatness” to execute a “grand
strategy,” the “subtleties” of which the Pennsylvanian “backcountry folk
might not have grasped.”443 But the burden on anyone suggesting that
events in the 1780s and 1790s convinced the people that political
disagreements would be resolved by the terms of the written constitution
and paced by the calendar of elections is to show a meaningful and
widespread cultural change. Looking past the battleﬁeld to what came
next, what Amar calls Washington’s “grand strategy” appears to have been
far too subtle for many Americans to grasp.444 Indeed, the Federalists
would soon ﬁnd themselves back in the same predicament.
Within ﬁve years, Pennsylvanians once again took up arms against a
federal tax, throwing the Adams Administration into a new test of federal
authority. Faced with the threat of war with France, Alexander Hamilton
decided on yet another internal tax regime to raise funds for the national
defense. In contrast to the highly regressive whiskey tax, Hamilton
carefully designed his 1799 “house tax” to estimate wealth and to tax
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Akhil Reed Amar, The Words that Made Us: American’s Constitutional
Conversation, 1760–1840, at 383–87 (2021) [hereinafter Amar, The Words that Made Us]
(arguing that Washington’s militaristic suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion established
that, in a self-governing republic, critics of the government should “vote, serve on juries,
speak up, sue, and petition,” rather than engage in violent rebellion).
442. Cf. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 482 (1993) (opining
that the Whiskey Rebellion collapsed because the rebels’ “popular protest” was “stiﬂed by
the popular will and the force of republican principles,” personiﬁed by Washington riding
at the head of an army of militia).
443. Amar, The Words that Made Us, supra note 441, at 383, 387.
444. Id. at 383.
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people progressively based on the size and opulence of their homes.445 But
his proposals also included incendiary measures, including a Stamp Tax
similar to Britain’s hated tax of 1765, and a tax that assessed the vacant
lands of large speculators at a lower rate than the cultivated land of
smallholders.446
This time the resistance to the tax was concentrated in Bucks,
Montgomery, and Northampton—all Pennsylvania counties with high
German-speaking populations447—where citizens worried that the taxes
were part of a plot to recreate the feudal tenancies of Europe.448 In terms
that echoed pre-Revolutionary rhetoric, they charged that the new
measures would leave the people “Slaves.”449 More than a hundred men in
Northampton County signed a petition warning their local federal tax
assessor not to perform his duties, as the law was “unconstitutional.”450 A
preacher there encouraged a crowd that the people should “oppose the
law” or “otherwise” become “slaves.”451 Brandishing a book that “he
pretended contained the Constitution and laws of the country,” he told
the gathering that the Federalists’ laws contravened it.452 One of the
county militias erected a liberty pole and swore together that “they would
rather die than submit to the Stamp Act and the House Tax Law which was
Slavery and Taking the Liberty Away.”453 Men joined in associations of
mutual support, pledging not to submit to the tax law and “that in case
any one of them was put into conﬁnement upon account of the opposition
that they would rescue them.”454 Tax “assessors were taken and imprisoned
445. Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, 1 Stat. 580 (providing for the valuation of lands and
dwelling houses and the enumeration of slaves within the United States).
446. Id.; Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (laying duties on stamped vellum,
parchment, and paper); see also Paul Douglas Newman, Fries’s Rebellion: The Enduring
Struggle for the American Revolution 76–77 (2012) [hereinafter Newman, Fries’s
Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution] (noting that Hamilton
knew that the house tax “would behave regressively when applied to improved small farms
of modest taxable men as compared to the unimproved lands of wealthy speculators”).
447. Newman, Fries’s Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution,
supra note 446, at 7–8.
448. Paul Douglas Newman, Fries’s Rebellion and American Political Culture, 119 Pa.
Mag. Hist. & Biography 37, 48 (1995) [hereinafter Newman, Fries’s Rebellion and American
Political Culture] (quoting the deposition of Henry Ohl, given before Judge William Henry,
on April 27, 1799).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 54–55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the deposition of James
Williamson, given before Judge Richard Peters, on April 15, 1799).
451. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the deposition of John
Lehrfoss, given before Judge William Henry, on February 1, 1799).
452. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the deposition of John Lehrfoss,
given before Judge William Henry, on February 1, 1799).
453. Id. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the deposition of Philip
Wescoe).
454. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the deposition of Michael
Bobst, given before Judge William Henry, on January 28, 1799).
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by armed parties” and “mobs assembled to compel them, either to deliver
up their papers, or to resign their commissions.”455
A federal district court judge issued warrants for the arrest of the
agitators, sending a marshal to detain them since the local justice of the
peace and magistrate had joined the resisters.456 As the marshal retrieved
and conﬁned the arrestees in an inn in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, men
were already gathering in taverns in Bucks and Montgomery Counties to
discuss plans for a rescue.457 Some thought the tax laws were
unconstitutional.458 Others were of the opinion that the government’s
main wrong was in removing the arrestees from German-speaking counties
to Philadelphia, where they would have to face English-speaking juries.459
The rescue effort would eventually coalesce behind John Fries, a
captain of the Bucks County militia. Fries would later testify that he didn’t
know “who originally” thought of “rescu[ing] . . . the prisoners” or who
“assembled the people for the purpose—[t]he township seemed to be all
of one mind.”460 When Fries’s unit set out to march to Bethlehem, they
encountered another militia contingent from Northampton County that
had also mustered to the rescue.461 Arriving at the inn leading a combined
company of some hundred and ﬁfty men, Fries went in to parlay with the
marshal and soon secured the prisoners’ release.462

455. Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States During the Administrations of
Washington and Adams 493 (1849) (quoting the opening statement of prosecutor Samuel
Sitgreaves); see also id. at 512 (quoting testimony of Jacob Eyerly, tax assessor, noting that
he had difficulty ﬁnding deputies because locals “thought it was dangerous for them to
accept” the positions); id. at 513 (noting, in the same testimony, that “the assessor from
Hamilton township . . . told me that he had been obliged to ﬂy from his house in the night
to save his life, and begged of me to accept of his resignation”). A local judge testiﬁed that
it was difficult to take witness depositions about tax resistance, because members of the
militia paraded in uniform outside the building, peering and making faces at witnesses
through the windows. Id. at 536. One witness was “in [such] great terror . . . when he was
called up to give his testimony, he cried like a child, and begged, for God’s sake, that we
would not ask him, for that the people would ruin him when he returned home. Indeed, all
the witnesses were much agitated.” Id. at 536 (quoting testimony of Judge Henry). One tax
assessor was forced to swear allegiance to a mob as it beat him and threatened his life. Id. at
529–30. The poor young man told his abusers that because of these hardships, he was leaving
“the township with a view of not returning to it, unless compelled by authority, and from
their present treatment, if they ever catched me going back without that authority, I would
give them leave to shoot me.” Id. at 532 (quoting testimony of Jacob Eyerly).
456. Id. at 532–33.
457. Id. at 503 (testimony of William Nichols); id. at 517–22 (testimony of William
Thomas and George Mitchel).
458. Id. at 503.
459. Id. at 505–06; see also Newman, Fries’s Rebellion and American Political Culture,
supra note 448, at 56.
460. Wharton, supra note 455, at 534 (quoting the examination of John Fries).
461. Id. at 494–95, 498.
462. Id. at 500–01.
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The marshal would later testify at Fries’s trial for treason and sedition
that he had asked Fries to consider that he “and those about him would
be severely punished for this conduct, that he would surely be hanged.”463
Fries was unconcerned, the marshal recalled, explaining that “the stamp
act” and the “house-tax law” were “unconstitutional.”464 He “could not be
punished” in any event because “the government [was] not strong enough
to hang him, for . . . if the troops were brought out, they would join
him.”465 Fries’s testimony to the judge who took his deposition before trial
was similarly self-assured. Advised that he need not incriminate himself,
Fries had been not “at all disinclined” to discuss his actions and indeed
had the manner of “a man not having done anything wrong.”466 After all,
Fries had acted with the consensus of his community.
Echoing Washington’s proclamation, the prosecution urged that “it is
not necessary to say whether the complaints urged [against the tax laws]
were well or ill founded, because it is a settled point that any insurrection
for removing public grievances” was “treason,” as insurrection “is not the
mode pointed out by law for obtaining redress.”467 But the unwritten law
that validated Fries’s Rebellion could not so easily be brushed aside.
Although Fries was convicted and sentenced to death, the question of
what to do with him vexed the Adams Administration.468 The Federalists
had come to “suspect[] that it was the lack of capital punishment” after
the Whiskey Rebellion “that precipitated the second” spate of unrest,469
and so members of Adams’s cabinet were dismayed when they learned that
the President meant to pardon Fries and his associates.470 Adams heard
them out.471 But he expressed skepticism that what Fries had done really
amounted to treason, or even insurrection.472 Was Fries’s Rebellion “any
thing more than a riot,” asked the aging Patriot—even if it had been “high-

463. Id. at 505 (quoting testimony of William Nichols).
464. Id. (quoting testimony of William Nichols).
465. Id. (quoting testimony of William Nichols). This was Fries’s settled view. A tax
collector earlier testiﬁed that Fries had warned him to stop all the assessments or else “there
would be ﬁve or seven hundred men under arms here to-morrow by sunrise.” Id. at 524
(quoting testimony of James Chapman). When the assessor told him that the federal
government would respond militarily, Fries replied “if they do, we will soon try who is
strongest.” Id. (quoting testimony of James Chapman).
466. Id. at 535.
467. This was the opening statement of the prosecution in the ﬁrst of two trials. Id. at
492 (quoting Samuel Sitgreaves).
468. Id. at 636, 641.
469. Newman, Fries’s Rebellion and American Political Culture, supra note 448, at 38.
470. Id. at 39 n.6 (“All the secretaries agreed that at least Fries ought to hang.”).
471. Letter from John Adams to Heads of Department (May 20, 1800), in 9 The Works
of John Adams 57, 57–59 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854)
(probing whether a capital sentence for treason was warranted in Fries’s case).
472. Id.
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handed, aggravated, daring, and dangerous”?473 Would not the national
Constitution “acquire more conﬁdence in the minds of the American
people by the execution than by the pardon of one or more of the
offenders”?474
“It is in vain to expect or hope to carry on government against the
universal bent and genius of the people,” John Adams wrote in 1775.
“[W]e may whimper and whine as much as we will, but nature made it
impossible when she made men.”475 A quarter-century after
Independence, Adams knew the nation was still governed by constitutions
of consensus. Adams understood, perhaps better than Hamilton, the danger of ignoring the “genius of the people” and the risk that an
overreaction posed to the federal Constitution and the government it had
created.476 Adams followed through on his intentions and issued a pardon
to Fries and those awaiting execution alongside him.
*

*

*

The Whiskey Rebellion and Fries’s Rebellion put the newly
constituted government in a bind. The administration could not be seen
backing down in the face of violent intimidation. To do so, Washington
understood, would be the “end to our Constitution & laws.”477 But neither
could it deny the continued legitimacy of violent resistance to laws deemed
unjust by the body of the people.478 The federal government’s authority,
Edmund Randolph explained, still had to contend with “the ultimate
sense of the people.”479 That included the unlettered views of men like
Fries and his compatriots as to what was constitutional. What made it
difficult to convince militiamen to muster to confront the rebels, and what
made it ultimately impossible to execute their ringleaders, was that the
unwritten constitution they invoked had not been superseded.
Over time, Americans would become more committed to text and
institutions. The legal role of community consensus in the form of the lawﬁnding jury would be displaced by the embrace of the law-ﬁnding judge,
and over the course of the nineteenth century, there would be a turn to

473. Id. at 58.
474. Id.
475. Adams, Novanglus, No. 5, supra note 162, at 74–75.
476. Id.; The Federalist No. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
477. Kohn, supra note 373, at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting George
Washington, Conference at the President’s (Aug. 2, 1794), 4 Pa. Archives 122–24).
478. See Gregory Ablavsky, Two Federalist Constitutions of Empire, 89 Fordham L. Rev.
1677, 1680 (2021) (noting that “Federalists failed to anticipate how poorly their
antidemocratic efforts would fare in a political system in which opportunities for popular
control and dissent remained rife” and turned to currying “popular favor” by “deploying
federal power to placate” the “demands” of frontier whites).
479. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 414, at 527.
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formalism and institutionalization in law.480 But our nation’s evolution
toward institutionalization and text-based legalism has not meant that we
ever wholly gave up our constitutionalism of force.481 Americans have
instead made recourse to both tools of constitutional change.
Amid a robust culture of textual interpretation and hermeneutical
debate in the early nineteenth century, the Constitution continued to
evolve through the use and threat of force.482 One need only recall the
violent reactions of state governments to the rulings of the early Supreme
Court to ﬁnd that elites were ready to pick up arms when their legal
arguments failed and that sometimes a Supreme Court opinion amounted
to no more, as Ohio State Representatives put it, than “make-weight in
effecting a compromise.”483
Even the Founders’ debate over which style of interpretation should
be given to the written Constitution during the ﬁrst few decades of the
Republic at times gave way to the threat of violence.484 By the late 1820s,
John C. Calhoun had come to the conclusion that “a proper system of
construction” alone would not be able to resolve the debates over the
constitution’s meaning and that instead “power can only be met with
power.”485 Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans picked up
hermeneutics, institutionalism, and texts—and then put them down again
when those tools stopped working to achieve the ends they preferred.
Our constitutional order would continue to evolve through force,
most obviously during the Civil War and its aftermath. To be sure, not every
act of violent opposition to authority is an example of our
480. See generally Peterson, Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Authority, supra note
257, at 177–282.
481. Whether any development in legal culture can totally protect a society from constitutional change by force is a question for political scientists. What may be different about
our society is that, after the ﬁrst break from England, we have never accounted any of our
violent constitutional change “revolutionary.” Instead, we continue to insist that we have
lived under the same Constitution and in the same nation since a single Founding moment,
deﬁned as 1788, and not the more plausible 1870 (when the ﬁnal Reconstruction
Amendment was ratiﬁed).
482. See generally Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 Yale L.J. 2 (2020)
[hereinafter Peterson, Expounding the Constitution] (discussing debates about
interpretation of the constitution at the Founding).
483. See Right of a State to Tax a Branch of the United States Bank, 37 Annals of Cong.
1684, 1697 (1821) (asserting that “in great questions of political rights and political powers,
a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is not conclusive of the rights decided
by it”); Richard Ellis, Aggressive Nationalism 151–53 (2007) (discussing the Ohio legislature’s
reaction to McCulloch v. Maryland and the violent confrontation between U.S. Bank officials
and state agents that followed); R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court Under Marshall and
Taney 36 (2006) (discussing how Pennsylvania’s Governor reacted to United States v. Peters).
484. See Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, supra note 482, at 6–10 (discussing
debates about interpretation of the constitution at the Founding); id. at 36 (describing a
Southern congressman musing that a judge’s life would be in danger were he to follow the
mode of interpretation suggested by a Northern colleague).
485. Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constitutionalism of force.486 But when armed Americans have invoked the
constitution and customary rights in support of their claims, men like
Washington, Adams, and Randolph have understood that those claims
might have transformative potential.
And it adds little to ask whether an act of resistance is “illegal.” The
examples of Fries and the leaders of Shays’ Rebellion illustrate vividly that
punishing an act of violence as a crime cannot resolve the question of
whether the act amounts to a constitutional argument or whether the
argument will gain adherents. As he pondered whether executing Fries
would undermine his government’s efforts to establish its legitimacy, John
Adams knew better than to rely on Fries’s conviction for treason.487
When seeking out our constitutionalism of force in the historical record, nor is it useful to attempt to distinguish private and “official” conduct.
Were the members of the Pennsylvania militia who marched to liberate
federal prisoners by threat of force in Fries’s Rebellion private vigilantes?
During another “constitutional moment”—the Red Summer of 1919 and
the riots that followed—were the police officers who joined with the mobs
to burn Blacks’ homes and businesses to the ground “state actors”?488
These categories are not easily separable. And more importantly, what
makes a claim pursued in violence ultimately part of our constitutional
order is its post-hoc ratiﬁcation through the consensus of the community.
The presence or absence of state officers in the initial violence is therefore
entirely beside the point.489
486. Note that partial victories, pyrrhic victories, and dominance within a locality or
within a dominant discursive community but not in others may be enough to “count.” Total
dominance of a constitutional argument pressed through violence is not necessary for us to
see a claim as part of our constitutional order, any more than total dominance of a formal
legal idea is necessary for us to see it as a governing paradigm. Because constitutionalism by
praxis is necessarily local and often contested, it makes even more sense to speak of
constitutionalisms that one expects to ﬁnd in tension, overlapping, and at odds.
487. Newman, Fries’s Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution,
supra note 446, at 69–70.
488. During the span of years starting in the summer of 1919 and stretching into the
early 1920s, after Black veterans returned from World War I newly conﬁdent in their claims
to American rights and respect, white mobs engaged in brutal riots across the country
intended to beat Black communities back into a place of penury and oppression. See James
S. Hirsch, Riot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and Its Legacy 58–59 (2002). Those
riots included the 1921 destruction of Black Wall Street in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Randall
Kennedy, Preface to Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of
1921, at ix (2002). The perpetrators, including police officers, acted openly and with
impunity. Id. at 57–59. Was this private vigilantism or was it state action? Either way, the riots
certainly achieved their ends: the violent reordering of those communities and reassertion
of white political and economic dominance by force. See Hirsch, supra, at 58–59, 101–02,
127; see also Scott Ellsworth, Death in a Promised Land 54 (1982).
489. Deﬁning a constitution as how society is constituted, sweeping in all of a society’s
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In general, the way we think about and teach law as textual and
institutional breeds a strange naiveté on this issue, an expectation that
there will be clear lines between constitutional violence and private crime.
This is a naiveté that has never really been available to the Black citizen,
for whom, in many places and across generations, the police force has
blended imperceptibly into the vigilante posse comitatus.490 White citizens
may not notice this as much because the blurring redounds to their
beneﬁt. The Second Amendment, for instance, affords a white person the
ability to clothe himself with constitutional authority even as he poses a
direct threat to those around him.491 His actual violence is also more likely
to be found lawful.492 A white man’s home is his castle, and his home is the
State; he is at home in our shared nation and so he can “stand his ground.”
The Black citizen cannot.493 In the end, where rights reside in our society
nonvoluntary relationships and associations and including relationships among groups,
continues to be useful to us, in spite of the fact that it downplays the boundaries between
state and private action. In some contexts, it may be more useful than a deﬁnition of our
constitutional order that consists merely of the organization of the government and those
points of connection between the institutions of the state and individual private citizens.
This latter version is easier to describe and easier to teach, but it does not capture the
instrumentalities of power and sources of coercion by which our society is actually governed.
490. See, e.g., Ellsworth, supra note 488, at 100 (explaining the blending of police and
“vigilante” violence against Black citizens in Tulsa, Oklahoma).
491. See John R. Lott, Jr. & Rujun Wang, Concealed Carry Permit Holders Across the
United
States:
2021,
at
31
(2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3937627
[https://perma.cc/LS9A-U9QP] (ﬁnding that “whites still hold the vast majority of
[concealed ﬁrearm] permits”).
492. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Examining the Race Effects of Stand Your
Ground Laws and Related Issues 16 (2020), https://www.usccr.gov/ﬁles/pubs/2020/04-06Stand-Your-Ground.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WN6-97AB] (citing empirical research
showing that in states with Stand Your Ground laws, it is “ten times more likely” for a
homicide to be deemed justiﬁed “when the shooter is white and the victim is black, than if
the shooter is black and the victim is white”).
493. Id. Nor is the state as likely to step in to protect the Black citizen from the power
the armed white civilian has arrogated to himself, or punish his killer, even when the state
might impose consequences if the victim were white. See American Bar Association,
National Task Force on Stand Your Ground Laws: Report and Recommendations 13 (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity/SYG_Report_B
ook.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP25-KAMB] (“[A] white shooter who kills a black victim is 350
percent more likely to be found to be justiﬁed than if the same shooter killed a white
victim.”). We must see such arenas of conﬂict, suppression, and violence in which the state
regularly withholds its power, surveillance, and protection for what they are: not the absence
of law, but rather, consigned to governance by means other than institutions and text. See
Michele Goodwin, Pregnancy and the New Jane Crow, 53 Conn. L. Rev. 543, 562 (2021)
(connecting the law’s failure to protect Black citizens from mob violence during Jim Crow
to the many ways law now persecutes and fails to protect women of color of childbearing
age); Aziz Z. Huq, The Private Suppression of Constitutional Rights, Tex. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 6), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4072800%20
[https://perma.cc/8JRP-VKQP] (discussing that while laws like Texas’s S.B. 8 seem a “loss
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is not really a formal question that can be answered by reading and
interpreting a text or understanding a text’s institutional context,
although of course it is the duty of courts to strive to make it so. As a
practical matter, we can only understand our rights by understanding how
our society is constituted, and this is essentially a question about power.
Ours is a victor’s constitution. It includes violent claims that have been
ratiﬁed by elites or through community consensus and have become part
of the fabric of our formal law. In the decades following the Revolution,
successive American governments would continue to indulge violent
movements in which men willing to “live free or die” asserted their claims
to a vision of constitutional rights distinct from those envisioned by those
in formal positions of power.494 Some of those visions would thrive and
of control on the part of the state,” in practice they work “as a way for the state” to empower
private citizens to weaken constitutional constraints, magnifying its reach and achieving
policy changes otherwise difficult to effect). The blind zone perpetuated by qualiﬁed
immunity doctrine, for instance, and the perpetual refusal to create “clearly established”
rules governing conﬂict with police and carceral officials, is an active decision to reserve
those arenas to governance by violence. See William Baude, Is Qualiﬁed Immunity
Unlawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 45, 46–47 (2018) (arguing that the “technical legal
justiﬁcation[s]” of qualiﬁed immunity do not hold up). One cannot help but think qualiﬁed
immunity endures because of the lingering view that, just as before the Civil War, the police
state helps protect the “real” citizenry from an “internal enemy” and needs as much leeway
to do so as possible. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model
of Some of the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1484 (2016) (arguing that the qualiﬁed immunity
doctrine helps to explain police use of excessive force against Black Americans). When the
cannons ﬁre, the law falls silent.
494. Not all “constitutionalism of force” is populist. Throughout our history elites have
also had recourse to force change to the Constitution, and they enjoy distinct advantages
when they choose to use force to pursue their aims. Some of the armed groups in Southern
States after Reconstruction pursuing vicious campaigns of rape, murder, and torture were
nothing less than the Confederacy out of power, ﬁghting until they ﬁnally resumed control
of Southern state governance. See Carole Emberton, Beyond Redemption: Race, Violence,
and the American South After the Civil War 5, 8 (2013). When they retook power, they did
so with an internal hierarchy entirely intact. See id. at 182–92 (describing the “armed
assaults on local governments” that “white leagues and riﬂe clubs” executed as a spectacle
of Southern white unity and a demonstration of their military strength); Hahn, supra note
37, at 270 (noting that Klan “leaders generally had held rank in the [Confederate] army . . .
and were connected to families of local prominence”); see also Michele Goodwin, The
Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass Incarceration, 104 Cornell
L. Rev. 899, 990 (2019) (discussing the horrors Black men, women, and children suffered
in the post-war South and their helplessness in the face of the “collusion and complicity” of
local officials). But it is worth pausing a moment to ask what makes some violent populist
efforts more likely to succeed in becoming incorporated into our constitutional order. The
answer seems to be that violent populist movements have succeeded when elites could more
readily coopt them than suppress them. When the constitutional values a movement
expresses support the rule of a governing elite, or some portion of an elite, or its colonial
projects, the movement tends to be indulged. Consider, for instance, the anti-rent uprising
of 1840s New York. During these deadly land riots, angry tenants urged that New York’s
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would be incorporated into governance: when adopted as the
constitutional positions of major parties, or as formalized in legislation, or
in court judgments that either hewed to the constitutional positions of
violent groups or disclaimed judges’ power to correct them.495
But not all movements were indulged, of course, and not all men. In
1800, the same year Adams pardoned John Fries, a group of enslaved
Virginians plotted a bold armed rebellion. Gabriel Prosser intended to
lead an armed uprising to bring an end to his bondage and to all bondage
in Virginia while marching under a banner stitched with the words “death
or liberty.”496 The plot failed. The conspirators were betrayed, captured,
tortured, and taken to “trial.” Asked what he had to say for himself, one of
the insurrectionists responded:
I have nothing more to offer than what General Washington
would have had to offer, had he been taken by the British and
put to trial by them. I have adventured my life in endeavouring
to obtain the liberty of my countrymen, and I am a willing
sacriﬁce in their cause.497
Virginia did not hesitate to put this Black Nathan Hale ﬁgure to death,
along with more than two dozen of his associates.
CONCLUSION
The men and women who defended the Capitol on January 6, 2021,
experienced our violent constitutional heritage ﬁrst hand. Capitol Police
Officer Harry Dunn described “a sea of people,” with officers “engaged in
manorial tenancies were incompatible with republicanism. See Charles W. McCurdy, The
Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 1839–1865, at 252, 270–71 (2001). Some of
them were arrested and sentenced to death for the murder of an undersheriff, but the
Governor of New York commuted the sentences of some and pardoned the rest of those
facing the most severe sentences. Id. And though the anti-renter rioters never achieved their
speciﬁc aims, the rioters’ cause remained on New York’s policy agenda for two decades. Id.
This is because during the 1840s, the economic radicalism of the American Revolution still
formed part of the value system deﬁning Jacksonian Democracy. See Michael Feldberg, The
Turbulent Era: Riot and Disorder in Jacksonian America 4–7, 127–28 (1980) (arguing that
Americans saw rioting as a regular part of the political process during the Jacksonian
period). By contrast, in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, labor movements
were often crushed with government force, private force, or some combination. See Scott
Martelle, Blood Passion: The Ludlow Massacre and Class War in the American West 123–76
(2007) (describing how the Colorado National Guard and private militia violently
suppressed a coal miner strike in Ludlow, Colorado in 1914). Because economic radicalism
was no longer central to the identity of a major political party, elites could crush movements
based on constitutional claims to economic redistribution without sparking broader
accusations of hypocrisy or otherwise undermining the majoritarian basis of their power.
495. On the theme of judicial powerlessness, see Robert Cover, Justice Accused:
Antislavery and the Judicial Process 210 (1975).
496. Douglas R. Egerton, Gabriel’s Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800
and 1802, at 51–52 (1993).
497. Id. at 102.
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desperate, hand-to-hand ﬁghting with rioters across the West Lawn.”498 He
saw “rioters using all kinds of weapons against officers, including ﬂag
poles, metal bike racks they had torn apart, and various kinds of
projectiles.”499 Officers were “bloodied,” “many were screaming, and many
were blinded and coughing from chemical irritants being sprayed in their
faces.”500
Metropolitan Police Officer Daniel Hodges almost died when the
mob crushed him in a door, and he suffered injuries to his ribs, his skull,
and his eye socket. But his testimony before the House Select Committee
investigating the events of January 6 emphasized the destabilizing
psychological experiences of that day. He described how the rioters
justiﬁed and explained themselves even as they fought their way into the
Capitol. “Men alleging to be veterans told us how they had fought for this
country and were ﬁghting for it again.”501 Members of the crowd accused
him and the other officers of betraying the country they served, calling out
to him to “remember” his “oath.”502 Hodges recalled with indignation that
“[a]nother woman, who was part of the mob of terrorists laying siege to
the Capitol of the United States, shouted ‘Traitors!’”503 The crowd then
made this their chant.
Above all, throughout that brutal day, Officer Hodges remembered
the “terrorists alternated between attempting to break our defenses” and
“attempting to convert us.”504 He remembered one man who told him to
498. The Law Enforcement Experience on January 6th: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, at 01:19 (July
27, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/law-enforcement-experiencejanuary-6th (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Law Enforcement
Experience on January 6th]; see also Harry A. Dunn, Capitol Police Officer, Written
Statement to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol
2 (Jan. 27, 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IJ/IJ00/20210727/113969/HHRG117-IJ00-Wstate-DunnO-20210727.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6Q5-HX3U]
[hereinafter
Statement of Officer Harry Dunn].
499. Statement of Officer Harry Dunn, supra note 498, at 2.
500. Id.
501. Law Enforcement Experience on January 6th, supra note 498, at 01:06; see also
Daniel Hodges, Metropolitan Police Officer, Written Statement to the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol 3 (n.d.), https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IJ/IJ00/20210727/113969/HHRG-117-IJ00-Wstate-HodgesO-20210727.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FH8U-UMJ8] [hereinafter Statement of Officer Daniel Hodges].
502. Statement of Officer Daniel Hodges, supra note 501, at 2.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 3. Officer Harry Dunn, who is Black, and Sergeant Aquilino Gonell, who is
Dominican American, had a different experience that day from Officer Daniel Hodges. See
Ari Shapiro, Ashley Brown & Anna Sirianni, ‘This Is How I’m Going to Die’: Capitol Police
Sergeant Recalls Jan. 6 Attack, NPR (July 30, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
2021/07/30/1022909553/this-is-how-im-going-to-die-capitol-police-sergeant-recalls-jan-6-
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“show solidarity with ‘we the people’ or we’re going to run over you!”505
Even during the most intense ﬁghting, when Hodges and his fellow
officers were desperately engaged in a “battle of inches” fought in a
“hallway ﬁlled with smoke and screams” that they believed was the “last
line of defense before the terrorists had true access to the building, and
potentially our elected representatives,” the insurrectionists continued to
try “to convert us.”506 He remembered a man shouting, “We just want to
make our voices heard! And I think you feel the same! I really think you
feel the same!” while at the same time another man tried “to batter us with
a stolen shield.”507
The officers were in an untenable position. They were the foot
soldiers of the constitutional order of today and yesterday, facing a mob
that represents what some Americans, including powerful officials, hope
will be the constitutional order of tomorrow.508 The disorientation they
attackblack [https://perma.cc/DJ7N-9T58] (describing how the “undercurrent of racism”
was present in the mob’s treatment of Officer Dunn and Sergeant Gonell). Members of the
mob also screamed that they were traitors, but no one was trying to convert them to the
cause the mob represented, as an overt aspect of that cause was white supremacy. Statement
of Officer Harry Dunn, supra note 498, at 3. Remembering a moment when about twenty
members of the mob started screaming “nigger” at him, Officer Dunn said that in the days
that followed, other Black officers shared that they had had similar experiences. Id. One
said the insurrectionists had “told him to ‘Put your gun down and we’ll show you what kind
of nigger you really are!’” Id. One of the white officers testifying before the committee said
that members of the mob had told him, “Do not attack us! We are not Black Lives Matter!”
Statement of Officer Daniel Hodges, supra note 501, at 3.
505. Statement of Officer Daniel Hodges, supra note 501, at 3.
506. Id. at 4.
507. Id.
508. Former President Trump has promised that if he wins reelection, he will “treat
those people from January 6 fairly . . . [a]nd if it requires pardons, we will give them
pardons.” WION, Former US President Donald Trump Vow to Pardon January 6 Rioters,
Teases
3rd
Run
for
the
White House, YouTube,
at
00:17 (Jan.
30,
2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7X1JcqFIudE (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). Senator Ron Johnson (R–Wis.) has said of the January 6 insurrectionists, “[T]hose
were people that loved this country, that truly respect law enforcement, would never do
anything to break a law.” Dartunorro Clark, GOP Sen. Ron Johnson Says He Never Felt
Threatened During Jan. 6 Capitol Attack, NBC News (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/gop-sen-ron-johnson-says-he-never-feltthreatened-during-n1261024 [https://perma.cc/6ADP-E8S8]. Congresswoman Marjorie
Taylor Greene (R–Ga.) justiﬁed January 6 with the reﬂection: “[I]f you think about what
our Declaration of Independence says, it says to overthrow tyrants.” Aaron Blake, Marjorie
Taylor Greene Says Jan. 6 Riot Was in Line With the Declaration of Independence, Wash.
Post (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/26/marjorietaylor-greene-says-jan-6-riot-was-line-with-declaration-independence/ (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review). Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich called the January 6
House Committee a “lynch mob” and warned that its members “face a real risk of jail”
should power change hands. Rick Rouan, Newt Gingrich Says January 6 Investigators ‘Face
Real Risk of Jail’ if GOP Wins Congress, USA Today (Jan. 24, 2022),
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experienced during the insurrection persisted long after the riot was over
and the presidency had changed hands.509 Officer Michael Fanone
testiﬁed to the House committee that “nothing—truly nothing—has
prepared me to address those elected members of our government who
continue to deny the events of that day,” including the “very same
members whose lives, offices, staff members I was ﬁghting so desperately
to defend.”510 After a year in which various members of the party
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/01/24/newt-gingrich-january-6committee-investigators-may-face-jail/9200720002/ [https://perma.cc/8E27-N62B]. An
Ohio candidate for Senate called those arrested and in jail awaiting trial for their
involvement in the January 6 insurrection “political prisoners” and said that “their captivity
is an assault on democracy.” J.D. Vance (@JDVance1), Twitter (Jan. 6, 2022, 1:50 PM),
https://twitter.com/JDVance1/status/1479163416363384834?cxt=HHwWhIC0cnShYcpAAAA (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
509. This reﬂected a deepening schism of perspectives on our constitutional order. In
an interview months later, Officer Michael Fanone said he had rewatched the bodycam
footage from the insurrection and reﬂected on the many police officers that seemed friendly
with the rioters and on the fact that out of more than 3,000 on duty, only about 850 had
responded to the Capitol. Molly Ball, What Mike Fanone Can’t Forget, Time (Aug. 5, 2021),
https://time.com/6087577/michael-fanone-january-6-interview/
[https://perma.cc/JA4GPVUS]. During the attack, he suffered “a heart attack and a traumatic brain injury after
being tased numerous times at the base of [his] skull.” Id. He survived only by pleading for
his life. Id. But he wondered: “The vast majority of police officers—would they have been
on the other side of those battle lines?” Id.; see also Martha Bellisle & Jake Bleiberg, US
Police Weigh Officer Discipline After Rally, Capitol Riot, AP News (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/us-police-capitol-riot-980545361a10fff982676d42b79b84ab
[https://perma.cc/UG4E-ZL2P] (citing a survey ﬁnding at least thirty-one police officers in
twelve states are suspected or face criminal charges for participating in the riot). In a 2021
op-ed, three retired generals, noting the outsized involvement of veterans and active-duty
servicemen in the January 6 insurrection, warned that the “potential for a total breakdown
of the chain of command along partisan lines . . . is signiﬁcant should another insurrection
occur.” Paul D. Eaton, Antonio M. Taguba & Steven M. Anderson, Opinion, 3 Retired
Generals: The Military Must Prepare Now for a 2024 Insurrection, Wash. Post. (Dec. 17,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-andersongenerals-military/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). They explained that while
servicemembers swear “to protect the U.S. Constitution,” “in a contested election, with
loyalties split, some might follow orders from the rightful commander in chief, while others
might follow the Trumpian loser,” and “[u]nder such a scenario, it is not outlandish to say
a military breakdown could lead to civil war.” Id.
510. Law Enforcement Experience on January 6th, supra note 498, at 54:42; Michael
Fanone, Metropolitan Police Officer, Written Statement to the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol 5–6 (July 27, 2021),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IJ/IJ00/20210727/113969/HHRG-117-IJ00-WstateFanoneO-20210727.pdf [https://perma.cc/462V-B7GR]; see also Pew Rsch. Ctr., Declining
Share of Republicans Say It Is Important to Prosecute Jan. 6 Rioters 4–5 (2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/28/declining-share-of-republicans-say-itis-important-to-prosecute-jan-6-rioters/ [https://perma.cc/Q9CC-LW5T] (showing a
signiﬁcant decline in the percentage of Republicans who believed that it was important to
prosecute rioters from January 6 between March and September 2021); Tim Malloy & Doug
Schwartz, 78% of Republicans Want to See Trump Run for President in 2024, Quinnipiac
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downplayed the events of January 6, in early 2022, the Republican National
Committee committed to the position that the deadly insurrection
amounted to “legitimate political discourse.”511
We cannot be sanguine. The danger of violent movements like the
one the rioters brought to the Capitol on January 6 is not simply that they
threaten to destabilize our treasured institutions; it is that they have the
potential to remake them, to create a new order that conforms to their
demands. This is the heritage of our constitutionalism of force. Despite
the efforts of the Founding elite, ours has remained a government of the
people and by the people, as contingent on community consensus as the
unwritten constitution it replaced. The question confronting the men and
women guarding the Capitol on January 6—and so many of us watching at
home—was whether that consensus had shifted beneath their feet.

University National Poll Finds; Americans Now Split on Border Wall as Opposition Softens,
Quinnipiac Univ. Nat’l Poll (Oct. 19, 2021), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/
us10192021_uplv52.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5NU-RJXW] (ﬁnding that by October 2021,
66% of Republicans did not consider the January 6 insurrection “an attack on the
government”).
511. Republican Nat’l Comm., Resolution to Formally Censure Liz Cheney and Adam
Kinzinger and to No Longer Support Them as Members of the Republican Party (Feb. 4,
2022), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/rnc-censure-resolution/58226d40412e4f18/
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP9Y-MQ2Q]; see also Jonathan Weisman & Reid J. Epstein,
G.O.P. Declares Jan. 6 Attack ‘Legitimate Political Discourse’, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/us/politics/republicans-jan-6-cheneycensure.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (capturing the vacillation and attempts
to walk back the dramatic implications of the censure in some Republicans’ public
statements after the initial official statement).
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